Sustainable
Development in Central America: |
This
publication was made possible through financial support provided by the Office
of Regional and Sustainable Development, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC),
U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of Grant No.
LAG-G-00-98-00048-00 and the Commission of the European Union. The opinions
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Commission of
the European Union.
CA 2020: Working Paper # 8
Charles T. Call
Sustainable development in
central america:
the challenges of violence,
injustice and insecurity
Charles T. Call
Sustainable Development in Central America: The Challenges of Violence,
Injustice and Insecurity
Hamburg: Institut für
Iberoamerika-Kunde 2000
(CA 2020: Working Paper # 8)
ISBN 3-926446-678
Charles T.
Call; Assistant Professor at Brown
University’s Watson Institute for International Studies. He has published on
police reforms and peacekeeping, human rights and democratization in Latin
America. With the support of the MacArthur Foundation, he is currently writing
a book on policing and international security in post-war settings. He has
served as consultant to the Ford Foundation, the U.S. Justice Department and
Human Rights Watch. He received his Ph.D. from Stanford University in political
science.
Executive Summary 1
Resumen Ejecutivo 4
1. Introduction:
Violence and Insecurity in Central America 7
1.1. How Serious are Violence and Insecurity in Central America? 8
1.2. Increased
Violence and Insecurity: Why? 11
2. Challenges left by Recent Security Reforms: Policing and Violence
Prevention 15
2.1. Preventive
Police Forces 17
2.1.1.
Demilitarization & Civilianization 17
2.1.2.
Depoliticization 20
2.1.3.
Equipment 21
2.1.4.
Quality of Personnel 22
2.1.5.
Representativity 25
2.1.6.
Specialized Units 28
2.2. Private
Security Agencies 29
2.3.
Criminal Investigative Capabilities 32
2.4. Human
Rights and Accountability of Police and Judicial Authorities 34
2.5.
“Globalization” and Regional Police Cooperation 38
2.6. Arms
Control 39
3. Challenges
left by Recent Judicial Reforms: The Judiciary and Violence Prevention 41
3.1.
Greater Judicial Autonomy and Accountability 44
3.2.
Greater Access to Justice for the Poor 46
3.3.
Expanded Access for Indigenous Peoples to Justice and Security 50
3.4. Reconceptualizing
Rehabilitation 52
3.5.
Alternative
Dispute Resolution 52
4. Challenges for Civil Society in Violence
Prevention 54
4.1.
Research and Civil Society Expertise 55
4.2.
Civil Society Advocacy 56
4.3. Community-Based
Programs, Municipalities and Community-Oriented Policing 58
4.4.
The Role of the Media and Public
Education 62
4.5.
Youth Violence Prevention Programs 64
5. Recommendations 67
Bibliography 74
Experts
have recently recognized the need to address problems of violence, insecurity
and injustice in order to advance processes of socio-economic development. In
addition to their obvious harm to everyday human life, violence and insecurity
carry economic costs, pose dangers to democratization, pose health burdens, and
threaten whatever social fabric exists. In Central America, violence and insecurity
are especially pertinent to medium- and long-term development. Despite
experiencing an end to bloody wars, improved human rights, and positive
economic growth during the 1990s, the region during the past decade experienced
alarming increases in criminal violence. In El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras, homicide rates reached alarming proportions in the late 1990s – much
higher than almost every country in the world in 1997. Even in long-democratic
Costa Rica, the homicide rate jumped by 41% between 1991 and 1998. Increases in
murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and car theft have come to symbolize the
disintegration of public security after the end of regional wars, even though
all violent crimes did not rise in every country.
Ironically,
the rise in violence has occurred alongside sweeping security and justice
reforms throughout the region. Reforms have included steps to demilitarize
internal policing, reductions in partisan influence over policing and
judiciaries, new police doctrines which formally embrace human rights and
citizen protection, new government ombudsman’s offices designed to protect
human rights, new laws providing greater guarantees to detainees and criminal
suspects, criminal penalties for intrafamilial violence, and more agile and
open criminal justice procedures. This paper examines the accomplishments and
shortcomings of these reform efforts. It also examines the rapidly evolving
role of civil society in security and justice issues.
In
general, the study finds that Central America’s justice and internal security
systems are generally more civilian, more professional, and more accountable
than they were twenty years ago. Government institutions in this area have
experienced tremendous advances, and civil society is more engaged, informed,
and active with regard to these issues than at any time in the region’s
history. Similarly, international judicial and police assistance programs show
some significant improvements over the past decade. USAID, for example, has
gone beyond code reform and the creation of specialized police units to focus
more on the overall institutional context of criminal justice reforms. Human
rights now occupy a central place in the conceptualization and implementation
of donor projects, as the region is firmly embedded in an international context
formally committed to individual rights and democratic forms of governance.
Nevertheless,
serious shortcomings remain. Popular dissatisfaction with judicial processes
and police conduct reveal continuing challenges with no ready fixes. Dramatic
rises in indicators of violence exemplify the challenges faced. So do instances
of people taking justice and security into their own hands, such as local
lynchings of petty thieves and the proliferation of private security agencies.
Police forces are not fully effective, having failed to establish a
relationship of trust, proximity, and service to communities. Judicial systems
remain highly corrupt, partisan, and inaccessible to rural, poor, and
marginalized populations. Civil society organizations as well as governments
require further expertise, along with the ability to translate that expertise
into effective policy. International programs have failed to fully recognize
these defects and remedy them.
The
central recommendation of this study is that Central American actors and
international donors seek long-term, multifaceted preventive approaches to
adequately address problems of violence and insecurity. No simple,
straightforward solutions exist. Consequently, policies that focus on single
governmental agencies, such as the police, or on single-minded strategies, such
as code reform, are unlikely to succeed. Instead, coordinated preventive
measures are necessary, including youth programs, media efforts, and education
about violence and its causes, as well as reconceptualized, strengthened, and
accountable policing strategies and judicial institutions. Researchers of
violence from fields as diverse as health, economics, and sociology are convinced
that violence-reduction requires multi-year, multidisciplinary preventive
approaches involving multiple governmental agencies working in tandem with
civil society.
Integrated
violence prevention will involve reoriented security and justice policies on a
number of levels. Central America’s governments and non-governmental
organizations confront genuine problems of resources for confronting violence
and providing security and justice. A strategic response to the realities and
opportunities outlined in this document will require addressing three broader
challenges in the coming decades: (1) the development of a new,
reconceptualized security framework appropriate for the region; (2) addressing
the problems of uneven and unequal access to justice and security; and (3) the
enhancement of civil society’s capacities, roles, and input in violence
prevention policies.
For most
of Central America’s inhabitants, the region’s systems of security and justice
have historically inspired fear, distrust, and alienation. International
actors have frequently contributed to the problems of injustice and insecurity
in the region. However, for the first time in decades, conditions in the region
and the rest of the world offer the chance to build on new principles,
political regimes, and organizations to stem violence through long-term,
integrated, multifaceted prevention efforts. We have much yet to learn about
which prevention programs work and how well, but the present window of
opportunity for building such long-term preventive programs is too important to
ignore.
En época reciente los expertos han empezado a reconocer que para asegurar
el avance de los procesos de desarrollo social y económico se requiere abordar
los problemas de la violencia, la injusticia y la inseguridad. Aparte del obvio
menoscabo que causan a la vida de las personas, estos fenómenos comportan
además un costo económico, constituyen un peligro para la democratización,
representan un riesgo para la salud y amenazan la existencia del tejido social.
En América Central, la violencia y la inseguridad son aspectos de especial
relevancia para el desarrollo a mediano y largo plazo. A pesar del término de
los conflictos armados, de un mayor respeto por los derechos humanos y del
crecimiento económico experimentado durante los años 90, en el último decenio
se ha venido produciendo un alarmante aumento de la violencia criminal en toda
la región. Hacia fines de los 90 la tasa de homicidios en El Salvador,
Guatemala y Honduras alcanzaba proporciones alarmantes, superando en 1997 a la
de casi el resto del mundo. Incluso en Costa Rica, país de larga tradición
democrática, entre 1991 y 1998 la tasa de homicidios aumentó en un 41%. Si bien
es cierto que no todos los países experimentaron un aumento de los delitos de
violencia, el incremento general de los homicidios, secuestros, asaltos a mano
armada y robo de automóviles ha llegado a simbolizar la desintegración de la
seguridad pública después del término de las guerras en la región.
No deja de ser irónico comprobar que el aumento de la violencia ocurre
al tiempo que en toda la región los ámbitos de la seguridad y la administración
de justicia están siendo sometidos a un proceso de reforma orientado a
desmilitarizar las fuerzas policiales, morigerar la influencia
político-partidista sobre la policía y el poder judicial, formalizar una nueva
doctrina policial de protección ciudadana y respeto por los derechos humanos,
crear defensorías del pueblo que velen por los derechos de las personas,
promulgar nuevos cuerpos legales que otorguen garantías a detenidos y
sospechosos, imponer sanciones penales a la violencia intrafamiliar e instaurar
procedimientos judiciales y penales más ágiles y abiertos. En este estudio se
pasa revista a los logros y falencias de estas reformas y se analiza la rápida
evolución del papel de la sociedad civil en los ámbitos de la seguridad y la
justicia.
En términos generales, el estudio concluye que en la América Central
de hoy los sistemas judiciales y de seguridad interior son menos militarizados,
más profesionales y más responsables ante la sociedad que hace veinte años
atrás. En este plano las instituciones de gobierno han experimentado enormes
avances, al tiempo que la sociedad civil se muestra más participativa,
informada y activa respecto de estos temas que en cualquier otro momento en la
historia de la región. Asimismo, se observan durante el último decenio mejoras
significativas en los programas internacionales de asistencia judicial y
policial. USAID, por ejemplo, ya no apoya tan sólo la reforma de los códigos o
la creación de unidades policiales especializadas, sino que además privilegia
el contexto institucional de una reforma procesal penal de carácter general.
Los derechos humanos actualmente ocupan un lugar central en la
conceptualización e implementación de los proyectos de los países donantes, en
tanto que la región se encuentra firmemente asentada en un contexto
internacional de compromiso formal con los derechos individuales y la
gobernabilidad democrática.
No obstante lo anterior, subsisten serias falencias. El descontento
popular con los procedimientos judiciales y la conducta policial revela la
persistencia de problemas que no son de fácil solución. El impactante aumento
de los hechos de violencia ejemplifica la magnitud del desafío; lo propio
ocurre con incidentes en que las personas se toman la justicia y la seguridad
en sus propias manos, fenómeno manifestado en hechos tales como el linchamiento
de delincuentes y la proliferación de servicios privados de seguridad. Las
eficacia de las fuerzas policiales dista mucho de ser la adecuada, entre otros
motivos porque éstas no han podido establecer una relación de confianza,
cercanía y servicio con la comunidad. Los sistemas judiciales siguen siendo
extremadamente corruptos y parciales e inaccesibles para la población rural,
pobre o marginalizada. Las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y los gobiernos
necesitan de una mayor asesoría especializada, así como la capacidad para
transformar esa asesoría en políticas eficaces. Los programas de cooperación
internacional no han sido capaces de reconocer a cabalidad estos defectos, y
por ende de aportar a remediarlos.
La recomendación central de este estudio es que, para abordar de forma
adecuada los problemas de la violencia y la inseguridad, los actores
centroamericanos y la cooperación internacional deben buscar un enfoque
multifacético y de largo plazo. No existen soluciones simples y fáciles, de
modo que las políticas que sólo apunten a mejorar un determinado aspecto – los
servicios policiales, por ejemplo – o las estrategias que privilegien un ámbito
determinado – tal como la reforma de los códigos – no tienen mayores
probabilidades de alcanzar sus objetivos. Lo que hace falta son medidas
preventivas coordinadas, entre ellas programas orientados a la juventud,
campañas de prensa, formación sobre la violencia y sus causas y estrategias
policiales e instituciones judiciales reconceptualizadas, fortalecidas y con un
sentido de responsabilidad ante la sociedad. Los estudios sobre el fenómeno de
la violencia realizados por especialistas provenientes de disciplinas tan
diversas como la salud, la economía y la sociología coinciden en señalar que su
reducción requiere de propuestas multidisciplinarias de largo aliento, en las
cuales trabajen de común acuerdo una multiplicidad de servicios públicos y la
sociedad civil.
Una propuesta integral de prevención de la violencia requiere repensar
las políticas que informan los temas de seguridad y justicia a diversos
niveles. Los gobiernos centroamericanos y las ONGs carecen de los recursos que
se necesitan para hacer frente a la violencia y entregar seguridad y justicia.
Una respuesta estratégica a las realidades y oportunidades que se esbozan en
este estudio requiere que en los próximos decenios se aborden tres importante
desafíos: 1) El desarrollo de un marco reconceptualizado de seguridad para la
región; 2) El problema del acceso desigual a la justicia y la seguridad; y 3)
La potenciación de las capacidades, papel y aporte de la sociedad civil en la
formulación de políticas de prevención de la violencia.
Para la mayoría de la población de
América Central, los sistemas regionales de seguridad y justicia han
históricamente inspirado temor, desconfianza y animadversión. Más aún, los
actores internacionales han contribuido frecuentemente a agudizar los problemas
de injusticia e inseguridad. No obstante, por primera vez en muchos años, las
condiciones en la región y en el resto del mundo ofrecen la oportunidad de
desarrollar nuevos principios, regímenes políticos y organismos para controlar
la violencia a partir de un trabajo preventivo integral, multifacético y de largo
plazo. Todavía queda mucho por aprender respecto de qué programas de prevención
son los mejores y hasta qué punto funcionan, pero la oportunidad que se
presenta hoy para desarrollar este tipo de programas preventivos de largo
plazo es demasiado propicia como para ser desaprovechada.
In recent
years, economists, health specialists, sociologists, political scientists, and
psychologists have come to believe that issues of security and justice must be
addressed to comprehend fully the nature and possibilities for socio-economic
development[1].
A 1997 World Bank study (World Bank 1997: i) recognized this relatively new
perspective for international development institutions, concluding that “crime
and violence have emerged in recent years as major obstacles to the realization
of development objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Violence and
physical insecurity carry social and human costs that undermine the overall
quality of life[2].
Through injuries and deaths, violence exacts a concrete financial cost in human
work years for society. A weak rule of law creates uncertainty in land tenure,
contracts, and other economic transactions. It provides incentives for
citizens and groups to seek alternative, informal, or private means of justice
and security, such as lynchings, which may deepen inequities and remain
unaccountable. Furthermore, if governments are unable to protect citizens from
violence in society, then unconsolidated democratic practices may be
threatened by calls for a reversion to authoritarianism, jeopardizing the
political environment for foreign investment and sustainable, equitable
economic development.
In Central
America, violence is especially pertinent to medium- and long-term development.
A region known internationally for its internal wars and human rights
violations during the 1980s, Central America has since become known for a
different sort of violence: violent common crime. Although some countries of
the region have maintained remarkably low crime rates, others, especially
countries that were directly affected by warfare, have seen crime rates
skyrocket. Crime now consistently ranks among the top public concerns in
opinion polls, threatening peace-building, democratization, and
demilitarization experiences which have been viewed in other parts of the
developing world as surprisingly smooth.
Latin
America, with a homicide rate of 30/100.000, was considered the most violent
region in the world during the 1990s[3].
El Salvador topped some global murder rankings in 1996 with a homicide rate of
139 per 100.000 — thirteen times more violent than the United States’ lamentably
high 10/100.000 rate and over twenty times the global average of 5/100.000
(Cruz et al. 1997, Londono 1996). El Salvador’s murder rate dropped in 1998,
but even in long-democratic Costa Rica, the homicide rate jumped by 41% between
1991 and that year (see Table 1).
Table 1: Violent Deaths per 100.000[4]
Central America, 1991-98[5]
Country |
1991 |
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
Guatemala |
63.7 |
67.5 |
63.5 |
69.8 |
68.3 |
66.9 |
75.2 |
76.9 |
El Salvador |
- |
- |
- |
164.5 (9135) |
149.7 (8485) |
139.0 (8047) |
145.1 (8573) |
82.4 (4970) |
Honduras |
- |
- |
- |
38.2 (2202) |
36.8 (2192) |
37.2 (2287) |
41.0 (2520) |
40.7 (2505) |
Nicaragua |
18.3 (732) |
20.0 (826) |
17.8 (762) |
16.5 (725) |
15.6 (707) |
15.6 (662) |
15.0 (679) |
13.3 (639) |
Costa Rica |
4.1 (132) |
4.9 (160) |
4.8 (160) |
5.3 (182) |
5.2 (184) |
5.2 (189) |
5.7 (210) |
5.8 (222) |
During the
1990s, kidnappings for ransom increased dramatically in Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras, and armed robberies of banks, armored cars, and automobiles
became daily fare. In Guatemala, the total number of crimes reported increased
by 50% between 1996 and 1998. In Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala,
kidnappings affected not just wealthy families, but middle-class families as
well. Youth gangs proliferated, increasing violence and fear among juveniles.
