The Dynamics of Sectoral Growth
in Central America: |
This
publication was made possible through financial support provided by the Office
of Regional and Sustainable Development, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC),
U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of Grant No.
LAG-G-00-98-00048-00 and the Commission of the European Union. The opinions
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Commission of
the European Union.
Clarence
Zuvekas, Jr.
The dynamics of sectoral growth
in
central
america:
Recent trends and prospects for
2020
Clarence
Zuvekas, Jr.
The Dynamics of Sectoral Growth in Central America: Recent Trends and
Prospects for 2020
Hamburg: Institut für
Iberoamerika-Kunde 2000
(CA 2020: Working Paper # 2)
ISBN 3-926446-74-9
Clarence
Zuvekas, Jr.; independent
consultant who has worked on economic-policy issues in Central America for 20
years. Since 1997 he has been an advisor to the Government of Honduras. He
holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Washington University in St. Louis.
Executive Summary
1
Resumen Ejecutivo
5
1.
Introduction
10
2.
Macroeconomic Performance since
1980: A Brief Review 12
2.1. 1980-83:
Multiple
Shocks, Major Depression
12
2.2. 1983-90: Uneven Progress toward Policy Reform
14
2.3. 1990-97: Moderate Recovery
16
3.
Sectoral Growth Trends since
1978
19
3.1. Data Sources and Issues
19
3.2. Sectoral Growth Patterns
20
4.
Anticipated Global, Hemispheric
and Regional Economic Trends and their Potential Effects on the Structure of
Production in Central America 27
4.1.
Overview
27
4.2.
The Global Economy
28
4.3.
Global
Prospects at the Sectoral Level and Implications for Central America’s Exports
35
4.4.
Toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas 40
4.5.
Strengthening
Central American Economic Integration 41
5.
Alternative Visions of Central
America’s Economic Structure in 2020
43
5.1. Base Scenario 43
5.2. High-Growth Scenario 46
5.3. Low-Growth Scenario 47
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
51
6.1. Overview
51
6.2. Economic Growth: Economy-Wide Measures
51
6.3. Economic Growth: Sectoral Policies
53
6.4. Equity
59
6.5. Environmental Sustainability 59
6.6. Participatory Democracy
60
6.7. Regional Economic Integration
61
6.8. More Effective Development Assistance 61
Tables
64
Bibliography
73
The
Central American countries entered into a severe and prolonged economic
depression in the early 1980s. Per capita GDP for the five countries of the
Central American Common Market (CACM) fell by a weighted average 18% between
1979 and 1986. In most countries, recovery was barely perceptible until the
1990s, when gross domestic product (GDP) for the region, including Belize and
Panama, grew at a weighted average annual rate of 4.3%, or 1.8% per capita,
through 1997. This pattern of moderate recovery, facilitated by the adoption of
significant economic policy reforms and a strong U.S. economy, was temporarily
disrupted by Hurricane Mitch, which devastated Central America in October 1998,
with particularly severe effects in Honduras and Nicaragua.
At the end
of the 1970s, agriculture was clearly the region's dominant sector. It fared
better than the economy as a whole between 1978-80 and 1987-89 but
underperformed it between 1987-89 and 1995-97. Agriculture's share of 1997 GDP
in current prices was 18%.
The
manufacturing sector, according to the national accounts, underperformed
aggregate GDP in both periods. However, a significant proportion of maquila
(assembly) production, whose value added in the region grew explosively from
about $165 million in 1990 to about $1.180 million in 1997, is not recorded in
the national accounts. Manufacturing's reported 16% share of regional GDP in
1997 thus understates its contribution.
During the
1980s, Central American countries paid little attention to external advice to
shrink the size of their public sectors, whose shares of real GDP rose
everywhere but Costa Rica. In the 1990s, by contrast, the state shrunk
absolutely in real terms in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, and declined
relatively everywhere else but Guatemala, where most observers would say a
relative increase was desirable to remedy that country's very low spending on
social services. Public administration and defense accounted for 9% of 1997
regional GDP in current prices.
The
private services sectors contributed 50% of regional GDP in 1997. Commerce, by
far the largest of these sectors, declined in relative importance in the 1980s
and only partially recovered its pre-crisis share during the 1990s. Two other
sectors - transport, storage, and communications, and finance, insurance, and
business services - outperformed aggregate GDP in both periods.
Another
notable development was the rapid expansion of mining between 1987-89 and
1995-97, with annual growth rates ranging from 6% to 12% in all countries.
