Lead Consultants’
Statement
February 1999
Both USAID
and the EC have had programs of development assistance for Central America for
many years. While elements of these programs have been very successful, they
have not been coordinated. At the
same time, like most of the actors concerned with promoting development, these
funding agencies are subject to constraints that make it difficult for them to
take a long-term perspective. Central America 2020 is designed to address
these two deficiencies. The analytical time frame is long-term (covering the
years up to 2020) and the resulting recommendations will be presented to both
funding agencies as well as others involved in Central American development.
This
provides the participants in Central America 2020 a rare opportunity: to
think long-term and to plan strategically. At the same time it presents some
notable difficulties. Previous models may not be of much assistance in thinking
about Central American development over the next generation, while events inside
the region will be conditioned to a large extent—as always—by developments
outside the region. However, it is not impossible to develop plausible scenarios
within which development in Central America will proceed between now and the
year 2020. The project research
team seek to construct such scenarios, taking into account several trends that
we believe shape the region’s development alternatives.
First, the
trend towards globalization will continue.
World product and factor markets will become more integrated in the next
generation and the global architecture for overseeing these changes—the WTO,
ILO, UN, World Bank, IMF, etc.—will become less imperfect.
In responding to this trend, the nation-state will become less relevant
and regions will acquire greater influence.
For smaller economies, such as those in Central America, this trend poses
special problems. As marginal members of the world economy, even when grouped
as a region, their influence on events will be very small; at the same time, the
special trading arrangements established for exports to developed countries
(e.g., the Caribbean Basin Initiative with the US and the Cooperation Agreement
with the European Union) may not survive the shift towards multilateral trade
preferences at the global level.
Secondly,
hemispheric integration will advance further.
This prediction may seem bold in the light of the difficulties facing the
project to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005.
However, hemispheric integration is simply the other side of the
globalization coin. It began before the FTAA project was launched and it will
continue even if the FTAA is not established.
The issue for Central America, therefore, is how to position itself best
to take advantage of the trend towards hemispheric integration.
Once again, the danger is one of marginalization from a process that will
be dominated by larger countries and sub-regions.
Thirdly, the
demographic transition now under way in Central America will continue. The Crude
Birth Rate and the fertility rate will fall, but not by enough to prevent an
increase in population. Most of
this increase will take place in urban areas over the next generation, though
the rural population will also experience some increase. These demographic changes have implications for Central
American development; the labor force will expand over the next generation, a
higher proportion of the poor will be found in urban areas, and pressures on the
environment—in both urban and rural areas—will be intense.
Fourthly,
migration patterns will become more complex and will affect a greater part of
the population. In addition to the
standard migration route northwards to the United States, Central Americans are
increasingly aware of opportunities elsewhere in the hemisphere.
We expect these patterns to intensify in the next generation; at the same
time, there is likely to be reverse or circular migration along the lines found
in some Caribbean states, where movement to and from the United States is very
common. These migration patterns
provide opportunities that were previously not available as well as tangible
resources through remittances, but they also pose a challenge for
nation-building, educational advancement and the avoidance of inter-state
conflict.
Fifthly,
minorities in Central America (in Guatemala, the Indian majority) will become
more assertive in pursuit of their civil, political and economic rights.
This trend, common to the hemisphere as a whole, will place a great
strain on the political system in each country as it is forced to become less
exclusionary and more representative. Recommendations
which do nothing to further the process of inclusion in Central America or which
are likely to exacerbate the problem through increasing concentration of income
and wealth are not viable in the present and future context.
It is
important to be clear about the goals of Central America 2020 and the
definition of terms. We have
defined Central America to include Panama and Belize as well as Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
The year 2020 should not be interpreted literally, but should be
understood to demarcate an analytical time frame of about two decades.
Thus we adopt a broad definition of the region and seek to look one
generation ahead.
The
principle underlying Central America 2020 and the choice of research
themes is the promotion of development. In
the project’s initial formulation, we defined development as a dynamic,
multi-dimensional process consisting of:
Sustainable
economic growth;
Improved
social welfare; and
Guarantees
of citizenship across all social categories, including gender and ethnicity.
We believe
that this is a robust definition of development, but it was written before
Hurricane Mitch hit the region with such devastating effect in November 1998.
We do not think that the definition should now be rewritten, but Mitch
served as a terrible reminder of the vulnerability of the region to disasters
and the limited capacity of the state to respond effectively when disaster
strikes. “Sustainability” has acquired special significance in the
Central American context: natural
disasters in Central America cannot be avoided, but they should not be
exacerbated by human action, nor should their consequences be made worse by
state incapacity or incompetence.
The research
for Central America 2020 therefore pays special attention to both the
environment and the role of the state, with the goal of generating a set of
recommendations that can lead to a strengthening of environmental protection
without placing unrealistic demands on the public sector.
These are legitimate concerns since the efforts by Central American
countries to recover from the disastrous years of the 1980s have done little to
reverse the cumulative damage to the environment and have revealed the
limitations of the state to address economic, social and political problems in
the current context.
There are
other issues that cut across all the individual studies.
First is the relationship between the market and civil society.
We do not intend to challenge the new orthodoxy in favor of
market-friendly policies, which we believe to be an appropriate orientation and
a viable goal for the next two decades. We
are, however, concerned that the new orthodoxy in support of free markets should
encourage the strengthening of civil society and should not exacerbate social
exclusion. Some policies will
enhance free markets and civil society, but this is not always the
case—occasionally there is a trade-off
Another
crucial issue is regionalism. Central
America 2020 has a regional focus, but does not ignore the national or
sub-national levels of analysis. However,
special attention is given to identifying opportunities for a regional scope of
action in the promotion of development wherever this seems appropriate.
Finally, we intend for the recommendations that emerge
from the project to be viable. This
does not mean they should be timid. On the contrary, as noted above, we believe
that Central America 2020 offers a rare opportunity for being bold and
pushing forward the boundaries of what is possible. At present, few—if any—government leaders in the region
can afford to take a long view and the result is a series of short-term measures
unlikely to add up to a coherent long-term strategy. We want to be able to propose development strategies to
governments and key actors in the region that will go beyond the patchwork of
measures currently in place and hold out the prospect of substantive
improvements in each of the three facets of development identified above.
A. Douglas Kincaid (kincaidd@fiu.edu)
Victor Bulmer-Thomas (V.Bulmer-Thomas@sas.ac.uk)
February 1999