This excerpt from one US newspaper summed up concerns about crime and justice
in post-war Guatemala: “Lawyers and judges, not to mention ordinary citizens,
worry that police and the courts have become the weak link that will destroy
their hopes of forging a new, democratic Guatemala from the scrap metal of the
genocidal civil war that ended in 1996”[6].
Although
surges in crime were most pronounced in El Salvador and Guatemala, the
remainder of the region experienced increases in violence, too, especially in
the early 1990s. Crimes against persons in Nicaragua, for instance, almost
tripled, from 9.392 in 1991 to 25.804 in 1998 (Policía Nacional). In Costa
Rica, crimes against life and personal integrity increased by 67% between 1989
and 1993 (Zamora Cordero 1997: 308). Perceptions of violence and crime have
also climbed in the region, with polls showing that these issues are
increasingly considered to be among the main problems facing societies. From
the least violent country in the region, Costa Rica, to the most violent, El
Salvador, over two-thirds of all crimes go unreported – meaning the figures
understate the scale of the problem[7].
The most
prevalent form of violence in the region remains largely invisible in public
discourse: intrafamilial violence. Although a serious problem throughout the
region, intrafamilial violence remains underreported and incompletely
addressed by state and social actors. In Costa Rica, whose homicide rate is
one-twentieth of El Salvador’s, some 36% of those polled reported that a woman
in their household had suffered physical abuse at the hands of a husband or
domestic partner[8].
Laws prohibiting intrafamilial violence have only begun to be implemented, and
statistical tracking of the scope of the problem is extremely poor. Necessary
transformation of longstanding male-dominated intrafamilial power relations
will be difficult and slow.
Although
politically motivated violence fell off sharply, social conflict was an
increasingly important, but diffuse and variable, source of violence in the
region during the 1990s[9].
As armed struggle is decreasingly seen as an option to remedy perceived or
real social ills, protests, strikes, and other forms of social conflict will
likely persist as a principal source of collective violence. Finding ways to
prevent such conflicts from becoming violent, and to defuse them with minimal
force, are challenges which will persist in the coming decades. As exemplified
by televised images of Salvadoran police officers beating unarmed paraplegic
war veterans in 1995, how the state handles social protests will shape the
legitimacy and citizen support enjoyed by public authorities.
Finally,
state actors themselves continue to be an important source of violence and
crime. The nature of human rights violations has changed dramatically with the
end of civil wars and the reduction in serious political crimes such as
disappearance, torture, and assassination. However, the undue use of force by
police, increased violation of due process, the involvement of some police and
military personnel in violent crimes, and politically motivated crimes
(especially in Guatemala) persist as important direct sources of insecurity
and indirect impediments to social trust and community rapport.
What
factors lie behind this recent surge of violence and insecurity in Central
America? Only recently have researchers begun to conduct serious studies of the
nature and causes of non-political violence in Central America. Although
analysts devoted extensive attention to the political violence which swept most
of the region during the 1970s and 1980s, other sorts of violence — social
violence, criminal violence, and domestic violence — received hardly any
attention. Recently the situation has changed, and crime especially has
received greater attention within the region.
As Moser
(1996: 1) points out, however, “crime” and “violence” are not equivalent[10].
Violence may involve nothing illegal (e.g., the beating or rape of one’s spouse
is not a crime in some societies), just as some crimes (e.g., fraud, bribery,
perjury) may not involve violence. In developed countries, crime has received
significantly more attention than violence per se, except where that violence
has reflected organized political or interstate warfare[11].
Therefore,
research on crime in developed countries is a useful point of reference,
although much of the work of criminologists has focused on crime and its causes
rather than violence. Studies of crime in developed countries have shown that
multiple factors, rather than a single decisive factor, are associated with
levels of crime. These “associated” factors include a wide array of social and
economic conditions which go well beyond the purview of the state’s judicial
and security apparatus. Although very few studies exist of criminal behavior in
Central America, political and sociological studies of the region point to a
series of factors associated with crime, especially violent crime. These
factors include:
(1) The aftermath of war, including (a) a surfeit of arms available throughout
the region at relatively affordable prices; (b) thousands of demobilized
ex-soldiers and ex-guerrillas, trained in the use of arms, uprooted mainly from
rural homes and lifestyles, and organized into networks accustomed to exerting
power over civilians; (c) a socialization to violence, with populations accustomed
to seeing violence as the means to resolve conflicts, a generation of children
inured to the effects of violence, and individuals uprooted from communities
and families where they felt a greater sense of belonging and accountability;
and (d) the necessary disruption of legal systems, internal security forces and
other state enforcement mechanisms which, while meriting serious reforms,
deterred criminal behavior[12].
A conservative estimate of the number of demobilized combatants in Central
America since 1990 (see Table 2) shows that almost half a million persons
trained in violence have had to seek new employment in difficult post-war
economies.
Table 2
Combatants Demobilized, 1990-1997, Central America[13]
|
Soldiers Demobilized |
Guerillas Demobilized |
PACs/Paramilitaries Demobilized |
Total Demobilized |
Guatemala |
14.000 |
500 (a) |
279.421 (a) |
293.921 |
El Salvador |
24.500 |
12.362 (e) |
30.000 (f) |
66.862 |
Honduras |
7.085 |
0 (c) |
5.000 (c) |
12.085 |
Nicaragua |
72.726 |
19.000 (c) |
0 |
91.726 |
Cost Rica |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Panama |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Belize |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
TOTAL |
118.311 |
31.862 |
314.421 |
464.594 |
(2) Central America’s penetrability. Due to its small size and strategic
geographic location bridging South and North America, the region is vulnerable
to international organized crime such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration,
and auto theft rings (Chinchilla and Rico 1997:9). The small size of the
region’s economies and their small tax bases make it difficult for states to
afford a sophisticated state law enforcement capable of confronting organized
international criminal networks.
(3) Extreme and apparent unequal patterns of wealth, income, and consumption
in the region which fuel frustration and make illegal acquisition of wealth
more attractive.
(4) Deficient judicial systems. Despite a need for research on the
relationship between injustice and violence in the region, the low probability
of arrest, conviction, and incarceration provide little incentive for
conformity with the law, especially in countries such as Guatemala and El
Salvador where impunity is rampant[14]:
All of
these broader political, economic and social conditions are associated with
increases in violence and crime in other societies, and research on Latin
America points to their relevance in the Central American region as well[15]:
Any long-term attempt to prevent violence and improve citizen security in the
region should incorporate policies aimed at addressing these social,
educational, and economic conditions which provide incentives and
disincentives for criminal behavior.
The severe
problems of violence, insecurity, and the absence of a fully effective rule of
law in the 1990s in Central America have occurred alongside efforts to improve
the performance of police and judicial institutions. Contrary to what one might
expect, judicial and police reforms embedded in dramatic transitions from war
to peace have coincided with more,
rather than less, violence. Over the
past fifteen years international donors have supported, even sparked, attempts
to reform the region’s judiciaries and police forces[16].
International reform attempts have been driven by several, often competing
interests such as suppressing communist guerrilla movements, improving the
climate for investment, generating stability abroad, fighting drug trafficking,
promoting peace processes, consolidating democracy, and advancing human rights.
Particularly important in the judicial reform efforts of USAID and
international financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development
Bank and the World Bank have been concerns over improving the climate for
international economic and financial transactions and investment[17].
In general, these efforts have tended to emphasize legal reform and the
modernization and professionalization of governmental institutions, focusing on
national-level judiciaries and police forces rather than local-level or
indigenous policing or conflict resolution mechanisms. They have also tended to
stress efficiency and professionalism, with only recent concern with access to
the poor and accountability[18].
Economistic and health approaches to violence reduction have emphasized,
perhaps to excess, the economic costs of violence, measured through indicators
such as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), health system costs, lost
productivity, etc. (Rubio 1998, World Bank 1997, Buvinic et al. 1998). While
such measures might have been necessary to get health and financial institutions
to begin to examine issues of violence, broader “human” costs of violence — be
they social, emotional, psychological or political — also merit consideration.
These
recent reform efforts have had some important results. Throughout the region,
governments have introduced national-level police forces that are separate from
the armed forces high command and Ministries of Defense. Moreover, with the
possible exception of Nicaragua (which underwent some reform in 1979), police
forces enjoy higher quality personnel than they did ten years ago thanks to
higher salaries, more stringent selection standards, better education and
specialization, and improved career assurances. Most Central American police
forces are more autonomous from political parties than they were fifteen years
ago, and their public image and profile are more positive than before reforms
occurred. Similarly, those serving on the region’s judiciaries enjoy greater
independence, professionalism, and career assurances than they did fifteen years
ago. More “modern” criminal procedures codes, including expanded reliance upon
oral trials and accusatory systems, have also been introduced throughout the
region. Moreover, organizational mechanisms for the protection of human rights
— including Human Rights Ombudsmen, constitutional and legal due process
guarantees, and legislative and regulatory oversight offices — have contributed
to the overall level of accountability and recourse for victims of abuse.
Yet,
recent reforms have not eliminated severe deficiencies among the judicial and
internal security systems of the region. The dramatic increase in perceived and
recorded crime is testament to the ineffectiveness of reformed police forces
in preventing and investigating crimes and of judicial systems in adjudicating
criminal cases. Despite receiving extensive equipment and training assistance
from donors, criminal investigative units remain plagued with serious problems
of incompetence, corruption, and penetration by organized crime. In general, internationally
backed reforms have proven better at getting rid of “bad” old traits such as
overt militarization and politicization than at introducing “good” new police
and judicial practices which are effective, accountable, and publicly accepted
and supported. Even where new police and judicial personnel have been part of
revamped criminal justice systems, corruption has persisted. Indigenous
communities, even those which have some local conflict resolution mechanisms,
fall almost wholly outside the formal justice system, and domestic violence is
extremely serious (Heise 1994; Buvenic, Morrison and Shifter 1998; Morrison and
Biehl 1999). Perhaps most important, the great majority of Central Americans
continue to regard procedural justice as something to which wealthy and
well-connected individuals have access, but marginalized sectors — especially
the poor, uneducated, women, indigenous persons, and children — do not.
Below I
examine the accomplishments and shortcomings of reforms as they relate to three
broad groups of actors: citizen security; judicial systems and the rule of law;
and civil society as protagonist in issues of security and justice.
Since
1989, police reform efforts in Central America, backed by international donor
programs and policies, have gone far to reduce military influence and
characteristics within the police forces of the region. Whereas only three
police forces were formally independent of the armed forces high command in
1978, now all seven countries enjoy police forces which are separate from the
military, under civilian-led ministries[19]. As the
decades-long formal separation from the military of Guatemala’s National Police
illustrates, however, nominal separation from the armed forces high command
does not guarantee a civilian-oriented police force.
Other
elements of the demilitarization of policing in Central America underscore the
important advances achieved in the 1990s. The police doctrine of most Central
American countries now emphasizes not the defense of the state or the
constitutional order, but the service and protection of citizens. This shift is
enshrined in new police academies created largely to remove military influence
and the old focus on state security. In Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras,
the creation of new police forces also separated senior police officials who
used to be active-duty military members from the army and its chain of command.
In addition, side arms more appropriate for the minimal use of force replaced
long firearms in the hands of everyday patrol agents in most of the region's
police forces. Domestic intelligence services, formerly under military control
in most of the region, have passed to civilian command in every country. In
general, internationally backed reform efforts have been relatively successful
at purging the prior influence of the military from the region’s new civilian
policing[20].
However,
it has been easier to remove formal military traits from policing than it has
been to create sustainable, internalized (among police personnel) and socially
accepted (among the population) models of civilian
policing centered upon citizen protection. Most of the instructors in police
academies in Panama, Honduras, and Guatemala are the same instructors that
served under the prior militarized system[21]. Internal
regimens of police academies throughout the region emphasize a military-like
corporate identity, reinforcing "us-vs.-them" attitudes toward the
general population. The use of Spanish Civil Guard personnel to oversee
training of the new National Civilian Police in Guatemala has elicited
criticism for an excessive militarism in the content and form of education
(Byrne, Garst and Stanley 1999; Stanley and Holiday 2000).
Central
Americans dissatisfied with the old way of policing have not embraced any clear
alternative — either conceptually or operationally — to prevailing structures.
In Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador, and Honduras, police agents continue to live
in barracks or police stations rather than in their own homes or rented rooms
in the communities they serve[22].
Police in many countries (Nicaragua and Costa Rica are exceptions) continue to
patrol mainly in large groups in the back of pick-up trucks, rather than
circulating and interacting with members of a specific beat. High levels of
violent crime together with extremely high on-duty death rates for police
officers have contributed to a sense of distrust among Salvadoran, Guatemalan,
and Honduran police toward the population.
Consolidation
of the gains in civilianization will be a challenge for the next two or three
decades in Central America. The effort will involve not only the continued
institutional development of national police forces' autonomous operational,
planning, and budgeting capabilities, but also a learning process of
interaction with superior ministry-level officials and with collaborating
governmental agencies. Continued definition of militaries’ roles in internal
security will affect this process. The largely U.S.-inspired push to
“militarize” anti-narcotics activities endangers gains in civilianization[23].
Moreover, serious debate with civil and political society about the nature of
"civilian," "democratic" and/or "community-oriented"
policing in the region would help define what model of policing will succeed
the old military models as appropriate and optimal for each society in the
region[24].
One of the
causes offered for the militarization of policing in Central America during the
Cold War was the political partisanship within some countries’ police forces
from the 1930s through the 1950s[25].
One of the most overlooked achievements of the Central American peace processes
is the initiation of police forces which are under civilian control but are not
controlled by a single political party or used for overtly partisan purposes.
For perhaps the first time in Central American history, police demilitarization
has not led to partisanship.
However,
political party influence persists in some countries of the region. In Costa
Rica, legislators in the late 1990s rejected a bid to eliminate the ability of
the winning political party to appoint most mid-level police commanders
following every presidential election[26]. Their
concern was that the reduction of party influence would open the way to an
autonomous, semi-militarized police force which would, like the constabularies
of Panama and Nicaragua in the 1930s and 1940s, become a powerful unopposed
armed force mired in political governance (Millett 1977, Guevara Mann 1996,
Arias Calderon 1994). This concern is understandable; however, such practices
are not necessarily advisable. When police appointments, promotions, and
longevity are based upon non-merit considerations, technical police competence
suffers. In Nicaragua, despite a high degree of political partisanship in
police selection and promotion, police-community relations remain relatively
positive except in some formerly conflictive zones. Since 1996, with a new
police organic law and amidst great pressure from the U.S. Congress, the
Nicaraguan government has taken steps to reduce partisan criteria in police
selection and assignments.
Because
international technical advice to police forces usually costs relatively
little, the majority of international police aid tends to take the form of
equipment and training courses[27].
Despite the attention given by donor country officials to the broader
institutional context and overall institutional development of police and
judicial institutions, the nuts and bolts of such aid programs are generally
the delivery of equipment and training courses. Consequently, the “tail” can
begin “wagging the dog,” as delivery of goods and services becomes an end in
itself. Success may end up being measured by how many courses and pieces of
equipment have been delivered to the satisfaction of the recipient police
force, rather than the quality of overall institutional development, including
how well equipment is maintained, how well trainees incorporate their training
into operations, and how effectiveness and community-police relations improve
as a result of training and better equipment. Often equipment is not the most
urgent or appropriate requirement for police operations. “Clientitis” can also
be a problem; donor-country police professionals charged with developing
assistance plans may err too far on the side of taking counterpart officials’
preferences into account, uncritically accepting their requests without a view
to the overall institutional development of the police (or judicial, etc.)
agency involved.
Despite
the limitations and problems of providing equipment to foreign police forces,
Central America’s police forces have important equipment requirements and are
likely to have them for the next two decades. Although budgets for national
police forces increased significantly during the late 1990s, the number of
patrol officers per vehicle remains high, reducing the ability of police agents
to circulate in small numbers among the population. Access to computerized data
and networks remains limited, although these needs vary from country to country[28].
Objective diagnoses of equipment needs are imperative and can best be met by
international cooperation.
Recent
police reforms in most of the region have left the quality of police recruits
and officers much improved over twenty years ago. As policing is increasingly
viewed as a profession, forced recruitment has ended and higher selection
standards have been adopted. These changes are most pronounced in El Salvador
and Guatemala; Panama and Honduras have largely preserved previous personnel
and officer corps. During the 1990s, new organic police laws were approved in
El Salvador (1992), Costa Rica (1994), Nicaragua (1996), Guatemala (1997),
Panama (1997), and Honduras (1998). All stressed the professional nature of
policing and set forth more stringent selection standards and processes.