However, mining contributes more than 1% of GDP only in Honduras, where the
figure is close to 2%.
Central
America's economic growth potential in the next two decades lies primarily in
the services sectors, and secondarily in manufacturing, including maquila
operations. In agriculture, traditional exports will continue to decline
relatively and sometimes absolutely. Agriculture's overall performance will
depend on countries' abilities to (1) continue diversifying their exports and
(2) reduce poverty and narrow income inequality, thus increasing effective
demand for domestic foodstuffs. Changes in the structure of production will
depend on how well the region adapts its policies and institutions to exploit
sectoral growth opportunities, especially in the services sectors.
Overall
economic performance will depend not only on national economic policies and
entrepreneurial dynamism, but also on world demand for the region's potential
exports. The degree to which intraregional (CACM) and hemispheric (FTAA)
integration advances will also influence GDP growth, although to a lesser
degree.
Key
developments in the global economy that will strongly influence Central America's
aggregate economic performance and sectoral patterns of growth between 1997 and
2020 include (1) economic growth performance in the industrial and newly
industrialized countries; (2) the extent to which world trade is liberalized,
particularly for agricultural products and services; (3) the continued
globalization of financial markets; and (4) technological progress, especially
in telecommunications and information technology, biotechnology, energy, and
transport. Sectors or subsectors for which Central America has particularly
good prospects include maquila operations and other labor-intensive
manufacturing; horticultural products and other nontraditional agricultural
exports; telecommunications and information technology; financial services; and
tourism.
Three
scenarios (base, high, low) are developed for aggregate and sectoral growth to
2020 in the region as a whole, as time and space considerations preclude
calculations for each country. Actual growth, of course, will vary by country.
Since skilled human resources are a major determinant of long-term economic
growth, Costa Rica and Panama are currently best able to exploit growth
opportunities, other things being equal, while Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua are the most disadvantaged.
The base scenario
assumes that aggregate GDP grows by 4.5% a year. Continued but modest reforms
in macroeconomic and microeconomic policies, and in institutional structures,
allow countries to take advantage of opportunities in manufacturing and,
especially, private services. The share of private services in GDP rises from
50% in 1997 to 55% in 2020; manufacturing's share remains at 16%, while agriculture's
falls from 18% to 14%.
Under the
high-growth scenario, stronger policy reforms and a dynamic world economy allow
aggregate GDP to expand by 6.0% annually. Growth is led by private services,
whose share of GDP reaches 58% in 2020. Manufacturing's share of GDP holds
steady at 16%, while agriculture's drops to 12%.
The
low-growth scenario, based on little progress in policy and institutional
reforms and a weak world economy, produces little change in the structure of
production. Manufacturing's share of GDP rises from 16% to 18% on the strength
of maquila exports, while agriculture's falls from 18% to 16% and the share of
private services remains at 50%.
Per capita
GDP in the region rises from $1.630 in 1997 to $2.000 under the low-growth
scenario, $2.790 under the base scenario, and $3.870 under the high-growth
scenario.
Successful,
sustainable responses to the challenges of globalization require national
strategies with an integrated focus on four interrelated goals: (1) economic
growth, (2) poverty reduction, (3) environmental protection, and (4)
participatory democracy. Deeper and broader regional integration would
strengthen Central America's participation in the world economy.
Key
national policy actions that, together with a favorable global economy, could
make the high-growth scenario feasible include maintenance of macroeconomic
stability; stronger supervision and prudential regulation of financial
institutions; pension reform, including the establishment of private schemes;
modernization and rationalization of the state, including a reduction of high
transaction costs that inhibit private investment; major educational reforms to
improve the quantity and quality of skilled human resources; elimination of
most remaining price distortions in agriculture (including forestry); adoption
of a long-term strategy to convert maquila operations into true manufacturing
activities; and effective cooperation between the public and private sectors
to promote tourism.
At the
regional level, more effective economic integration requires additional
measures to liberalize trade, especially in agriculture and services, and
eventual adoption of a common currency (perhaps the U.S. dollar). These
measures, together with strong macroeconomic policies, would almost
automatically create strong regional financial institutions and capital
markets.
International
donors could more effectively support Central American economic growth by
reorienting their support for social investment funds, away from a primary
focus on temporary job creation to one centered on directly productive
activities; permitting more flexibility in fiscal adjustments to external and
internal shocks; supporting consensus-building mechanisms involving
governments, business groups, and civil society; strengthening programs that
deepen understanding of economic and social policy issues; and improving the
quality and timeliness of economic and social data, thus providing better
inputs for policy analysis.