Education levels were raised, largely through higher scholastic requirements
for entry into reformed police forces in Panama, Guatemala, and El Salvador. In
an attempt to attract better candidates and to deter corruption, salaries were
raised considerably in several countries, although those of poorer Honduras and
Nicaragua remain fairly low (see table below). The figures reveal a troubling
legacy of militarized policing: a serious salary gap between lower-level agents
and officer-level personnel, especially in Honduras and El Salvador. Career
police laws in some countries have introduced merit-based standards for review,
promotion, and selection which might reduce the arbitrary, personalistic, or
politicized nature of career decisions.
Table 3
Monthly Salaries of Police, Central America[29]
|
Entry-level Salary, Agent |
Entry-level Salary, Officer Level |
||||
Local Curr. |
$ US |
Sal/GNP per cap |
Local Curr. |
$ US |
Sal/GNP per cap |
|
El Salvador |
C2800 |
322 |
240% |
C7150 |
822 |
612% |
Honduras |
L1200 |
92 |
180% |
L2652 |
203 |
406% |
Nicaragua |
C1108 |
96 |
300% |
C1409 |
115 |
363% |
Costa Rica |
C66,050 |
304 |
140% |
C70,450 |
324 |
149% |
Panama |
B350 |
350 |
153% |
B500 |
500 |
218% |
Furthermore,
most Central American governments have increased both the numbers and the
budgets of police forces in the region during the 1990s, partly in response to
perceived and actual rises in crime rates. The total number of government
police personnel in El Salvador grew from 14.700 in 1991 (Call 1999) to 16.493
in 1999. The Guatemalan PNC, currently 13.206, will number 16.000 by the end
of 1999 (see Table 4). During the 1990s, police personnel grew almost twice as
rapidly as the general population, lifting the number of Panamanian National
Police personnel per thousand persons from 4.1 in 1991 to 4.9 in 1997[30].
Table 4
Total Police Personnel, Central America, 1999[31]
|
Total Police per 100.000 Inhabitants |
Total Police Personnel |
Guatemala |
122 |
13.206 |
El Salvador |
273 |
16.493 |
Honduras |
150 |
9.205 |
Nicaragua |
126 |
6.076 |
Costa Rica |
276 |
10.594 |
Panama |
442 |
11.625 |
Region |
195 |
67.199 |
Budgets
for internal security also increased markedly across the region in the course
of the 1990s. For example, the portion of El Salvador’s government budget
dedicated to public security more than doubled between 1991 (3.4%) and 1998
(7.8%), peaking at 9.11% of central government expenditures in 1996[32].
Similarly, the portion of Costa Rica’s budget devoted to the Security Ministry
increased by 50% between 1993 and 1996.
Despite
these improvements, serious challenges remain for the quality of police
personnel in the region. Police ultimately reflect the society to which they
belong, and low levels of literacy mean that even better educated police
personnel sometimes cannot read or write well enough to fill out accurate
reports or interact with the public in an effective crime prevention program.
Many police throughout the region continue to view their jobs as static guard
duty of buildings, or responding to public order threats when called. Using
minimum force as a last resort to resolve conflicts requires greater individual
judgment and initiative than using repression. Improved education can
facilitate conflict prevention, but higher salaries must accompany augmented
educational requirements to attract and retain personnel. Career laws and
better regulations would also enhance the motivation and longevity of personnel.
Classroom training has been perfunctory and followed by inadequate field
training in many cases. Where few senior police personnel committed to
citizen-oriented policing exist, field training will be deficient and may
reinforce prior authoritarian practices. International actors generally do not
have the personnel or resources to provide an array of field advisers and
on-the-job trainers, creating a gap in police development. In addition, the
region could use more police; Central America’s rate of 195 police per 100.000
inhabitants is lower than countries such as the United States (285), France
(318), and Spain (266).
As
underscored by well-publicized, ethnicity-linked police abuses in the United
States and European countries, the inclusion of important social groups at all
ranks of police forces is an important element of addressing the security
considerations of those groups. A little-noticed change within the region’s
police forces during the past several years is the inclusion of more women and
indigenous persons as members of the region’s police forces. Although women
have reached senior posts within the Costa Rican and Nicaraguan police, only
recently did reformed police forces in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama
begin to admit and recruit women. Unfortunately, as Table 5 shows, women
continue to represent a very low percentage of police personnel in the region.
In the entire region (except Guatemala, where figures were unavailable), only
8% of police personnel were women in 1999. Reflecting the legacy of women’s
roles in the revolution, Nicaragua’s National Police is a notable exception,
with 21%. Its Commission on Gender requires follow-up policies to advance the
careers of female police officers, setting a model for the region. At present,
few women have the opportunity to hold the most senior posts within the
region’s police forces. In Honduras, where women have participated in the main
preventive police for years, only 9 policewomen ranked among the 479
upper-level police officers in late 1999[33]!
Table 5
Representativity in Central American
Police Forces, 1999[34]
|
# of Women Police Personnel |
Female Police as % of Total |
Indigenous Police as % of Total |
Guatemala |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
El Salvador |
1.049 |
6.4 |
n/a |
Honduras |
258 |
3.3 |
n/a |
Nicaragua |
1.316 |
21.7 |
n/a |
Costa Rica |
535 |
6.3 |
n/a |
Panama |
1.000 |
8.6 |
9 |
TOTAL |
4.158 |
8.2 |
n/a |
Although
the Guatemalan and Panamanian police forces have begun to recruit indigenous
candidates for their police academies, the numbers remain low, especially for
the 22 Guatemalan groups for whom Spanish is not the first language. The
refusal of the new Guatemalan Police Academy leadership to offer courses in
indigenous languages, provide interpreters, or slow down Spanish-language instruction
has meant that indigenous police students have neither felt welcome nor enjoyed
great success. The Guatemalan government has failed to reach out and recruit
indigenous candidates. Many of the early indigenous candidates who did enroll
were migrants who had lived in cities for some years and may be reluctant to
deploy to rural indigenous communities[35].
In Panama, efforts to recruit indigenous candidates have been inadequate.
Additional strides to recruit, train, and promote indigenous candidates will be
required in the coming decades.
Table 6
Institutionalization of Efforts against Intrafamilial Violence (VIF)
in Central America[36]
Country |
Inter-Agency Plans/Programs to Prevent VIF |
Government Institutes for Women’s Issues |
Specialized Police Units |
Specialized Courts Handling VIF |
Prosecutor’ Offices |
Human Rights Units |
Belize |
National Plan for Attention to VIF |
Office for Women |
n.a.
|
Family Court |
n.a. |
n.a. |
Guatemala |
Program for the Prevention and Eradication of VIF
(PROPEVI) |
National Office of Women (ONAM) |
No specialized units. |
Family Courts |
Women’s Unit. Office for Attention to Victims,
Public Ministry |
Advocate for Women’s Rights (DEFEM), of the Human
Rights Advocate’s Office |
El Salvador |
Program for Healthy Family Relations |
Salvadoran Institute for Women (ISDEMU) |
Dept. for the Protection of the Family, Minors and
Women |
Family Courts |
Unit for Crimes against Women and Children |
Assistant Advocate for Women’s Rights, Office of the
HR Advocate |
Honduras |
No plan. There is an Inter-Institutional Technical
Commission. |
Institute for Women |
Women’s Unit, Criminal Investigative Div. |
n.a. |
Special Prosecutor for Crimes against Women |
n.a. |
Nicaragua |
No plan. A National Commission Against Violence is
preparing a plan against violence. |
Nicaraguan Inst. of Women (INIM) |
Consultative Council on Gender of the Nat’l. Police. Separate Offices for Women, Youth |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
Costa Rica
|
National Plan for Attention to and Prevention of
VIF, carried out by National System for Attention to and Prevention of VIF |
National Institute for Women (INAMU) |
Police are part of Local Networks for Integral
Attention to Victims of VIF, which include NGOs. |
Family Courts |
Prosecutor for Domestic Violence & Sex
Crimes. Domestic Violence Unit |
Advocate for Women’s Rights, within the People’s
Defender Office |
Panama
|
No plan. There is a Program, “Promotion of Equal
Opportunity in Panama.” |
National Directorate for Women, at the Ministry for
Youth, Women and Children |
Center for Attention to Victims of VIF at the
Judicial Technical Police |
Special Juvenile Courts. |
Special Prosecutors for Family and Youth Issues |
n.a. |
Perhaps
more important than the incorporation of women into the ranks of police forces,
the region’s governments have also taken steps to enforce new laws
criminalizing violence against women and children. Separate court jurisdictions
for the family have been adopted in El Salvador, Belize, Guatemala, and Costa
Rica. In Panama, the establishment of a separate center to handle complaints
of intrafamilial violence and provide emotional support for its victims has
been welcomed. Spurred by international conferences, regional presidential
summits and non-governmental pressures, the region’s governments have created a
host of new institutions to advance the establishment and protection of women’s
rights. Table 6 demonstrates the myriad institutions developed in the 1990s to
address intrafamilial violence. Because efforts to prevent such violence are in
their infancy, these institutions will require further consolidation,
resources, and technical expertise in the coming decades.
Because of the high degree of resources,
specialization, and experience of their own police forces, international
donors can often make a unique contribution to specialized units of Central
American police forces. Donors have contributed most to anti-narcotics,
criminal investigations, SWAT, and riot control – all areas where Central American
forces have historically been weak. Foreign methods may not be entirely
appropriate for the less-funded police forces of the region (too capital
intensive, e.g.), but certain training, equipment, and technical advice may
best be found outside the region. The specifics of specialized training will
depend upon the needs of each country.
International assistance to specialized units,
however, should be viewed with particular caution. Often the delivery of
specialized courses has less to do with the needs of the recipient government
than with the security and foreign policy objectives of the donor. For
instance, riot-control training and anti-narcotics assistance largely reflect
donor interests in ensuring economic stability abroad and in stemming drug
trafficking. Such aid also addresses real security concerns within Central
America, but donors and recipient governments should be certain that it is
designed and delivered in such a manner as to advance, rather than undermine,
broader institutional development and democratization objectives (Kincaid and
Gamarra 1995, 1994; WOLA 1991, 1998).
Organized
private actors have historically played an important role in generating
violence in Central America. However, the 1990s witnessed an important change
in the nature of private organized violence in the region. Whereas
government-affiliated civil defense units, finca-operated enforcement
squads, and politically motivated death squads predominated during prior
decades, these forms of private organized violence have diminished in recent
years (McClintock 1985, Call 1999). Throughout the region, "classic"
death squads — that is, private armed groups engaging in assassination and
other illegal acts principally for political motivations — reduced their
activities significantly with the end of the wars of the 1980s. Some of these
groups became criminal organizations acting principally for profit, posing some
of the most serious threats to citizen security[37].
In their
place, more conventional private security agencies organized along North
American models emerged and multiplied rapidly during the 1990s. Formal private
security companies — stationary guard services, private detective agencies,
neighborhood watch organizations, and bodyguard services — were relatively few
before 1988, despite many informal neighborhood vigilante arrangements. In El
Salvador, for example, such firms numbered fewer than ten, playing a small role
outside of large factories, financial institutions, and foreign-owned
enterprises (Call 1999). Within three years of El Salvador’s peace agreements,
however, private security companies had skyrocketed in number to almost eighty
(80)[38].
As the table below demonstrates, private security agencies proliferated in the
rest of the region as well.
The
existence of private security servics per se does not represent a “problem” for
security and justice in Central America. These agencies have become an
important repository for unemployed ex-military (and ex-guerrilla) personnel
who might otherwise turn to common crime to make a living[39]. In
addition, they supplement the activities of public police agencies, letting
police forces deploy for crime prevention rather than less demanding static
guard duties.
Table 7
Private Security Agencies, Central America[40]
|
Previous #, Agencies |
Recent #, Agencies |
Estimated #, Private Agents |
Guatemala |
40 (1997) |
114 (1999) |
35.000 |
El Salvador |
15 (1993) |
149 (1999) |
70.000 |
Honduras |
N.A. |
36 (1999) |
N.A. |
Nicaragua |
8 (1995) |
47 (1999) |
6.260 |
Costa Rica |
20 (1994) |
204 (1997) |
5.141 |
TOTAL |
83 |
550 |
116.401 |
As
currently constituted, however, private security agencies pose serious
problems. In Guatemala and El Salvador, these agencies make overall security
systems deeply unequal and unaccountable. First, the burgeoning number of
private security agencies reflects and reinforces socio-economic inequities
which translate into unequal access to physical security. If a government as a
matter of policy relies upon private security efforts without dedicating
adequate resources to violence and crime prevention, it abdicates one of its
core functions. To the extent that private security efforts become an excuse
not to invest in public security forces and violence prevention, the poor are
left unprotected, deepening unequal access to security and fueling further
privatization of security.
Second,
the weak checks and controls over these agencies create the possibility that
private security guards might themselves become a salient source of violence.
During the 1980s in El Salvador, several death squads were organized as formal
or informal private security groups (Stanley 1996). Most countries of the
region have in recent years adopted laws which regulate private security
agencies, usually requiring registration and in some cases training of security
guards[41].
Yet, the authorities charged with enforcing these laws readily admit that
compliance is very weak and that dozens of small private security agencies
operate illegally in the region.
MINUGUA estimated in March 1999 that almost three times as many private
security agencies operated illegally as operated legally[42]. The police
units charged with oversight of private security agencies tend to be small and
underfunded. Already stretched police departments are reluctant to undermine
potential allies by closing down private security agencies because of perceived
“technicalities.”[43]
In addition, most private security agencies are managed by former military
officers (Call 1999). Bolstering enforcement of oversight efforts and
enforcement will be an important element in ensuring that the region’s private
security forces, which in some cases vastly outnumber public police, do not
become an important contributor to organized criminal activity.
Detective
units are crucial to the performance of law enforcement agencies because their
investigations often determine whether or not murderers are prosecuted or go
free, whether well-connected or wealthy individuals can engineer or purchase
impunity for serious crimes, and whether or not intelligence is misused.
Criminal investigative units which are clean, fearless and competent always
hold the potential to investigate and expose corruption, even inside the
police. As a result, the extent to which a police force is corrupt depends
largely upon the extent to which its criminal investigative units (and internal
affairs units) are corrupt. Through the networks of informants they maintain,
investigators are often the main channel of information and monitoring between
the state and the “underworld” of career criminals and organized crime.
A
significant portion of international police assistance to Central America has
been directed at improving criminal investigations capabilities. U.S. aid has
gone to the criminal investigative units of the old and new police forces of El
Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Guatemala, as well as to detective units in
Costa Rica and Nicaragua[44].
The United States has focused much of its police training and advice to Panama
and Honduras on these specialized investigative police forces[45].
Table 8
Criminal Investigators, Central America, 1999[46]
|
# of Criminal Investigators |
% of Total Police Personnel |
Criminal Investigators per 100.000
Inhabitants |
Guatemala |
472 |
3.6 |
4.4 |
El Salvador |
340 |
2.1 |
5.6 |
Honduras |
800 |
8.7 |
13.0 |
Nicaragua |
915 |
15.1 |
19.0 |
Costa Rica |
715 |
6.7 |
18.6 |
Panama |
n/a |
n/a |
n/a |
TOTAL |
3.242 |
5.8 |
10.3 |
Yet,
criminal investigative units in most of the region suffer persistent problems
of ineffectiveness. Links between holdover ex-military detectives and their
former military colleagues have contributed to impunity and cover-ups for ex-colleagues
implicated in murder and other criminal activity[47]. Military
intelligence continues to influence the operations of criminal investigations
in Guatemala[48].
In the cases of the Criminal Investigative Divisions of El Salvador and
Honduras and the Technical Judicial Police of Panama, the selection, training,
and supervision of new investigators hired after the ouster or departure of
previous detectives created serious problems which continue to plague these
institutions (WOLA/Hemisphere Initiatives 1996, Call 1999).
Furthermore,
as one former Security Minister put it, the region’s police still “detain in
order to investigate” rather than “investigate in order to detain.”[49]
Investigators often are unable to arrive quickly at crime scenes to collect and
preserve evidence adequately, and a bureaucratic “wait for orders” attitude
trumps individual initiative in investigations. Assistance has tended to focus
too much on high-tech equipment rather than on inculcating good investigative
habits. Furthermore, as the table above demonstrates, the numbers of detectives
in the region remains low. Despite the mixed record of assistance to such
forces, criminal investigative units will clearly require significant attention
from the region’s governments and international donors in the coming decades.