A principios de los años 80 los países de América Central entraron en
una seria y prolongada depresión económica. Entre 1979 y 1986, el PIB per
cápita de los cinco países miembros del Mercado Común Centroamericano cayó en
un promedio ponderado del 18%. En la mayoría de los países la recuperación fue
casi imperceptible hasta entrados los 90, desde el momento en que el PIB de la
región - incluyendo a Belice y Panamá- empezó a crecer a un promedio anual
ponderado del 4.3%, equivalente al 1.8% per cápita, fenómeno que se prolongó
hasta 1997. Este proceso de recuperación moderada, facilitado por la adopción
de importantes reformas económicas y por la fortaleza de la economía
norteamericana, se vio temporalmente interrumpido por la destrucción causada
en Octubre de 1998 por el huracán Mitch en toda Centroamérica, especialmente
en Honduras y Nicaragua.
Hacia fines de 1970 la agricultura dominaba claramente la actividad
económica en toda la región. Entre 1978-80 y 1987-89 el sector creció más
rápido que el resto de la economía, pero decayó notablemente entre 1987-89 y
1995-97. En precios actuales, en 1997 la participación del sector agrícola en
el PIB era del 18%.
Según cuentas nacionales, el sector manufacturero se mantuvo por
debajo del PIB acumulado para ambos períodos. Estas cifras, sin embargo, no dan
cuenta de gran parte de la producción de las maquiladoras, cuyo valor agregado
tuvo un enorme crecimiento en toda la región, pasando de unos US$165 millones
en 1990 a cerca de US$1.180 millones en 1997. Así, la participación del 16% en
el PIB regional que tiene el sector manufacturero según estas cuentas, en
realidad subestima su verdadero aporte.
Durante los años 80 los países de América Central prestaron poca
atención a las recomendaciones externas en el sentido de reducir el tamaño del
sector público, cuya participación en el PIB real aumentó en todos los países a
excepción de Costa Rica. En contraste con lo anterior, durante los 90 el tamaño
del aparato estatal se redujo absolutamente en términos reales en Honduras,
Nicaragua y Panamá y disminuyó en términos relativos en todos los países salvo
Guatemala, donde la mayor parte de los observadores señalan que un aumento
relativo era necesario para remediar en parte el extremadamente bajo gasto
social. En precios actuales, hacia 1997 la participación en el PIB regional de
la administración pública y la defensa alcanzaba al 9%.
En el mismo año los sectores de servicios privados aportaban el 50%
del PIB regional. El comercio, lejos el más importante de estos sectores,
decayó en términos relativos en los años 80, recuperando durante los 90 tan
sólo una parte de su participación previa a la crisis. Dos otros sectores
-transporte, bodegaje y comunicaciones y servicios financieros, comerciales y
de seguros- mostraron mejores resultados que el PIB acumulado para ambos
períodos.
Otro acontecimiento notable lo constituyó la expansión de la minería
entre 1987-89 y 1995-97, con tasas de crecimiento anual que fluctuaron entre
el 6% y el 12% en todos los países. Sin embargo, sólo en Honduras - donde la
cifra es cercana al 2% - la minería aporta más del 1% del PIB.
El mayor potencial de crecimiento para los siguientes veinte años se
observa en los sectores de servicios, y en segundo lugar en el sector
manufacturero, en especial las operaciones de maquila. En cuanto respecta a la
agricultura, las exportaciones tradicionales seguirán decayendo en términos
relativos, y en ocasiones en términos absolutos. Los resultados generales en
el sector agrícola dependerán de la capacidad de los países para 1) Seguir
diversificando sus exportaciones, y 2) Combatir la pobreza y la mala
distribución del ingreso, aumentando de paso la demanda interna por productos
agrícolas. Los cambios en la estructura productiva dependerán del grado en que
la región sea capaz de adaptar sus políticas e instituciones a fin de
aprovechar las oportunidades de crecimiento sectorial, especialmente servicios.
Los resultados económicos generales, por su parte, dependerán no sólo
de las políticas económicas nacionales y del dinamismo empresarial, sino
además de la demanda mundial por las exportaciones que ofrece la región. Si
bien en menor grado, el grado de avance de la integración regional (Mercado
Común Centroamericano) y hemisférica (Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas)
también afectará el crecimiento del PIB.