The selection, initial training, and mentoring of new investigators are areas
of special need, as is the strengthening of mechanisms for controlling
corruption and abuses. Central American governments, with donor support, should
terminate all outside influences in investigations – be they from political
parties, intelligence agents, or military personnel.
Along with
the reduced role of the armed forces, perhaps the most dramatic shift in the
security arena in Central America over the past fifteen years is the emergence
of norms and institutions aimed at ensuring that governmental forces respect
internationally recognized human rights standards. Reflecting shifts at the
global level, reforms to Central America’s military forces, police forces, and
judiciaries have officially embraced internationally recognized political and
civil rights. Military doctrines now
incorporate respect for human rights, as do newly reformed police doctrines
throughout the region. Non-governmental human rights organizations generally
have less antagonistic and more constructive relationships with state agencies[50].
New human rights ombudsmen and equivalent offices have been created in each
country of the region, improving governmental responsiveness to and promotion
of human rights concerns. Most important, indicators of the most serious human
rights violations — especially politically motivated murders, disappearances, and
torture — have dropped dramatically over the past ten years. International
assistance has tended to strengthen formal and institutional commitments to
political and civil rights[51].
With these
changes, human rights issues have shifted from military forces to police and
judicial bodies. More human rights abuses are attributed to police and judicial
bodies in most of the region than to any other state entity. In Nicaragua, for
instance, 54% of all complaints received by the non-governmental Centro
Nicaragüense de Derechos Humanos (CENIDH) were attributed to the National
Police, followed by 15% charged to the judiciary, with no other entity
receiving more than 11% of complaints (CENIDH 1997: 66). Similarly, in El
Salvador during the same year, complainants to the Human Rights Ombudswoman
charged the National Civilian Police (PNC) with 45% of human rights violations.
The judiciary was charged with 19%, with no other state entities receiving more
than 13% of total complaints[52].
Public perceptions reflect these numbers; opinion polls in El Salvador show
that, after “criminals,” respondents cite “the PNC” as the entity most prone to
violate rights[53].
The high levels of complaints against police and judicial authorities reveal
the serious need for greater mechanisms of oversight and accountability among
these state employees.
One
significant advance in the realm of human rights in Central America over the
past decade is recognition of the need for effective oversight mechanisms of
police, military, and other state institutions[54]. New
civilian police forces have included “internal” oversight mechanisms backed by
internal disciplinary regulations[55].
Whereas internal police and military oversight units in the past frequently
assisted in the cover-up of human rights violations, newly created units have
operated with greater autonomy and assisted in curbing physical abuses and
corruption. However, they have failed to prevent newly reformed police forces
from experiencing growing problems of corruption or the serious human rights
abuses which have tarnished the reputations of new police forces in El Salvador
and Panama. In general, these internal control units have been weak,
understaffed for the caseloads they confront, and extremely slow to make
recommendations for disciplinary actions. Even when internal oversight units
work, police leadership often undercuts them[56].
“External”
oversight mechanisms of the conduct of police and other state agents can take
many forms[57].
In most European and North American developed countries, external controls are
designed to supplement the operation of internal controls. For example, ombudsmen
offices generally lack either administrative or criminal prosecution powers,
instead making recommendations based upon their investigations. Similarly,
Inspectorates General (such as those present within each U.S. cabinet-level
ministry) do not have prosecutorial powers, instead checking the performance of
internal oversight offices and making broad, systemic recommendations about how
an agency should organize itself to avoid fraud, waste, and abuse. The presumption
is that improprieties are usually adequately handled by internal oversight
mechanisms or, where criminal acts have occurred, referred to the criminal
justice system (Perez 1998).
However,
in Central America the weakness of both internal oversight bodies and the
criminal justice system means that external mechanisms are extremely important
in checking abuses, especially human rights abuses, by police and other state
agents. In some cases, external oversight mechanisms have operated in ways
which go beyond their northern counterparts, providing either duplicative or
stronger oversight. In other cases, external mechanisms of accountability have
not fully compensated for or corrected weak internal oversight units of police
or military bodies. In the cases of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, the
press and human rights advocates (ombudsmen) have played an especially
important role in overseeing police abuses, stepping in for weak internal control
systems[58].
Indeed, if enhanced accountability represents a
strategic priority for improved security systems in the region over the next
two decades (as it should), then the consolidation of governmental human rights
ombudsmen’s offices is imperative. Created with European support over the past
fifteen years, these bodies have become particularly important for documenting
human rights abuses, prompting action against problematic personnel, and
stimulating corrective measures among police and other agencies. Yet, these
offices have faced funding constraints, political impediments to their
operations and budgets, organizational weaknesses, and a lack of adequately
prepared personnel (Dodson and Jackson 1998). International assistance is
likely to be vital in addressing institutional weaknesses and ensuring the
continued operation of these entities in the face of persistent obstacles.
One of the
most important future challenges for the rule of law and citizen security in
Central America is the increased sophistication and scale of international
criminal networks and activities. “Globalization” has made regional
coordination more necessary and promising than ever. Regional efforts to
coordinate crime prevention have taken important steps forward in the past
decade with the formation of the Central American Association of Chiefs of
Police in 1992; the renewal of the Central American Security Commission in
1994; the creation of a permanent regional commission to combat narcotics
production and trafficking in 1994; the signing of the Framework Agreement on
Democratic Security in Central America in 1995; and the agreement to create
the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Superiores de Policía (ICESPO) in
1996 (see Chinchilla 1997). The regional Police Chiefs Association has created
a Liaison Office which has improved coordination in combating regional
criminal activity (Fernandez 1997), and the Framework Agreement on Democratic
Security sets forth markers for the continuing development of regional
coordination and national conformity with democratic principles as law
enforcement efforts develop.
Despite
these steps forward, regional efforts to prevent violence and crime suffer from
important deficiencies. The actual operational sharing of information is not
what it could be, and important data continues to be withheld, sometimes due to
well-founded fears of compromising investigations. Porous borders and weak
electronic capabilities for storing and transmitting data leave Central America
with highly penetrable frontiers; indeed, one of the most common forms of
evading law enforcement is to flee and hide in a neighboring Central American
country. Finally, insufficient data and analysis are accumulated across the
region.
A
consensus seems to exist among Central American security analysts that the high
number of readily available small arms in the region is an important factor in
the region’s high levels of violence[59].
Estimates of the number of such arms are difficult to pinpoint, but authorities
in 1999 claimed that civilians held about 200.000 small arms and munitions,
including legally registered and illicit weapons (see Table 9 below). In
Guatemala, for instance, one source estimated that some 20% of the civilian
population possessed two million arms, the majority of them unregistered
(Gutierrez 1999: 565). Some 150 companies engage in the manufacture and sale of
weapons and other private security equipment (Ibid.).
Table 9: Number of Arms in Civilian Hands, Central America, 1999[60]
|
Guatemala |
El Salvador |
Honduras |
Nicaragua |
Costa Rica |
Total |
Estimated
# of Arms in Civilian Hands |
n/a |
130.505 |
3.960 |
47.059 |
18.417 |
199.941 |
Several countries in the region have passed laws
mandating the registration of weapons in the hands of civilians[61].
However, these laws generally do no more than require the registration of
private arms and restrict possession of certain arms to members of the armed
forces. In Costa Rica, the number of government-issued permits to carry arms
increased from 3.232 in 1990 to 9.386 in 1995[62].
Additional legal or other measures would help control the extraordinarily high
numbers of arms in the region and improve citizen safety. Expanding the kinds
of arms considered illegal is a possibility, as is screening applicants, but
enforcement of existing laws would be the easiest first step. The lucrative
small arms market, rooted mainly in the United States and other developed
countries, contributes to the easy access of such weapons to Central American
markets.
Among the
most important institutional reforms of the past twenty years in Central
America are efforts to modernize and professionalize the region’s judicial
systems. Judicial reforms accomplished the following in most of the region:
·
approval of revamped criminal
procedures codes (in every country of the region except Nicaragua)[63];
·
additional code reforms;
·
increased professional career
standards and protections for judges and other judicial functionaries;
·
greater independence of judiciaries
from executive and legislative influence;
·
the adoption of laws to prevent
intrafamilial violence;
·
the creation of special
jurisdictions for constitutional review and for special groups such as families
and minors; and
·
the introduction of new state
mechanisms (ombudsmen or their equivalent) for the protection of human rights.
Largely
with international funding (especially from USAID), reforms followed the
assumptions (a) that existing codes were outdated by decades if not centuries,
(b) that the continental “inquisitory” model of jurisprudence was inadequate
for current Latin American needs, (c) that victims merited a greater role and
voice in the criminal justice system, (d) that the selection of judges and the
operation of courts were highly politicized and not transparent, resulting in
serious corruption, and (e) that judicial processes were much delayed and
lengthy, resulting in a high percentage of pre-trial detainees in prison
systems, to the extent that pre-trial detention often exceeded the time which
would have been served under a conviction[64].
In the selection of judges, not only was the executive’s role reduced in El
Salvador and Guatemala (PNUD 1999: 199), but civil society (especially bar
associations) gained an important role in proposing the lists of candidates
from which the legislature selected magistrates of the Supreme Court[65].
New criminal procedures codes were seen as crucial to resolving these problems. Most such procedural code reforms shifted from longstanding inquisitory models toward accusatory models or some mixture, including the introduction of more oral processes rather than simply the review of written documents. They also involved the strengthening of the prosecutorial function (usually a Public Ministry) rather than the instructing judge in assigning primary responsibility for overseeing investigations, and the reduction of time periods for different stages of the judicial process (Rico 1997, as in PNUD 1999: 200, Hammergren 1998a). Another important innovation of code reforms was the introduction of mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) (Rico 1997). Additional reforms focused on laws regulating commerce and investment, reflecting a strong concern that international capital find a secure environment in the region. Finally, the portion of government budgets dedicated to judicial processes and institutions increased in most countries of the region; between 1992 and 1998, the percentage more than doubled in El Salvador, and in Honduras it tripled[66].
These
reforms have had an impact on day-to-day justice in the region. International
human rights standards have been incorporated into the codes of “operators” of
judiciaries in the region (i.e., judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and
police), bringing up by a notch the effectiveness of the rule of law as it
applies to individual rights[67].
Code reforms have modernized laws in much of the region (Hammergren 1998b),
although the failure of a constitutional reform referendum in 1999 set back
modernization efforts in Guatemala. In El Salvador the Supreme Court must now
share management of the judicial career with the new Judicial Council, which
also participates in the selection of Supreme Court justices. These and other
changes have produced a considerably more professional and politically plural
(though not depoliticized) Supreme Court. Judges in Guatemala and El Salvador
have been sanctioned, and some removed, by stronger mechanisms of
accountability for judicial performance[68].
Yet,
reforms have not fully redressed the serious problems of Central American
judicial systems. Public opinion polls in 1997 revealed that, in four of the
six countries surveyed, at least
half of respondents had “no confidence” in the judiciary[69].
Judiciaries merit further modernization and professionalization, especially in
countries such as Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras, where changes to date have
been less dramatic. Further code reforms are also needed. Such codes must be
appropriate and reflect international human rights standards. Improvements in
coordination among the different elements of the judicial system — the courts,
prosecutors, investigative police, administrative police, and the prison system
— have been recognized recently by international and national authorities and
will merit additional efforts[70].
The problems go beyond institutional engineering. In El Salvador, for example,
the Supreme Court continues to exercise inordinate influence over the selection
and performance of lower court judges.
Judicial
performance is linked to legitimacy of the justice system and possibly to the
very legitimacy of new democratic systems. Indicators of low faith in
democracy, such as high rates of electoral abstention, appear to correlate with
low levels of confidence in the judiciary, although further research on these
connections is warranted. The areas below merit special attention in coming
years if reform efforts to date are to be consolidated and expanded.
Ironically,
judicial independence has at times undercut reforms by making justices less
accountable. In the well-founded desire to establish firmer judicial
independence from the executive branch and from the political wrangling of the
legislative branch, a fundamental concept has often been overlooked in regional
reforms: the judicial branch must answer to someone,
or its members will have little incentive to act in the interests of justice
rather than in response to corrupt financial incentives, clientelist ties of
family and friends, or political partisan links. It means little to have a
judicial “profession” unless some body upholds the standards of that
profession. In the past, the region’s Supreme Courts have not shown themselves
capable of maintaining such professional and impartial conduct, much less
holding their colleagues to such standards. Ironically, the increased autonomy
of judiciaries can also make it more difficult to elicit competent performance
among judges and prosecutors, oust corrupt or incompetent officials, and help
judiciaries adapt to changing social and legal exigencies. Judges have been
among the most reticent to embrace updated legal and criminal procedure codes
which require new and more demanding tasks of them, even while releasing them
from some responsibilities. Continued reliance in law schools on memorization
of old codes is partly at fault. If new legal professionals are to serve the
interests of justice, then new educational substance and techniques – law
school clinics, moot courts, and more internships – are necessary.
At bottom,
increased autonomy is not synonymous with less accountability. Indeed, the
strategic needs of the region’s judiciaries in the coming decades include both consolidated autonomy from
executive and partisan influence and
greater accountability to citizens for their performance. In most of the
region, executive or partisan influence remains excessive. For example, in Nicaragua
and Panama, the executive branch’s strong role in the selection of magistrates
results in continued political influence and subordination to executive branch
policies (PNUD 1999: 199). Where legislatures have supplanted executive
influence in judicial selection, as in El Salvador and Guatemala, judicial
appointments still reflect political horse-trading even as the overall quality
of magistrates has improved. The performance of pseudo-independent judicial
councils (e.g., consejos de la magistratura)
and new constitutional courts should help hold the courts to higher
professional standards, but they too require a legal status which protects
them from excessive politicization. Whereas such bodies should help uphold
professional standards, including adherence to international human rights
norms, and serve as potential models, the results remain to be seen and
evaluated.
Greater
accountability for the performance of judicial personnel would help remedy two
persistent problems of the rule of law in the region: slowness and
inefficiency. Recent reform efforts, driven partly by dissatisfaction within
the private sector over inefficiency, have sought to create shorter timelines
for each phase of the judicial process and set penalties for abrogating those deadlines.
While in almost all countries judicial processes have been accelerated over
the past few years, such processes remain slow and tedious, especially where
reliance upon written review remains the primary procedural norm. The numbers
of pre-trial detainees reflects this inefficiency. Greater accountability for
judicial performance in the area of prompt fulfillment of responsibilities
should help remedy this deficiency as well. Many judges continue to view
criminal (and civil) justice as a technical application of an almost divine law
rather than a public service designed to create justice in the lives of human
beings within society (Hammergren 1998c). An ethos of public service and
accountability has yet to permeate the judiciary.
USAID’s
1996 Rule of Law strategy document (Blair and Hansen 1996) was the first by
that agency to explicitly express concern that reform efforts up to that point
had stressed the “supply side” of Latin American justice systems. The report
noted that reforms had not paid sufficient attention to concepts of political
will, public support, and the “demand side” (Hammergren 1998c). U.S.-sponsored
Administration of Justice (AOJ) programs in the 1980s and early 1990s
concentrated heavily upon government-to-government programs without sufficient
consideration and participation granted to the citizens who are the ultimate
beneficiaries of those programs. Reflecting the tendency of all assistance
efforts to approach complex political processes with technical solutions
engineered behind closed doors among legal experts, prior programs had fallen
short in seeking to generate public knowledge of and support for reforms, and
to consult more broadly with social sectors in their design. USAID’s approach
to judicial and police reform has since showed greater acceptance of the need
for broader consultation and “constituency-building.”
Nevertheless,
the operation of Central America’s justice systems continues to favor the
interests of wealthy and politically well-connected persons. As the media
trumpets headlines such as “Justice: A Joke”[71], the
overwhelming impression remains that corruption is rampant in the judiciary,
that poor people have little chance of realizing justice unless they have a well-connected
interlocutor or benefactor, and that slowness persists in judicial processes.
One regional international NGO official stated in 1999, “There is no justice
for poor people”[72].
Even more
worrisome, the perception of inaccessible and ineffective justice, especially
among poor and rural Central Americans, has stimulated a wave of lynchings of
common criminals, from petty thieves to gangsters and rapists. The U.N. Mission
in Guatemala recorded 47 lynchings in the last nine months of 1998[73],
and increased lynchings were recorded in El Salvador and Honduras in the late
1990s (Call 1999). When the “Black Shadow” death squad announced it would
execute several well-known criminals in eastern El Salvador in early 1995, and
then did so before a police investigation finally stopped it, over 40% of the
population supported the group’s decision to take justice into its own hands.
Indeed, a poll in 1996 showed that some 49% of Salvadoran respondents were
either “somewhat” or “very much” in agreement that citizens should ignore the
law and resolve problems without waiting for legal solutions[74].