Entre los acontecimientos de la economía global que afectarán fuertemente
los resultados económicos generales y los patrones de crecimiento sectorial en
América Central entre 1997 y el 2020 se cuentan: 1) El crecimiento económico en
los países industrializados; 2) El grado de apertura de los mercados mundiales,
especialmente para los bienes y servicios agrícolas; 3) La globalización
sostenida de los mercados financieros, y 4) El avance tecnológico,
especialmente en el terreno de las telecomunicaciones, la informática, la
biotecnología, la energía y el transporte. Entre los sectores o subsectores
centroamericanos con muy buenas perspectivas se cuentan las maquiladoras y
otras actividades manufactureras intensivas en uso de mano de obra; los productos
hortofrutícolas y las exportaciones agrícolas no tradicionales; las
telecomunicaciones y la informática; los servicios financieros y el sector
turismo.
Dado que el tiempo y el espacio disponibles impiden realizar cálculos
por país, para estimar el crecimiento acumulado y sectorial hasta el año 2020
hemos elaborado tres posibles escenarios – base, alto y bajo – para el conjunto
de la región. El crecimiento real, por cierto, variará de país en país. Dado
que los recursos humanos son una determinante fundamental del crecimiento
económico a largo plazo, y considerando todos los demás factores, Costa Rica y
Panamá muestran mejores condiciones para aprovechar las oportunidades de crecimiento,
mientras que Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua presentan las mayores desventajas.
El escenario base supone un crecimiento acumulado del PIB del 4.5%
anual. La realización de algunas reformas modestas pero estables en la política
macro y microeconómica y en las estructuras institucionales permitirá a los
países aprovechar las oportunidades que se abran en el sector manufacturero,
especialmente en los servicios privados. La participación de los servicios
privados en el PIB aumenta del 50% en 1997 al 55% en el 2020; la participación
del sector manufacturero se mantiene en el 16%, en tanto que el sector agrícola
cae del 18% al 14%.
Bajo el escenario de alto crecimiento, un proceso de fuertes reformas
y una economía mundial dinámica permiten un crecimiento del PIB acumulado a
razón de un 6.0% anual. Este crecimiento está impulsado por los servicios
privados, cuya participación en el PIB alcanza al 58% hacia el año 2020. La
participación del sector manufacturero en el PIB se mantiene sin variación en
un 16%, mientras que el sector agrícola cae al 12%.
El escenario de bajo crecimiento, que supone escasos avances en
materia de reforma institucional y una economía mundial debilitada, produce
pocas variaciones en la estructura productiva. La participación del sector
manufacturero en el PIB sube del 16% al 18% en base a las exportaciones de la
maquila, el sector agrícola cae del 18% al 16% y los servicios privados se mantienen
en el 50%.
El PIB per cápita en la región crece de US$1.630 en 1997 a US$2.000 en
el escenario de bajo crecimiento, a US$2.790 en el escenario base, y a US$3.870
en el escenario de alto crecimiento.
La elaboración de respuestas fructíferas y sustentables a los desafíos
que presenta la globalización necesita de estrategias nacionales con un enfoque
integral sobre cuatro objetivos estrechamente ligados entre sí: 1) Crecimiento
económico; 2) Combate a la pobreza; 3) Protección ambiental; y 4) Democracia
participativa. Además, la profundización y ampliación de los procesos de
integración regional fortalecería la participación de Centroamérica en la
economía mundial.
Entre las medidas nacionales que en conjunto con una economía global
favorable podrían hacer realidad el escenario de alto crecimiento se cuentan la
mantención de la estabilidad macroeconómica; una mayor fiscalización y prudente
regulación de las instituciones financieras; una reforma previsional que entre
otras cosas permita el ingreso del sector privado; una modernización y
racionalización del estado que contemple la reducción de los altos costos por
transacción que inhiben la inversión privada; una reforma educacional amplia
que mejore la calidad y cantidad de los recursos humanos calificados; la
eliminación de la mayor parte de las distorsiones de precios en el sector
agrícola (incluyendo la explotación forestal); la adopción de una estrategia de
largo plazo para convertir a las maquiladoras en verdaderas plantas
manufactureras, y una cooperación eficaz entre los sectores público y privado
para promover el turismo.
A nivel regional, una integración económica más eficaz necesita de
medidas amplias destinadas a promover la apertura comercial, especialmente en
los sectores agrícola y de servicios, y la eventual adopción de una moneda
común (que podría ser el dólar). Estas medidas, en conjunto con una sólida
reforma macroeconómica, crearían de forma casi automática instituciones
financieras y mercados de capitales fuertes en toda la región.
Los países donantes pueden aportar de forma más eficaz al crecimiento
económico en América Central a través de la reorientación de los fondos para la
inversión social, actualmente centrados en la creación de empleos temporales,
hacia objetivos vinculados directamente con actividades productivas;
permitiendo una mayor flexibilidad en los ajustes fiscales que se deban hacer
para enfrentar los impactos internos y externos; apoyando la conformación de
mecanismos de búsqueda de consenso con participación del estado, empresariado
y sociedad civil; fortaleciendo programas que profundicen la comprensión de la
problemática económica y social, y elevando la calidad y oportunidad de la
información económica y social para mejorar los elementos de juicio disponibles
para el estudio y diagnóstico de las políticas públicas.
In the
early 1980s, the Central American economies were all affected adversely by a
world recession, a hemisphere-wide debt crisis, and internal political
upheavals. Large-scale U.S. economic assistance to some countries helped halt
their economic declines and initiate a modest recovery, although sometimes with
significant social and political costs. In Costa Rica this assistance
contributed positively to economic stabilization and structural adjustment
(Newton et al. 1988); but in El Salvador and Honduras it allowed these reforms
to be delayed until 1989 and 1990, respectively.
The 1990s
were a decade of generally moderate economic recovery, aided by policy reforms
within the Central American countries and a strong U.S. economy. Still, the
region remains vulnerable to sharp fluctuations, and probably a secular
decline, in primary-export prices. Moreover, economic expansion in the 1990s
appears to have reduced poverty only modestly in most countries, especially in
rural areas. Income distribution trends are not as clear because these data are
even less reliable than the flawed poverty statistics[2]. The favorable experience of Costa Rica (Morley 1995: 134-150) is
unlikely to be typical of the region.
After
summarizing recent economic performance in Central America in the second
section of this essay, I focus in the third section on sectoral trends in
output over the last two decades. Twenty years ago, the five Central American
Common Market (CACM) countries were still more agricultural than industrial, at
least in current prices[3], even after two decades of import-substituting industrialization[4]. The same structure was evident in Belize[5]. while in Panama both agriculture (8% of 1980 GDP in 1982 prices) and
manufacturing (10%) were dwarfed by services (73%).
The
structure of production has changed significantly in some Central American
countries but not in others. The relative importance of any sector (notably
agriculture) is sensitive to the base year in which the data are expressed in
constant prices. Where base years are several decades old, differences between
constant-price and current-price shares can be large.
In the
fourth section of this paper I examine the outlook for the world, hemispheric,
and regional economies in the next two decades, and how these developments
might affect the structure of production in Central America. The fifth section
then presents three alternative visions of the size and structure of the
Central American economies in 2020, based on different sets of assumptions
about global, hemispheric, regional, and national conditions. The concluding
section offers policy recommendations, for both the Central American countries
and the international community, to help make the high-growth scenario
feasible.
Macroeconomic
performance in Central America since 1980 can be divided into three distinct
phases. The dates apply roughly to the region but vary somewhat by country.
Table 1 presents key macroeconomic indicators for selected years.
Factors
contributing to a major economic depression in the CACM countries in the early
and mid 1980s include soaring petroleum import costs; falling non-petroleum
commodity prices during the worldwide recession triggered by the second oil
price shock; debt problems (Zuvekas 1993a); armed internal conflicts,
especially in El Salvador and Nicaragua[7]; and capital flight.
For the
CACM as a whole, the decline in per capita GDP began as early as 1979 and
continued through 1986. The weighted-average per capita GDP fell over this
period by 18% (Zuvekas 1997: 1, n. 2). For the individual countries, including
Belize and Panama, the declines from pre-crisis peak to crisis trough were as
follows:
Belize | (1980-83) | -9% |
Costa Rica | (1979-83) | -17% |
El Salvador | (1978-82) | -28% |
Guatemala | (1980-86) | -20% |
Honduras | (1979-83) | -11% |
Nicaragua[8] | (1977-93) | -62% |
Panama | (1982-84) | -4% |
The
economic downturn is clearly reflected in investment and savings rates. The
unweighted average grossdomestic investment (GDI) rate for the seven countries
fell from 21.1% of GDP in 1980 to 17.8% in 1983[9]. Gross national savings (GNS) also fell, from an unweighted average of
12.8% to 11.8%. The large gap between GDI and GNS illustrates the region's
dependence at that time on external savings.