These trends underscore frustration with the ineffectiveness of the region’s
judicial systems.
Part of
the reason that justice remains elusive is the underfunding of judicial
institutions and a bureaucratic culture of inertia, except for cases involving
extra resources or political pressure. For example, because the public
prosecutor in some countries lacks funds to mount an effective case, those who
can supplement their efforts through privately funded investigations and case
preparation tend to have the best chance of obtaining a conviction. Such was
the case of the rare successful prosecution in 1994 of a military officer for
the killing of Myrna Mack in Guatemala, and the conviction of three men in the
kidnapping of wealthy family matriarch Isabel Boniface de Botran in 1998
(Darling 1999, op cit). As the chief
clerk of the Guatemalan Supreme Court stated in 1999, “In principle these cases
open up the [criminal justice system], but they do not work for poor people”[75].
In
addition to underfunding, other factors contribute to continuing problems of
corruption in the judicial system despite purges of corrupt personnel and
attempts to improve selection and oversight[76]. Until recently,
the courts (órganos judiciales) have
not received the portion of the state budget which they are constitutionally or
legally assigned in Central America (PNUD 1999). However, funding alone is no
cure-all. Money must be used wisely, based on needs assessments. Judiciaries
require greater training in managing and administering their resources.
More
important, greater funding for agencies outside the courts, such as Public
Ministries, would help ensure that prosecutors can do their jobs even without
victims’ financial help. Greater funding for public defense offices would also
help indigent victims obtain adequate legal representation. This last point is
an especially acute need. With the adoption of more adversarial systems, the
role of investigative judges in looking into both sides of the equation has
been eliminated, placing the full burden of a defendant’s interests in the
hands of his or her lawyer. Yet, internationally backed reform efforts have
focused more resources and training on the prosecutorial side of the equation.
In some countries, strengthened prosecutorial functions have been seen as a
central vehicle for AID-sponsored reform strategies. Public defenders capable
of rendering assistance to poor persons have been seriously lacking in much of
the region. The ratio of public defenders per population illustrates this
disparity between prosecutorial and defense functions, as well the need for
greater numbers of public defenders, especially in Guatemala, Panama (which
retains a more mixed model) and Honduras, none of which has more than 2.3
public defenders per 100.000 inhabitants (see table 10).
Table 10: Public Defenders, Central America and Los Angeles Co. 1999[77]
|
Guatemala |
El Salvador |
Honduras |
Costa Rica |
Panama |
Region |
Los Angeles Co. |
# of Public Defenders |
80 |
357 |
142 |
153 |
38 |
770 |
650 |
Public Defenders per 100.000 Inhabitants |
0.7 |
5.8 |
2.3 |
4.2 |
1.4 |
2.6 |
7.1 |
In the
long term, the low level of confidence in the judicial system can be reversed
only by wider access to and more effective performance of judicial
institutions. Emphasis on the “demand-side” has been interpreted by some to
mean building elite and popular support for internationally conceived
initiatives (Hammergren 1998c: 1), rather than expanding access to justice for
poor and other marginalized groups and increasing the voice of specialized
civil society groups in the design of such reforms. Precisely this sort of
participation and input is crucial to ensuring that judicial systems are
responsive to the needs of the population and engender support, legitimacy, and
effectiveness.
Other
measures could help widen poor people’s access to justice in the region in
coming years. Greater accountability systems for judicial efficiency and
honesty would help prevent those who can afford it from purchasing favorable
decisions. Reduced pre-trial prison populations would help make sure that
incarceration was meted out only to the guilty for the appropriate time period.
Popular education in law, security, and human rights would serve a preventive
function against both crime and abuse of the rights of the accused. Greater
decentralization of structures and personnel would facilitate physical access
to the formal judicial system. Police, prosecutors, and judges are concentrated
in cities and large towns (Sieder 1996: 199); even when a judge is assigned to
a rural post, he or she may only be present two or three days per week for
limited hours.
One factor
in the faith of poor and marginalized populations in the justice system is the
sense of prevailing impunity based upon the treatment of those responsible for
human rights violations during prior wartime or authoritarian regimes. Little
conclusive data is available to show that successful criminal prosecution for
past human rights abuses translates into improved justice or higher confidence
in judiciaries after conflicts end[78].
Nevertheless, in cases such as Argentina during the early 1980s and Honduras
during the early 1990s, judicial standing in the public eye has coincided with
efforts by political and judicial actors to aggressively prosecute past abusers[79].
It seem logical that, as human rights advocates have maintained, the perception
that justice systems let serious human rights abusers “off the hook” for their
abuses reinforces a lack of public confidence in the ability of formal
judiciaries to resolve legal problems and conflicts. Among groups victimized
under prior regimes, the absence of prosecution for prior human rights
violations raises the question of whether “new” judiciaries have overcome the
politicization, corruption, and/or complicity of the past. More important, if
the individuals who have impeded justice previously continue to operate freely,
even in official capacities, then the potential for real reform remains limited.
Although prospects seem dim for the full prosecution of past human rights
violators, the dispensation of justice would represent a leap forward in
removing obstacles to the rule of law and boost public confidence.
In
countries where indigenous populations retain their cultural heritage,
especially Guatemala, judicial reforms have done little to redress the enormous
gap between formal national judicial systems and everyday practices which are
viewed by those communities as more effective and legitimate. Formal judicial
systems operate in a language incomprehensible to many indigenous peoples —
including hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans — shortchanging both victims and
suspects of the full possibilities of justice. Many of the advances related to
justice for indigenous peoples achieved in the Guatemalan peace process make
formal judicial and police institutions more accessible to these groups. Steps
include the recruitment of more indigenous officers into the new National
Civilian Police, training judicial personnel in indigenous customs, improving
interpretive services for court and other judicial proceedings, and increasing
the availability of legal aid in indigenous languages. Although a
constitutional referendum which would have granted more recognition of
indigenous customs failed, most initiatives to open up Guatemala’s justice
system to indigenous persons were not contingent upon constitutional changes
and can continue. International donors can and should support such efforts.
Many
indigenous communities deeply distrust national-level institutions and have
their own legal and policing customs. International and national reform efforts
have focused excessively upon national-level systems without seeking to support
those local and community-based mechanisms of justice which generally enjoy
greater acceptance among indigenous peoples. As Sieder (1996) has argued, the
relationship between informal (but not ad
hoc) indigenous systems of conflict resolution and the formal justice
system exists and evolves over time. Indigenous customary law (derecho consuetudinario) should
certainly not be idealized, and some of its content conflicts with
internationally recognized human rights, especially the rights of women. Thus,
greater recognition of indigenous customary legal practices at the formal
national level is tricky and requires careful weighing of the contradictions
that are inevitable when group rights are balanced against individual rights.
Yet, some
indigenous customary systems can redress weaknesses in formal national judicial
systems. For instance, the use of community service as an alternative to
punitive incarceration seems to offer a lower chance of recidivism (Esquit and Garcia
1998). In the wake of the 1996 peace accords in Guatemala, international donors
have proffered numerous projects aimed at studying, strengthening, and
expanding recognition of indigenous legal practices. Donors and experts should
follow closely the results of these myriad projects in the next few years. In
the meantime, donor projects in this area hold the potential of strengthening
the practice and state recognition of local indigenous authorities.
Judicial reforms have failed to significantly
improve Central America’s penal systems, leaving prisons, like their jailed
occupants, largely overlooked by state and society. Despite improvements in
prison conditions, oversight, and the number of pre-trial detainees, problems
in the region’s prison systems continue. From a long-term perspective, perhaps
the most serious is the absence of a rehabilitative mentality in society and
government institutions. Prison continues to be viewed largely as a punitive
instrument, with few efforts to rehabilitate or educate inmates. Violence and
abuse within prisons occurs amidst a lack of supervision and accountability of
prison guards.
International donors face challenges and
opportunities in assisting penal systems. More than any other domestic policy
area, prisons and prisoners enjoy no domestic support or constituency.
Political pressure to improve the conditions of prisons is limited to human
rights groups. Unlike some of their northern counterparts, Central American
courts have failed to ensure that prisons meet national and international
standards. Here international actors can support improvements which otherwise
might not occur. At the same time, the absence of domestic constituency means
that fostering a rehabilitative mindset is difficult.
Alongside
support for indigenous customary legal practices, international donors have
increasingly supported experiments in alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
Such attempts have ranged from commercial and family law to criminal cases.
They hold the possibility of reducing caseload on the courts, offering more
creative and constructive punishment and rehabilitation of perpetrators, and
heightening the timeliness of justice. At the same time, the importation of
ADR methods from other countries without sufficient adaptation carries dangers.
For instance, when teen victims of sexual assault are forced to sit down and
seek “conciliatory” accords with their attackers before the criminal justice
system will initiate a trial, as has reportedly occurred in Costa Rica under
new alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, then such mechanisms serve to
unwisely punish victims and empower criminal suspects[80].
The
growing consciousness of the need to reform state judicial and police
institutions has been accompanied by a neglect of the broader social culture in
which they operate. Cultural practices in Central America include tendencies to
avoid interaction with state agencies out of historically well-founded
distrust, to rely heavily upon informal relationships (patrimonialism,
clientelism, amiguismo), and to gloss
over individual responsibility. These traits contribute to the challenge of
improving the effectiveness and acceptance of state services. Even as donors
have increased their attention to and support for non-governmental activities
related to violence, policing, and criminal justice, they have largely
neglected the complex problem of modifying cultural practices and attitudes
about governmental or non-governmental activities in the realm of justice and
security. Non-governmental activities are an increasingly important factor in
shaping social attitudes and influencing government behavior.
In part,
the difficulties donors have encountered in engaging civil society on issues of
violence and justice stem from three fundamental dilemmas. First, how can
donors support civil society efforts when there is so little to base such efforts
on (i.e., so few organizations with so little organizational capacity in these
areas)? Second, given the roles played historically by Central American civil
society in internal security, what positive roles can civil society play in
citizen security without falling into vigilantism or orejismo, i.e., spying on neighbors on behalf of the government?
And third, how can donors encourage civil society to work with and overcome
distrust of governmental police and judicial institutions while recognizing that
such distrust may be a well-founded element of external social actors’ roles in
violence prevention? That is, how can civil society collaborate with and guide
authorities in preventing crime and violence while serving as a useful watchdog
over those authorities?
The
challenges faced by donors in collaborating with civil society in preventing
violence and strengthening the rule of law are heightened by a fundamental
assumption of this analysis and of their programs: that any long-term strategy
to prevent violence and to strengthen the rule of law must go beyond state
institutions and strengthen the role of civil society as the source,
interlocutor, overseer, and implementation partner of governmental agencies.
Although the types of civil society actors may change in coming decades, this
need is unlikely to diminish. Seven areas of potential international donor
support for civil society activities in Central America are described below.
The
region’s governments and societies clearly need better information about
violence and crime, as well as academic programs which might prepare Central
Americans for understanding issues of citizen security and influencing policy.
Authoritarian regimes and political violence in prior decades inhibited
research on policing and non-political violence in Central America. Guatemala,
El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua have no criminology degree programs and a
virtual absence of academics with specialized knowledge of violence, violence
prevention, crime patterns, policing concepts or operations, and community
participation. Analysts in the region have a tendency to either wholly ignore
or uncritically import the crime-prevention experiences of other countries
(e.g., U.S. community policing). Government agencies have poor raw data on
crime trends. No reliable, unified state compilation of statistics across
agencies on crime, domestic violence, youth violence, accidents, and other
core data for a national crime prevention strategy exists[81].
These deficiencies in research and information undoubtedly help account for the
absence of national, government-integrated crime prevention strategies in the
region.
Several
types of programs might help fill these voids, including new think tanks and
research institutes; new academic programs, such as a "citizens security
diploma" at a major university[82]; a maestría in violence prevention at
major universities[83];
or an undergraduate program in criminology. Less ambitious would be the
offering of special courses in violence prevention, police themes, and citizen
security. Most important is the need to
develop a group of civilians who have been exposed to various approaches,
theories, and experiences of violence prevention. As one expert noted, “We’re
focusing on training entry-level cops when we really need to educate security
ministers.”[84]
As the
pace of cross-national communications and exchange accelerates over the next
two decades, one possibility seems to hold significant potential: exposure of
non-governmental representatives and analysts of one country to the experiences
of other countries, both within Latin America and beyond. NGO representatives
interviewed for this and previous projects have emphasized how important trips
to neighboring Central American countries, South America and the United States
have been in introducing them to new possibilities for policy changes,
different forms of organization of police and community efforts, and advocacy
strategies within their own countries. Participants in exchange programs of NGO
representatives among Central American countries and to the United States, for
example, uniformly praised these experiences. Expanding such exchanges in a
strategic manner to help construct cross-national and cross-regional networks
of research and/or advocacy (especially across developing countries) could be a
particularly fruitful way of contributing to fresh thinking and organizing
around violence prevention and the rule of law. Cooperation among donors is
important in this area, and donors should be prepared for diffuse and long-term
results.
In order
for the research of academic and non-governmental organizations to bear fruit
in the policy world, efforts to synthesize and present that information must be
developed and implemented. In other words, non-governmental actors must engage
in some degree of advocacy aimed at policy makers, political parties, and the
press. Civil society in Central America generally has little experience with
advocacy. Accustomed to denouncing government policies and relying upon public
protest in the face of political decision making via backroom deals rather than
transparent, participative processes, civil society found advocacy of limited
value before the 1990s. With the opening of political systems and the greater
vitality and autonomy of most legislative bodies in the region, advocacy has
become a higher priority in civil society strategies and in institutional
capacity-building.
Few
Central American non-governmental organizations specialize in issues of citizen
security and violence. However, the widespread recognition among Central
American NGOs of the need to respond to public clamor over crime and violence
and actively participate in long-term strategies to prevent violence has
sparked burgeoning NGO efforts[85].
At the same time, efforts to stimulate region-wide discussion and debate on
citizen security issues have not produced sustained collaborative work on this
issue. The principal obstacle to regional advocacy efforts is the lack of
national-level NGOs whose work on citizen security is sufficiently consolidated
to permit them (a) to think strategically about the issue, (b) to prioritize
regional efforts beyond an occasional information-sharing meeting, or (c) to
assume the leadership of a regional coordinating body with the support of
groups in neighboring countries[86].
To be
successful, regional efforts must be based upon the building blocks of
national-level institutions. Here again few national level institutions have
consolidated a reputation for serious, concentrated work on security and
justice issues. Without more institutionalized and specialized work on these
issues, a regional advocacy network is likely to be a house of cards.
Strengthening the skills and work of these national-level organizations is
likely to prove an important challenge for advancing the rule of law and
violence prevention programs over the next two decades.
A third
strategic area over the coming years is creating community-based programs aimed
at enhancing the participation of citizens in resolving their own security
problems. This participation can vary along several dimensions, among which
three stand out. First, it could be either autonomous from or integrated with
governmental efforts. On the one hand, it could take the form of independent
actions to address problems, such as community efforts to counsel youth,
dedicate resources to crime prevention measures, or organize a neighborhood
immediate-response system when a neighbor sounds an alarm. On the other hand,
it could come in the form of the participation of citizens and/or civil society
in the definition of priorities in governmental security policies and in the
monitoring, evaluation, and possibly execution of those policies. Both
approaches represent a contribution.
Second,
such community-based efforts range conceptually from (a) short-term or (b)
medium- to long-term orientation. A short-term orientation, for example, might
involve the organization of neighborhood watch groups for patrols, the creation
of networks of informants for police to combat crime, or funding construction
of a local police post. Medium-range measures might include having citizens
identify factors associated with crime risk, such as poor street lighting,
urging employers to hire more young people, organizing a gun buyback program,
etc. Long-term measures might include educational programs in schools or
working with youth in counseling or recreational programs.
Third, the
involvement of citizens or civil society in public security responses can have
its origins in (a) government-initiated efforts or (b) efforts emanating from
civil society. Most community involvement in public security activities in
industrialized countries is rooted in the initiative of public authorities. A
prominent example is community policing programs, which are generally organized
by police forces in the United States and Europe[87]. In Central
America, NGOs have launched pilot projects of both sorts, with varying degrees
of success. In Nicaragua, for example, political will and an openness to
citizen input on the part of police leadership have produced fairly successful
community policing programs.
Other
projects have been rooted in the problems and priorities defined by selected
neighborhoods in different Central American republics, emphasizing the risks of
orejismo and politicization of
citizen internal security activities which have plagued past police-society
collaboration[88].
This approach embraces communities reaching out to the police as a safer
strategy than police reaching out to communities. If community-initiated
programs are to be effective, however, they must achieve what pilot projects in
the region have not: sustainability and replication across other communities.
The
problem of replication has been especially vexing. Several analysts in the
region emphasize the need for linking community-based NGO projects on citizen
security to the role of local governments. One member of El Salvador’s National
Public Security Council, for instance, believes that mayoral offices are
crucial for the sustainability and diffusion of local experiences in violence
reduction[89].
Despite the risks of misuse (politicization, caciquismo) associated with strengthening local government, it
seems that linking community-based citizen security efforts to local
government structures, or initiating them through such structures, may the best
way to ensure that such efforts are sustainable and replicable.
Determining
what sorts of approaches are best will depend on the lessons and experiences of
regional and national-level actors, perhaps through a process of
experimentation involving different approaches with different groups. The
experiences to date of pilot projects indicates several principles which
should guide such projects in the future. First, most of the region’s police
forces have far to go in changing their operations to conform with newly
adopted doctrines which stress public service. The traditional core elements of
community-oriented policing — assigning police agents to patrol a specific
territory, get to know its inhabitants, and develop sources of information and
relations of trust — have not yet been observed in practice.
National
police forces remain resistant to the introduction of any local participation
in the selection of police officers assigned to those areas or the influence of
outside voices in the definition of citizen security priorities. All too often
“community policing” is interpreted to mean enlisting the population in
identifying and informing on suspicious activity by neighbors. While such
vigilance can serve some crime prevention ends, it does not signify the genuine
participation of citizens in the definition and implementation of preventive
security policies.
Second,
decisions about basing such programs in the police versus civil society should
consider the political will of the actors involved. In places such as Nicaragua and possibly Costa Rica, where police
leaders have shown a willingness to respond to community needs and concerns,
then working to strengthen police-initiated community policing projects is
likely to be fruitful. Perhaps more than any single NGO, the Nicaraguan Police
have shown a capability to involve local citizens in an organized manner which
has generally enjoyed local support. In other settings, however, such programs
may not merit support. In any case, the strengthening of oversight mechanisms
involving civil society should also be incorporated to avoid problems of the
past.
Third, in
countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, where police-community
relations are laced with distrust, community-based work alone is unlikely to
advance reform processes. Combining such work with advocacy and research may be
necessary to ensure that criminal justice systems, including the police, become
more democratic, accountable, and representative. Fourth, if community work is
undertaken, then it will be important to assure that sufficient local
leadership and capabilities are in place, both within civil society and local
governance bodies.
Fifth, the
methodology by which organizations enter or initiate community work is
extremely important. Two models here are the Unidad Técnica Ejecutora (UTE) of the Salvadoran Justice Sector,
and Acción Ciudadana of Guatemala. The UTE method points to
the utility of selecting one or two counterpart NGOs, rather than six or eight,
to assume ownership of the project; selecting communities based on the degree
of interest or will among participants; and conducting inter-sectoral work
which includes local government[90].
Acción Ciudadana's experience with municipal budgeting reveals the importance
of initiating work through local governments. It suggests that one way to
involve and select local governments is to convene a seminar of the authorities
of many municipalities and work with those who demonstrate interest and
enthusiasm[91].
Under any
circumstances, community-based preventive security projects provide one
possible manner in which public security authorities and Central American
societies might interact to prevent crime in ways which do not run the risks of
misapplied models from industrial countries. At the current juncture, careful monitoring
and evaluation of different community-initiated projects in preventive security
are necessary to verify whether such approaches will prove to be as useful or
effective as models (such as community policing) adapted from industrialized
countries. Work in this area should be formally evaluated, including
experiments coordinated by municipal governments.
Central
American governments have not yet undertaken significant efforts to use the
media and the public education system as means of preventing violence and
developing non-aggressive conflict reduction methods in society. In societies
where corporal punishment remains widely accepted, it is unsurprising that
educational systems have not introduced a curriculum which inculcates values
decrying violence and helps children, including teenagers, learn ways to
control anger and seek non-violent means of settling conflicts. Given that
violent behavior and responses are often developed at an early age, educational
systems represent a crucial arena for violence prevention in the long run.
Mass media
campaigns against violence have been undertaken in some countries of the
region. These efforts have been sponsored by both governmental and
non-governmental entities and have focused principally upon domestic violence
prevention, aimed both at women victims and male perpetrators. Such efforts,
which appear to hold some promise, have yet to be evaluated, nor have different
mass media approaches been fully analyzed.
More
troubling is the role of the media itself in fostering violent conduct.
Literally hundreds of studies over the past three decades have shown that
exposure to media images of violence correlates with a tendency toward
aggressive behavior[92].
The largest cross-national study of media and violence ever conducted showed a
correlation between the preference for aggressive media content among urban
twelve-year-olds and their preference to be in a risky situation themselves[93].
Some of this research has shown that the impact of media images upon violent
conduct holds within Latin America. Guillermo Orozco, for instance, concluded
that exposure to violent television images led to more aggressive behavior
among Mexican children (Shifter 1997: 4). Colombian health researcher Rodrigo
Guerrero believes that the media represent an important “risk factor” of
violence (ibid.). Several theories
have been put forward to explain this affinity; all imply that some reduction
in or transformation of the prevalence of violent images in the televised and
print media would help prevent violence.
What can
Central American governments and international actors do to reduce violence
presented in the media? Some news media and research institutes outside the
region have initiated programs whereby the press checks its own coverage of
crime and violence, introducing criteria of “newsworthiness” and degrees of
permissible carnage[94].
Some NGOs have sought to get the media to examine stories of successful
violence prevention or reduction with the same fervor as they do violent
criminal acts. And one magazine, Brill’s
Content, sought to introduce a code of conduct for how journalists
interview victims of violent acts (ibid.).
In Central America, where the press is generally enjoying newfound freedom from
government control, media decision makers have been reluctant to submit to any
hint of “censorship” of their activities[95]. Moreover,
the concentration of media ownership in few hands in most countries and a
culture of political influence on the press pose serious barriers to
responsible media conduct. Media representatives point out the beneficial
effects of their investigative work in exposing government corruption and
abuses which foster violence. Even so, innovative efforts to work with the media
to find ways to mitigate some of the deleterious effects of media images of
violence seem worth considering.
As youth
have become statistically more involved in crime — both as perpetrators and as
victims — increasing research and governmental policies have been devoted to
crime reduction involving youth.[96]
Within Central America, especially El Salvador, several studies have emerged in
recent years[97].
This emerging literature has focused especially upon how and why juveniles
become delinquent, citing several familiar risk factors associated with
juvenile crime: intrafamilial violence, other family problems, lack of
employment and social/recreational opportunities, migratory considerations,
drug consumption, and the effects of war (Cruz and Portillo 1998, Smutt and
Miranda 1998)[98].
To date,
there is little concrete knowledge of the dimensions and causes of violence by
or against children. Without question, the phenomenon of youth gangs
skyrocketed in the 1990s in Central America. El Salvador had some 236 youth
gangs in 1993[99],
and estimates of gang membership varied from 17.000 to 264.600 (see table
below; Cruz and Portillo 1998: 13; PNUD). Gang membership increased in
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua during the decade as well, often as a result
of the diffusion of Salvadoran youth. More pronounced was the perception that
rising crime rates were primarily the responsibility of youth gangs. One study
(Smutt and Miranda 1998: 23) of Salvadoran youth gangs, however, concluded that
the perceived attribution of crime to youth far exceeds the actual
participation of youth in criminal acts (e.g., only 12% of detentions in 1996
were of youth).
Table 11
Number of Youth Gangs in Central America, 1999[100]
|
Guatemala |
El Salvador |
Honduras |
Nicaragua |
Total |
Estimated # of Youth Gangs |
n/a |
236 |
407 |
168 |
811 |
Estimated # of Youth Gang Members |
n/a |
264.600 |
25.940 |
2.081 |
292.621 |
At the
same time as youth gangs spread in number and in the public awareness during
the 1990s, Central American states increasingly adopted legislation
guaranteeing children’s rights. Significantly, between 1994 and 1998, every
country in the region except Panama passed youth criminal code legislation
placing national laws more in accord with international commitments regarding
children’s rights[101].
Further
research is warranted, but two things seem clear. First, a purely law
enforcement approach will not successfully confront the problems posed by youth
gangs in the region. Complex social and economic risk factors must be addressed
in an integrated, multidisciplinary manner. Appropriate preventive measures
require analysis and coordinated efforts by governmental agencies, businesses,
and NGOs to help provide recreation, jobs, social and psychological attention,
and community work to guide young people away from violence to youth
organizations and gangs (not all gangs engage in violence or crime). Occasional
visits for an hour per week by social workers from a government institute are
insufficient. Effective youth violence prevention must involve a serious
presence and resources.
Second,
purely social and economic programs are insufficient to address the very real
problems of insecurity posed by the criminal behavior of members of some
gangs, and thus some criminal justice element of an integrated youth violence
prevention program is warranted. Specialized jurisdictions have been created
in some countries, but the lack of experienced personnel has kept them from
being fully effective. A backlash against youth criminal codes began in the
mid-1990s, threatening to undermine the rights guaranteed by international
conventions and new laws, as people blamed the laws rather than inadequate
enforcement for continuing high rates of violent crime.
No simple,
straightforward solution to the problem of violence exists. The central finding
of this paper is that any effective response will require a long-term,
multi-faceted, and inter-institutional approach. As the case of El Salvador
shows, even relatively far-reaching institutional reforms to police, government
human rights and judicial institutions are insufficient to redress violent
common crime. Researchers of violence from fields as diverse as public health
and political economy believe that effective violence reduction requires
several years, multi-disciplinary approaches, and coordinated efforts
involving both the government and civil society. Building upon incipient work
by the Pan-American Health Organization and the Inter-American Development
Bank, Central American governments and donors should adopt integrated,
preventive approaches.
Perhaps
the most salient gap in state responses to violence in Central America is the
absence of integrated violence prevention policies. Each of the three elements
of the phrase “integrated violence prevention” merits attention. First, more
attention to “violence” rather than “crime” would help bring domestic violence,
with its predominantly female and child victims, out from its subordinate
position in governmental efforts to improve citizen security. This step is
especially important given the relationship between abuse in the home and
violent behavior later in life, which fuels crime and social violence.
A greater
focus on “violence” versus “crime” would also contribute to the second element:
an emphasis on “prevention” versus reactive, coercive, or “curative” policies.
The term “crime” tends to conjure up threats to family, friends, and society,
stimulating repressive policies which have not proven to be very effective.
Transitions to democracy have unfortunately introduced the same sort of
electoral pressures that exist in longstanding democracies, and politicians
have felt compelled in many countries to back coercive responses to crime
favored by the electorate. Yet the experience in more industrialized countries
and within Latin America underscores the importance of preventive approaches
to violence as the best way to reduce crime and violence while simultaneously
protecting the citizen rights which stand at the heart of democratic
governance.
Perhaps
the least recognized requirement for effective violence prevention is the
“integrated” character required of policies. In general, the governments of the
region have not created inter-agency (inter-ministerial) violence prevention
policy making or advisory bodies involving all the agencies which might have
some impact on violence prevention — ministries of security, interior, justice,
education, housing, youth/family/sports, and health, as well as ombudsmen,
offices of women’s issues, national statistics bureaus, electricity institutes,
and municipalities. El Salvador, for example, formed an advisory National
Public Security Council in 1996, but one of its findings was the absence of a
coherent national governmental public security policy[102].
Consequently,
no coherent, multisectoral violence prevention policy exists. Instead, single
agencies such as national police forces, the justice sector, or the youth
courts have developed their own approaches to combat crime (usually not
violence). Because police forces and security ministries are seen as the main
protagonists in these issues, their approaches, which tend to be punitive and
reactive rather than preventive and rehabilitative, have usually dominated national
efforts. Top officials of some ministries are often unaware of their potential
role in helping prevent violence and crime, and thus ministries of education,
women’s institutes, and housing authorities have not fully utilized their
resources and capacity to help prevent violence through measures such as
children’s education in conflict resolution, improved street lighting, domestic
violence education programs, and the physical layout of new neighborhoods.
What are
the elements of an integrated violence prevention program? There is no
consensus about what levels and areas of government should be incorporated or
prioritized in an integrated violence prevention policy (World Bank 1997: 7).
However, distinctions among certain categories help identify different options
and levels at which state policies and other actions can occur. Some scholars
have distinguished among three levels of intervention: primary, i.e., measures
directed at the whole of society, such as education campaigns; secondary,
i.e., measures directed at populations which are especially likely to become
involved in crime (e.g., poor urban youths) or become its victims (e.g., poor
or elderly women); and tertiary, i.e., measures directed at individuals already
implicated in criminal behavior (e.g., convicted youths or parolees) (see
Fourcaudot and Prevost, and Gassin, cited in Chinchilla and Rico 1997: 15).
Different measures can address different populations. Another useful
distinction is between efforts to address broader socio-economic factors
associated with violence, such as domestic violence education programs, and
those seeking to modify or remove situations which facilitate crime (ibid.). The latter include encouraging
citizens to use locks, alarms, and bars to protect their property or whistles
or self-defense techniques to defend their persons; improved street lighting;
neighborhood patrols and support networks; after-school youth programs; etc.
These are only examples of elements of an integral violence prevention effort.
International
actors, with some exceptions, have tended to reinforce national actors’
adoption of uncoordinated, reactive responses to crime rather than integrated
violence prevention. Concerned about stability for capital and labor and eager
to fight drug trafficking and other illicit international activities,
international actors have conceived of rule-of-law programs principally in
terms of judicial reform and police reform, focusing especially upon building
capacities. By broadening these efforts to integrate violence prevention,
international donors could facilitate more effective long-term solutions to
these serious, multifaceted problems. As mentioned above, some donors are
already moving in this direction.
The
analysis offered here rests on assumptions about current trends and
circumstances. Obviously, not all circumstances can be foreseen. Several scenarios could require adjustment
of the analysis presented here. Levels of violence may unexpectedly drop.
Economic crisis may change the resource base for government action and foster
new insecurities. War may recur and sideline non-political security problems.
Preventing disastrous scenarios such as these calls for an array of policies.
In the arena of citizen security, the recommendations offered here should help
avoid these potential calamities.
Absent
highly unlikely and unexpected events, however, high levels of violence and
insecurity will probably pose obstacles to development over the coming decades.
Even if levels of violence were to drop by half, the region would remain more
violent than most of the world. Globalization, with its legal and illegal
movement of people, goods, and ideas across national borders, is likely to
expand in the next two decades. One consequence is likely to be more sophisticated
cross-border organized criminal activity, challenging the ability of the
region’s legal systems to handle immigrants, drug trafficking, arms
trafficking, and white-collar fraud and smuggling. These challenges heighten
the need for regionally coordinated preventive and corrective responses which
have historically been slow to become operational. Regional inter-governmental
collaboration — by no means assured even by the Central American Integration
System (SICA) — will require resources, political support, and infrastructure,
especially to confront technologically sophisticated organized crime networks.
At the same time, the next two decades will witness greater diffusion of
models, ideas, and institutions across the region’s governmental agencies, academics,
and NGO’s, possibly facilitating the development of effective policies and
programs.
Integrated
violence prevention will involve reoriented security policies on a number of
levels. Much of current efforts of both national governments and international
donors is heavily focused upon garnering the money, people, and equipment
required to maintain minimally adequate programs. Certainly, keeping one’s
“head above water” is an indispensable, and not always easy, requisite for
security and justice agencies. However, responding to the realities and
opportunities outlined in this document will require more strategic efforts.
Three broad challenges stand out over the coming two decades.
First,
Central America’s thinkers and policy makers must construct a new security
framework appropriate for the region. The standards adopted in the “Framework
Agreement on Democratic Security” are a laudable starting point toward
reconceptualizing citizen security. These should be given higher priority and
profile, and be translated into practice. In addition, more resources and
political support should be channeled to accountability for police conduct,
including internal oversight units and external oversight mechanisms.
Governments and NGOs should seek innovative ways for citizens outside
government to participate in overseeing police forces and formulating public
security policies. Donor policies and programs for public security forces must
focus on broader, long-term institutional development — especially education,
doctrine, and recruitment — than they have over the past two decades. In a
similar vein, transformations in police education (perhaps eventually occurring
in universities), field training and supervision, and selection procedures are
necessary to change how often police personnel get out of the station, how they
interact with citizens, and how much initiative they show. Just as police
organizations must seek new ways to respond to local-level concerns, they
should also seek to take advantage of “globalization” by strengthening regional
police coordination and cooperation – in essence going both “below” and “above”
the state.
Second,
the problem of uneven and unequal access must be addressed. Newly reformed
judiciaries and police forces in the region need to find ways to overcome the
constraints facing poor, rural, and other marginalized populations who seek
justice and security. Police are often unresponsive to the cases of poor
complainants, and justice is often arbitrary or absent for those who are not
well connected or wealthy enough to buy favors within the justice system.
Several
measures would help widen access to poor and marginalized sectors. Governments
should reinforce, not replace, informal judicial and conflict resolution
processes which exist at local levels in indigenous communities. New domestic
violence protections and the special units and agencies created to uphold them
should be further institutionalized. In addition, rural areas require greater
presence of judicial and police personnel and installations, rather than
occasional visits from unresponsive city-based officials, as well as enhanced
recruitment of rural personnel to serve in remote posts. In general,
governments, regional organizations, and researchers should assess judicial performance
based not solely upon overall statistics but also upon responsiveness to
diverse social groups of complainants and upon the satisfaction of those
complainants. Moreover, Central American societies should revisit the
conceptualization of legal professions in the region, revising law school
training to emphasize the application of the law and practical experience,
rather than rote memorization.
Third, new
efforts to enhance civil society’s capacities, roles, and input must be
undertaken. Donor governments and regional governments are generally more
comfortable dealing with one another at the state level. Effective integrated
violence prevention requires strengthening the capabilities of civil society
organizations to serve as innovators, interlocutors, overseers, and
implementation partners of government agencies. Governments and donors should
support the formation of university programs on issues of violence prevention,
citizen security, and criminology. Similarly, international actors should contribute
to the capacity of NGOs for advocacy on issues of violence, citizen security,
and judicial reform. These might include pilot projects in community-oriented
policing, which should be carefully evaluated. Furthermore, governments and
donors should foster innovative violence prevention programs targeting public
and private schools, women’s organizations, youth groups, and the media. And
finally, international donors should consider support for cross-national travel
and exchanges among civil society groups, including other regions of the world
which have confronted problems of violence and criminal justice reform, to
expose participants to alternative models and concepts and bolster transnational
networks.
For most
of Central America’s inhabitants, the region’s systems of security and justice
have historically inspired fear, distrust, and alienation. International
actors have frequently contributed to the problems of the region’s judicial and
security systems. Yet, for the first time in decades, conditions in the region
and globally now offer the chance to build on new principles, political
regimes, and organizations to stem violence through long-term, integrated,
multi-faceted prevention efforts. We have much to learn about which prevention
programs work and how well. But the need to undertake these programs is too
important to pass up the present window of opportunity.
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During the
1990s Central America went through processes of profound change on the
political scene, with democratic governments being set up in all states in the
region. However, the political changes were not accompanied to a sufficient
extent by parallel economic and social transformations, so Central America
continues to be the continent’s poorest region. At the same time the armed
conflicts of the previous decade led to greater backwardness in the region in
terms of social development (education, health and life expectancy of its
population).
This
situation has led to increasing awareness in the Central American countries of
the importance of implementing profound changes, and the need to establish a
regional development model for all the states in the area has grown
increasingly apparent. So various actions have been initiated with the goal of
achieving regional economic integration, thus reactivating the common internal
market.
However,
these forces of integration have often found themselves impeded by the lack of
an adequate institutional framework capable of meeting the challenges that the
future will pose. This is precisely where the international community could support
the regional development process in the area in the long term, and the present
project Central America 2020 is in
keeping with this.
The aim of
Central America 2020 is to promote
sustainable development in the region, starting from a concept of development
as a dynamic, multidimensional process consisting of:
• sustained
economic growth
• improvement
in social well-being
• guarantees of citizenship
for all social, gender and ethnic categories.
This
definition of development is sound and was devised before Hurricane Mitch
struck the region in October-November 1998, with devastating effects. It is not
that the definition now lacks relevance, but Mitch served to remind us of the
region’s vulnerability to natural disasters and of the state’s meagre capacity
to respond in an effective way. In this context, sustainability acquires a
special significance in Central America: natural disasters are inevitable, but
they must not be made worse by human action, nor must their consequences be
aggravated by the incapacity or incompetence of the state and its institutions.
One of the
chief objectives of the Central America
2020 project is to contribute toward the Central American states’ regional
integration process, taking stock of the results achieved so far and examining
the current difficulties and those which are likely to emerge in the medium
term in the politico-institutional field.
The
specific objectives are:
1.
To mount a comprehensive regional
survey of contemporary development issues. The questions asked must take into
account three intersecting issues:
·
relations between the state, the
market and civil society
·
options at the local, national and
regional level
·
the viability of sustainable
development in Central America
2. To ensure the participation
and contribution of a wide range of key regional players in the course of
research.
3. To provide governments and
other sectors in the region with various policy options and recommendations
4. To promote regional identity
among the public and private players involved in development
5. To extend the project results
to the international players that are most active in the region’s development
dynamics, including multilateral organisations and NGOs
6. To make policy recommendations to the United States and the European
Union for more effective aid programmes.
The
project’s findings will be presented at a major international conference to be
held in Central America during 2000 and at seminars in Washington, D.C., and
Brussels. They will also be distributed in a series of working papers,
monographs and books published in English and Spanish and also available on the
Internet, the Spanish and German versions at http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/IIK/za2020
and the English version at http://ca2020.fiu.edu.
Project Directors:
Klaus Bodemer, Institute
for Ibero-American Studies (Hamburg)
Eduardo Gamarra, Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University (Miami)
Academic Directors:
Sabine Kurtenbach,
Institute of Ibero-American Studies (Hamburg)
Michael Shifter,
Inter-American Dialogue (Washington D.C.)
Lead Consultants:
Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London
Douglas Kincaid, Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University (Miami)
Centralamerican Experts:
Fernando Durán, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress (Costa Rica)
Carlos Rosales, Secretary
of Communication (El Salvador)
Representatives of the Project
Sponsors:
Mendel Goldstein, Head
of Unit Directorate México, Central America and Cuba, European Commission DG IB
(Brussels)
Margaret Sarles, U.S.
Agency for International Development (Washington D.C.)
# 1: Pablo Rodas-martini: Centroamérica:
Para afrontar con éxito la globalización del siglo XXI
ISBN
3-926446-73-0
# 2: Clarence Zuvekas, jr.: The Dynamics of
Sectoral Growth in Central America: Recent Trends and Prospects for 2020
ISBN
3-926446-74-9
# 3: Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera:
Centroamérica 2020: La integración regional y los desafíos de sus relaciones
externas
ISBN
3-926446-72-2
# 4: Sarah Mahler: Migration and Transnational Issues.
Recent
Trends and Prospects for 2020
ISBN
3-926446-71-4
# 5: Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz: Las cuentas
pendientes de la modernización. Tendencias laborales y sus efectos sobre la
integración en el Istmo Centroamericano
ISBN
3-926446-70-6
# 6: Carlos Sojo: El traje nuevo del
emperador: La modernización del Estado en Centroamérica
ISBN
3-926446-69-2
# 7: Claudia Schatán: Desarrollo económico y
medio ambiente
ISBN
3-926446-68-4
# 8: Charles T. Call: Sustainable Development in Central America:
The
Challenges of Violence, Injustice and Insecurity
ISBN
3-926446-67-8
# 9: Günther Maihold / Ricardo Cordóva:
Democracia y ciudadanía en Centroamérica. Perspectivas hacia el 2020
ISBN
3-926446-75-7
# 10: Knut Walter: La educación en
Centroamérica: Reflexiones en torno a sus problemas y su potencial
ISBN
3-926446-66-8
[1] See, e.g., World Bank 1997; Buvenic, Morrison and Shifter 1998; Inter-American Development Bank Studies 1997; Londono 1996; Moser 1996; Moser and Holland 1997.
[2] Some studies have emphasized the health
costs of violence in the Americas. See Organización Panamericana de Salud 1999
(Special Issue on Violence), 1997; Guerrero 1997, 1996; Heise 1994.
[3] The “homicide rate” – i.e., the number
of violent deaths per 100.000 inhabitants – is the measure most often used to
judge the level of violence of a particular society. Drawing upon health
research rather than juridical definitions, the term includes both intentional
killings and accidental violent deaths (e.g., manslaughter, car accidents) in
most cross-national studies. It can be a misleading indicator of levels of
violence for several reasons: less-than-fatal violence (e.g. intrafamilial
violence) is overlooked; victims tend to be young males in most societies; and
armed conflicts cause a disproportionate number of violent deaths.
[4] Homicide rate (intentional and
unintentional killings per 100.000 inhabitants), with total violent deaths in
parentheses.
[5] Guatemala figures from “Seguridad
Ciudadana” chapter of U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report for Guatemala 1999, Guatemala City, based
on Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (1991-95) and PNC (1996-98). El Salvador
figures from Fiscalía General (1994-1998), compiled by FESPAD. Honduras figures
from Policía Preventiva, compiled by Eugenio Sosa. Nicaragua figures from PNN,
compiled by Roberto Cajina. Costa Rica figures from OIJ, compiled by Max Loria.
[6] Juanita Darling, “Unsolved Murder
Weakens Faith in Guatemalan Justice System,” Los Angeles Times, 30 May 1999, p. A3.
[7] Ibid.,
and surveys by IUDOP as reported in Estudios
Centroamericanos.
[8] National survey conducted in 1996 by
the Centro Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Mujer y la Familia, San José,
Costa Rica.
[9] Statistics of social protest and
conflicts show highly variable but persistent levels over the decade. In
Honduras, for instance, incidents of strikes, protests, and demonstrations
increased from 62 in 1991 to 170 in 1995 before declining steadily to 81 in
1998 (Preventive Police records, reported by Eugenio Sosa, 1999). In El
Salvador, FESPAD reports six strikes or protests in 1991, with fewer in
1992-1998 and 12 in early 1999 (personal correspondence, September 1999).
Social conflict in Nicaragua dropped precipitously between 1990 and 1995
(Saldomando 1999). On the importance of social conflict, see Salomon and
Saldomando chapters in CRIES 1999.
[10] “Crime” here is as an act defined by
society as punishable by law. By contrast, “violence” is the exercise of
physical force which harms or is intended to harm persons or property. The
category “crime” tends to vary much more widely across societies than does
“violence,” although many harmful and violent acts tend to be illegal across
almost all cultures and societies. See Moser 1996 and World Bank 1997: 1.
[11] Health specialists and the “violentólogos” of Colombia have
pioneered the study of violence in Latin America and its links to broader
social and health issues.
[12] See Chapter 4, dedicated to the
“boomerang effect” of post-war police and judicial reforms, in Call 1999.
[13] Sources as follows: (a) Stanley and
Holiday 2000; (b) Adam Isacson’s Altered
States (1997); (c) Herbert Wulf’s “La desmovilización del personal militar
como problema y como recurso potencial para el desarrollo humano” (1994); (d)
Roberto J. Cajina’s Transición politica y
reconversión militar en Nicaragua, 1990-1995 (1996); (e) United Nations,
from Montgomery 1995; (f) Call 2000 and Stanley 1996. Column One based upon
estimates in above sources. Estimates are as conservative (minimal) as
possible. Thus, although El Salvador’s Defense Ministry claimed over 63.000
troops in 1990 and the URNG officially demobilized over 2.900 part-time and full-time
guerrillas, estimates of those actually rendered unemployed are used. Note that
Nicaragua and Panama both demobilized sizable numbers of government troops
before 1990. Several thousand demobilized combatants in Guatemala and El
Salvador were incorporated into police forces and, eventually, private
security agencies.
[14] I am grateful to Rachel Sieder for
stressing this point.
[15] See also “Elementos básicos para una
estrategia de seguridad pública,” Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Publica, San
Salvador, El Salvador, September 1996.
[16] These reform efforts have usually sought
to modify - not to create “from scratch” - new constitutional orders, legal
regimes, and judicial institutions and procedures (newly created police forces
in Panama, El Salvador and Guatemala are the exception). Democratic forms of
government - such as constitutions which separate governmental powers, provide
for periodic elections, and enshrine individual rights - have long co-existed
alongside authoritarian practices in most of Central America. In the realm of
administration of justice, reform efforts have generally sought to modify the
informal functioning of existing mechanisms of justice and security, which have
tended to protect state security and elite interests rather than serve all
citizens and social groups. During the latter half of the Cold War,
international powers and national elites contributed to a process of
militarization of these institutions in the name of fighting communism,
aggravating existing problems of military-style policing and highly corrupt and
inefficient judiciaries. Consequently, pre-existing judicial and police
institutions have often been among the most salient obstacles to reform.
[17] Buscaglia, Dakolias and Ratliff
1995, Dakolias 1996; Rowat, Malik, and Dakolias 1995.
[18] See Correa 1999; Mendez et al 1999;
Buscaglia and Dakolias 1996; Buscaglia, Dakolias and Ratliff 1995, Dakolias
1996; Rowat, Malik, and Dakolias 1995; Hammergren 1997.
[19] Costa Rica eliminated its military in
1948; Guatemala moved its National Police to the Interior Ministry in 1955; and
Belize maintained a police separate from the military after independence from
Great Britain. In 1979, Nicaragua placed its new, post-revolutionary police
under the Interior Ministry; in 1989, Panama informally eliminated its armed
forces, converting its remnants into a new national police force. El Salvador
created a National Civilian Police separate from the military in 1992; Honduras
shifted its renamed National Police to interim civilian control in 1997 and to
a new Security Ministry in 1998. For more details, see my “From Soldiers to
Cops: ‘War Transitions’ and the Demilitarization of Public Security in Latin
America and the Caribbean,” Ph.D. Dissertation in Political Science, Stanford
University, 1999 (hereafter Call 1999).
[20] In Nicaragua, the 1979 revolutionary
victory resulted in a demilitarization of the police, although a high degree of
political partisanship ensued.
[21] Internal assessments by teams of
evaluators of US Justice Department police assistance to Panama and Honduras in
1997.
[22] Despite the formal ending of acuartelamiento in El Salvador in 1998,
police personnel continued to sleep and live in police stations informally
during their tours of duty. Author interviews, July 1998.
[23] By “militarization,” I refer to both the
involvement of the armed forces in anti-drug activities and the adoption of
paramilitary armaments and tactics by police forces. See WOLA 1999, 1991,
Bagley 1992.
[24] More detailed discussion of
community-oriented policing occurs below under the section entitled “Civil
Society and Marginalized Groups.”
[25] The military character and influence
within the Guatemalan National Police was partly a reaction against the
politicization of policing during the 1944-1954 democratization period.
Similarly, the Honduran armed forces cited the politicization of the Civil
Guard between 1959 and 1963 to exert military control over the police in 1963.
Although police forces were generally controlled by highly influential
political parties in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, militarization reduced the
ability of political parties to name police personnel and control policing operations
in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. In these authoritarian,
non-sultanistic regimes, state-controlled policing was politicized and
militarized, but not partisan.
[26] Author conversation with Laura
Chinchilla, former Minister of Security of Costa Rica, August 1998.
[27] Equipment also tends to permit
donors to facilitate the production and sale of goods (e.g., communications
equipment, vehicles, computers) manufactured by their nationals with
accompanying opportunities for future maintenance.
[28] Panama, for instance, has a more
sophisticated information processing capability than its neighbors.
[29] Sources: El Salvador: Budget,
Ministerio de Seguridad Pública 1996; Panama: Dirección de Recursos Humanos,
Policía Nacional, July 1997; Honduras: Oficina de Recursos Humanos, Policía
Nacional, November 1997; Nicaragua: Policia Nacional, August 1999, provided by
Roberto Cajina; Costa Rica: Dpto. de Recursos Humanos, Ministerio de Seguridad,
reported by Max Loria for 1998 (The Ley de Presupuesto proposed significant
increases of 7%-11% for 1999). Monthly salaries were annualized to obtain the
“Sal/GNP per capita” percentage. GNP/capita based on World Bank, World Development Report 1997, pp.
214-15.
[30] Draft report, “Assessment of the ICITAP
Program for the Development of Panama’s Police Systems, 1994-1997,” internal
ICITAP document, September 1997.
[31] Police totals include criminal
investigators but not administrative personnel in Panama’s PTJ, Costa Rica’s
OIJ, and Honduras’s DIC. Totals are for National Civilian Police of Guatemala
and El Salvador, and for National Police of Nicaragua. All figures for 1999
except for Panama (1995). Population based on 1998 figures from PNUD, Estado
de la Region, July 1999.
[32] Ministerio de Hacienda, figures
collected for this project by FESPAD, 1999. For Costa Rica, figures collected
by Max Loria for this project from the Ministerio de Seguridad, September 1999.
[33] Numbers collected by Eugenio Sosa
for this project from Dirección General, Policía Preventiva, September 1999.
[34] Sources identical to Table 1. For
Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras, figures exclude criminal investigative forces.
All figures for 1999 except Panama (1995).
[35] Author interview with Carmen Rosa de
León, July 1999, Guatemala.
[36] This table was prepared with the help of
the Fundación Género y Sociedad (GESO) in Costa Rica. Part of the information
is from papers presented at a regional workshop on “Políticas Públicas para la
Atención de la Violencia Intrafamiliar”, San José, September 1997, organized
by the governments of Costa Rica and Mexico in the context of
theTuxtla-Gutiérrez II Presidential Accords. The data has been updated in
consultation with government officials. n.a. = Not Available; VIF =
Intrafamilial Violence; H.R. = Human Rights
[37] See, e.g., the Grupo Conjunto’s “Report
on Illegal Armed Groups,” El Salvador, July 1994.
[38] September 1995 list of all private
security firms registered with the PNC, author files.
[39] Interviews in El Salvador indicate
that well over half the personnel of these agencies are ex-military personnel.
See Call 1999.
[40] Sources as follows: Guatemala: De
León, Ogaldes and López 1999, “CIG: Sector Productivo, protegido por 60 mil
guardias privados,” Siglo Veintiuno,
16 julio 1999, p. 3. The figures cited here are from PNC authorities; one
private sector study estimates some 60.000 private security agents and 260
unregistered agencies. El Salvador: Call 1999. Costa Rica: Ministerio
de Seguridad Pública, provided by Max Loria.
[41] In El Salvador, for example, before 1994
no law governed private security agencies, which in practice simply had to
obtain the signature of the Defense Minister to operate. In February 1994,
legislative decree 818 empowered the PNC to "exercise oversight and
supervision over all mechanisms which might emerge from civil society." It
required all private security services to meet a lengthy list of requirements for
authorization to operate. These requirements included providing a list of all
employees and arms to the PNC; certifying that all private security guards had
completed ninth grade, had passed psychological examinations, and had taken
courses in basic police procedure and human rights administered by the National
Public Security Academy; and leaving a hefty insurance deposit with the state
to cover damages to private guards or third persons from negligence by the
security firm or association (Article 18). See Call 1999.
[42] MINUGUA stated that of 200 private
security agencies reportedly operating in the country, only 55 were legally
registered. “Noveno Informe sobre Derechos Humanos,” Document A/53/853,
Guatemala, para 75.
[43] In El Salvador, most private guards
failed to meet the legal requirements for membership in private security
agencies as of 1995. Call 1999.
[44] The United States, mainly through the
Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program (ICITAP), has been the single most important donor. Call 1998.
[45] Author interviews with ICITAP officials
in these two countries and in Washington, D.C., 1997. In Panama, Honduras
(from 1994 to 1998), and Costa Rica, the criminal investigative work is handled
by a separate “judicial” police following the French model.
[46] Sources identical to Table 1. Number
of criminal investigators includes only sworn personnel assigned to
investigative functions. All figures for 1999, except Honduras (1998) and
population estimates (1998).
[47] On El Salvador, e.g., see William
Stanley’s WOLA/Hemisphere Initiative report, 1996.
[48] Personal interviews conducted for
this project in Guatemala, July 1999.
[49] Comment of Laura Chinchilla, former
Minister of Public Safety, Costa Rica, at workshop for this project held in
Managua, Nicaragua, August 1999.
[50] In a recent instance of collaboration
between human rghts NGOs and police forces, the Honduran Human Rights
Commission (CODEH) reportedly reached an agreement to help design human rights
education for the newly independent National Police of Honduras in September
1999. See “CODEH y Policía se unirán para educar a los agentes,” El Tiempo, September 9, 1999.
[51] In some cases, such as European
assistance to ombudsmen offices and their equivalents, international aid has
been decisive in the creation and sustenance of institutions dedicated to the
defense and promotion of human rights. Such policies contrast with some
international policies during the Cold War which undermined commitments to
human rights.
[52] Procuraduría para la Defensa de los
Derechos Humanos, Evolución de los
derechos humanos en El Salvador: Informe Anual 1997, San Salvador, 1998,
pp. 8-11.
[53] See “Los salvadoreños opinan sobre los
derechos humanos y la gestión de la procuraduría [para los derechos humanos],” ECA, No. 594, April 1998, p. 365.
[54] On police accountability, see Chevigny
1995; Stenning 1995; Bayley 1985; O’Rawe and Moore 1997; proceedings and papers
from the conference “Mecanismos de Control Democrático en el Mantenimiento de
la Seguridad Interior,” in Santiago, Chile, August 1997, and papers from the
1998 Vera Institute project (case studies of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Romania;
Hungary; Russia; San Diego, California; and Precincts #42 and 44 in the Bronx,
New York).
[55] In Honduras and Panama, “Offices of
Professional Responsibility” were established with the aid of the FBI. In El
Salvador, the creation of an Internal Control Unit (audit functions) and an
Internal Disciplinary Unit was backed by a ministry-level Inspectorate-General.
In Nicaragua, the Inspectorate General acts as an internal investigative unit.
[56] In El Salvador, even when the Internal
Disciplinary Unit has recommended administrative sanctions, the PNC
Disciplinary Tribunal which hands down those sanctions has tended to impose
lighter penalties than those recommended. Personal interview with head of the
Internal Disciplinary Unit, 1995, and with the PNC Director General, 1996, San
Salvador.
[57] Governmental external oversight
mechanisms of police and judicial personnel include ombudsmen; civilian police
commissions (a la Los Angeles); human rights commissions (e.g., Mexico, India);
blue-ribbon investigatory commissions; legislative bodies (including municipal
councils) and their committees and auditing bodies (e.g., the US General
Accounting Office); inspectorates general (these can be considered “internal”
as well); and of course the criminal justice system itself. Non-governmental external oversight
mechanisms include human rights NGOs; other auditing and advocacy NGOs,
including judicial assessment groups, the press, bar associations, private sector
or multisectoral civil society organizations; and local citizen police
councils.
[58] Call 1999, Stanley and Call 1996,
WOLA/Hemisphere Initiatives 1996.
[59] Buvinic, Morrison, and Shifter
1998:7; Carranza 1997; Cuadra 1999; Williams and Walter 1997; Cajina 1996;
Gutierrez 1999; Chinchilla and Rico 1997.
[60] Figures for El Salvador from Consejo
Nacional de Seguridad Pública; for Honduras from Policía Preventiva; for Nicaragua
from Policía Nacional; for Costa Rica from Ministerio de Seguridad Pública.
[61] Such countries include Costa Rica
(1995), El Salvador (1994), and Guatemala (1989). See latter chapters of
Carranza 1997b. Although the possession of arms is only governed by regulation
in Honduras, arms acquired legally and illegally increased during the 1990s in
that country. See Carranza 1997b:379.
[62] La Nación, August 4, 1996, cited
in Zamora Cordero 1997:320.
[63] New criminal procedures codes were
approved in Honduras in 1984, in Panama in 1986, in Guatemala in 1992, in Costa
Rica in 1996, and in El Salvador in 1998.
See cuadro 7.2 in PNUD, Estado de
la Región.
[64] Martinez Ventura 1997, Ibanez 1997,
Hammergren 1997 and 1998a, b and c; Popkin 1997; Rowat, Malik and Dakolias
1995; Stotzky 1995.
[65] In Guatemala, civil society has a voice
in the selection of Supreme Court and Appeals Court magistrates. According to
Articles 207, 216, and 217 of the constitution, a Nomination Commission
forwards to Congress the names of 26 lawyers as candidates for the 13 Supreme
Court magistrate posts, and the names of 146 candidates for the 73 slots on
various Courts of Appeals. The Nomination Commission is comprised of a
representative of the rectors of the seven major Guatemalan universities, the
deans of the six law schools, six representatives of the Colegio de Abogados y
Notarios de Guatemala (the Bar Association), and six persons selected by
sitting magistrates (for the Supreme Court, the Appeals Court justices select
these six persons; for the Appeals Court, the Supreme Court selects six
persons). The Congress elects the magistrates to these courts by a two-thirds
majority.
[66] These figures based upon the portion of
government-budgeted expenditures dedicated to the Organo Judicial plus the
Public Ministry in El Salvador (1.36% in 1992, 2.73% in 1998), and that portion
dedicated to the Poder Judicial, the Ministerio Público, and the Comisionado
para los Derechos Humanos (since the latter institutions were created) in
Honduras (0.6% in 1992, 3.01% in 1998). Data gathered from government
ministries.
[67] See I. Lavados Montes and J.E. Vargas
Viancos, La gestión judicial: memorias
del seminario del Banco Inter-Americano de Desarrollo, Washington, D.C.:
BID, 1993, cited in Cervantes 1999.
[68] In Guatemala, more than half of all
judges were forced from office in the face of increased public pressure in
1998, and 372 judges were dismissed for corruption between 1993 and 1998. From
Justice Ministry records, in Darling, op
cit.
[69] The phrase was ninguna confianza en el poder judicial. The four countries are
Guatemala (51%), Honduras (50%), Nicaragua (51%), and Panama (60%). Poll by N.
Garita, Barometro Centroamérica 1997,
internal PNUD document reported in PNUD 1999: 209, cuadro 7.13.
[70] Improved coordination is especially
difficult and of prime importance where more adversarial criminal procedure
codes have been adopted. Different approaches to orienting prosecutors and
investigative police to new systems are examined in Hammergren 1998b. In Honduras
and Panama, U.S. officials have stepped up efforts at their own coordination,
which remains imperfect. Personal interviews with USAID officials, ICITAP
officials, and Honduran and Panamanian judicial authorities, 1997.
[71] Cover of Guatemalan newsweekly Crónica 12, No. 585, 19-26 July 1999.
[72] Bruce Harris, Central America director
of Covenant House, cited in Darling, Los
Angeles Times, 30 May 1999, op cit.
[73] See MINUGUA, “Suplemento al noveno
informe sobre los derechos humanos; despliegue de la Policía Nacional
Civil...,” Document #A/53/853, Anexo, Guatemala, para. 66.
[74] Poll conducted of 1199 persons in
July-August 1996. IUDOP, “Las actitudes de los Salvadoreños en torno a las
leyes,” ECA, San Salvador, October
1996, p. 914.
[75] Cited in Darling, Los Angeles Times, 30 May 1999, op
cit.
[76] An October 1994 survey in El Salvador
found that over 94% of respondents believed that “corruption and
influence-peddling in public administration and the government are a serious
problem.” Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP), “Sistema de
justicia, delincuencia y corrupción: La opinión de los salvadoreños,” ECA, Oct 1994, p. 1063.
[77] Sources: PNUD 1999, Cuadro 7.6, p.
203. Nicaragua
has no public defenders, reflecting its judicial system (it is excluded from
regional total). For Los Angeles County, estimate based upon phone conversation
with Personnel Office, Office of the Public Defender, September 1999. Los
Angeles Co. is slightly smaller in population (est. 9.200.000) than Guatemala.
[78] On issues of transitional justice see
edited volumes by Kritz 1995, McAdams 1997, and Stotzky 1993.
[79] This information provided by Rachel
Sieder in private communication, October 1999.
[80] Example provided by former Security
Minister of Costa Rica, Laura Chinchilla, August 1999.
[81] ILANUD has increased its research in
the area of criminal justice, publishing some of the best available
compilations of crime statistics for the region. Carranza 1997a, 1997b.
[82] I am grateful to Marco Valle, an adviser
to the Nicaraguan National Police, for suggesting this idea in 1998.
[83] A UNDP program officer in El Salvador
suggested this concept to me in San Salvador in 1998.
[84] Comment of Dr. Jesús Rodes at
workshop conducted as part of this project in Managua, August 1999 (my translation).
[85] Some regional-level initiatives have
developed initial work on these issues, notably the IIDH, the Arias Foundation,
CRIES and the University of Peace.
[86] FESPAD in El Salvador and the IECCP
in Guatemala are collaborating in a network with CELS and the Instituto de
Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales y Sociales (INECIP) in Buenos Aires.
This collaboration might lead to regional coordination on issues of legal
reform, including police and internal security matters.
[87] Other programs, such as neighborhood
watch groups or civilian review boards, can be either community-initiated or
government-initiated. In both cases, community actors are likely to work
closely with governmental authorities, be they the local political authorities,
police officers or social service officials.
[88] Community-based programs emanating
from the government run particular risks in Latin America for two reasons.
First, the legacy of government-organized citizen intelligence groups which
committed human rights atrocities such as ORDEN in El Salvador and the Patrullas de Auto-Defensa Civil (PACs) in Guatemala make citizens extremely
nervous and reluctant to support such efforts, especially when organized by
the very same police officers who organized prior police informant networks to
fight (political) crime (see McClintock 1985). Second, the high levels of
politicization of the state in Central America give rise to fears that
government-initiated networks of citizens in the area of internal security
might become tools of the governing party or even of the party with which
individual police officers sympathize. In countries such as El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala, these problems pose serious obstacles to police-initiated
community-level programs.
[89] Author interview with Lic. Salvador
Samayoa, July 1998, San Salvador.
[90] The UTE method involves visiting
high-crime areas around the country and identifying the governmental agencies
and NGOs who work in the area, selecting the appropriate communities based on
the interest of a counterpart; identifying a single group which can be the
active counterpart and take ownership of the project in the community;
training to build institutional capacity; supporting the community's
development of a work plan; mobilization of the community and governmental
actors, including the local government; and carrying out the project. Each
phase takes about a month. Marcela Smutt and Daniel Carsana, of the UTE, used
four pre-conditions before beginning work: (1) a zone of high crime rates; (2)
an initiative of the community; (3) willingness by community actors to work
inter-institutionally, with churches, local government actors, etc.; and (4) a
strong NGO counterpart which can assume leadership of the project in the
community. They do not initiate work through local governments because of the
risks of politicization, and see programs which only offer workshops in the
community without an active accompaniment component as inherently weak and
likely to have minimal impact (this practice was dubbed tallerismo by another interviewee). Author interviews, San
Salvador, July 1999.
[91] Author interview with Acción Ciudadana, Guatemala, July
1999.
[92] See “Journalists Under Fire for Coverage
of Violent Crimes,” Los Angeles Times,
13 September 1999.
[93] See Jo Groebel, “The UNESCO Global Study
on Media Violence,” study for UNESCO, Paris, 19 February 1998. See also studies
by Suzanne Stutman and colleagues at the US Institute for Mental Health
Initiatives, cited in Shifter 1997: 4.
[94] “Journalists Under Fire...,” op cit., p. A13.
[95] This reluctance has been especially
pronounced in Guatemala. Author interview with editor-in-chief of a major
Guatemalan daily, July 1998, Guatemala City.
[96] See, e.g., [U.S.] President’s Crime
Prevention Council, Preventing Crime and
Promoting Responsibility: Fifty Programs that Help Communities Help Their
Youth, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995.
[97] For example, Ministerio de Justicia de
El Salvador et al, La prevención de la delincuencia juvenil en El Salvador:
hacia la formulación de una política social integral, San Salvador, 1998;
Marcela Smutt and Jenny Lissette E. Miranda, El fenómeno de las pandillas en El
Salvador, San Salvador: FLACSO and UNICEF, March 1998; Sneider Rivera, La nueva
justicia penal juvenil, San Salvador: Impresos Litográficos (sponsorship:
FESPAD, UNICEF, PDDH, Min. Justicia’s UTE, ISPM, PNUD y Organo Judicial),
January 1998; Jose Miguel Cruz and Nelson Portillo Pena, Solidaridad y
violencia en las pandillas del gran San Salvador, San Salvador: UCA Editores,
1998.
[98] One factor, much cited in the media, is
the deportation from the United States of numerous Salvadoran members of youth
gangs, diffusing networks and knowledge from well-organized criminal
enterprises in that country to a country ill-equipped to handle either the
social or the criminal challenges posed by these deportees.
[99] Diario Latino, February 1993, cited in
Smutt and Miranda 1998:32
[100] Figures for El Salvador from PNUD; for
Nicaragua from Ministerio de Gobernación; for Honduras from Sección de
Pandillas Juveniles de la Policía Preventiva.
[101] Costa Rica passed such youth criminal
codes in March 1996, El Salvador in June 1994, Guatemala in September 1996,
Honduras in May 1996, and Nicaragua in May 1998. Most of this legislation
stemmed from efforts to comply with the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of
Children, approved by every country in the region except for Panama as of early
1999. See Chapter 10 of the UNDP’s Estado
de la región en desarrollo humano sostenible, San José, Costa Rica: UNDP,
esp. Cuadro
10.2.
[102] This finding came notwithstanding the
formulation of a strategic policing plan known as “Plan 2000." See
“Resultados y conclusiones del Seminario sobre Políticas de Seguridad Pública,”
Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública, San Salvador, October 1997, p. 3. This
report failed to note the absence of a broader violence prevention policy.