Falling
prices for traditional primary products (64% of total exports in 1980) led to a
15% drop in earnings from these exports between 1980 and 1983. Intra-CACM trade
(24%) declined by 33%, and nontraditional exports outside the region (12%) fell
by 36%. Total CACM earnings from merchandise exports fell by 22%, from $4.9
billion to $3.8 billion. Belize also suffered a sharp drop in merchandise
exports (-20%), while Panama had a small increase (4%).
The
Central American countries initially cushioned the effects of the second oil
price shock by additional borrowing abroad. The region's public external debt
rose from $7.7 billion in 1980 to $14.2 billion in 1983. However, the ability
of governments to borrow from private lenders was restricted severely after
Costa Rica stopped payments to commercial-bank creditors in July 1981.
Fiscal
deficits (consolidated nonfinancial public sector, except for Belize) tended to
worsen between 1980 and 1983, reflecting declining tax revenues and a
reluctance to cut expenditures, which sometimes increased because of external
borrowing. The major exception was Costa Rica, the first country in the region
to initiate major economic reforms (late 1982), where the deficit fell from 13%
of GDP in 1980-81 to 3.1% in 1983.
Interestingly,
annual inflation rates were lower in 1983 than in 1980 everywhere but Costa
Rica, where inflation peaked at 90% in 1982 before falling to 33% in 1983.
Significant external financing of fiscal deficits, and in some cases overvalued
exchange rates, helped keep inflation in check or at least repressed.
Regional
per capita GDP continued to decline between 1983 and 1986. Costa Rica was the
major exception to this trend, with per capita GDP rising by a cumulative 5.6%.
Belize, Panama, and Honduras also had positive growth, but barely so. After
1986, economic recovery was more widespread, if generally slow. However, per
capita GDP continued to fall in Nicaragua through 1993, and in Panama the U.S.
embargo and invasion contributed to a drop of 18% between 1986 and 1989. Belize
was the star performer in 1986-90, with per capita GDP rising by 36% in
response to major policy reforms begun in 1984. Except for Belize, per capita
GDP in 1990 remained below its pre-crisis level. No other country recovered
this level until Panama did so in 1993 and Costa Rica in 1994.
Gross
domestic investment rates rose between 1983 and 1990 everywhere but Nicaragua
and Panama. The unweighted regional average rose from 17.8% to 19.9%, but
Guatemala and El Salvador were below 14%. Gross national savings rose from
11.8% to 14.9%.
Exports
contributed less to economic recovery than U.S. grant assistance and
remittances. Total CACM merchandise exports in 1990 were only 12% higher than
in 1983; most of the increase occurred in 1989-90. Disaggregating these
figures, however, one sees evidence of policy and institutional reforms that
helped diversify exports:
|
US$ Million |
Percent |
||
Export
Category |
1983 |
1990 |
1983 |
1990 |
|
|
|
|
|
Traditional |
2.648 |
2.491 |
69.6 |
58.6 |
Nontraditional-CACM |
779 |
664 |
20.5 |
15.6 |
Nontraditional-Other |
376 |
1.097 |
9.9 |
25.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
3.803 |
4.252 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
Nontraditional
exports to extraregional destinations rose from 10% of total exports in 1983 to
26% in 1990. Costa Rica accounted for 53% of these exports in 1990, and 63% of
their growth between 1983 and 1990, reflecting both policy reforms and export
subsidies that were phased out in the 1990s. Another 20% of the growth was in
Guatemala, where significant policy reforms were begun in 1986. Meanwhile,
traditional exports declined, reflecting depressed commodity prices as well as
the continuing wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Intra-CACM trade first
continued to contract, falling to $409 million in 1986 - 65% below the 1980
peak in nominal terms and 69% below in real terms - before initiating a
recovery that would accelerate in the 1990s.
The export
figures above exclude value added from maquila (assembly) operations, reported
as an export of services until new national accounts norms adopted in 1993
treated the gross value of maquiladora exports and imports as merchandise[10]. Maquila exports differ qualitatively from standard merchandise exports
in that their value added in Central America generally accounts for only 20-25%
of the value of the final product. Thus, including their full value with merchandise
exports, as some countries began to do in the 1990s, creates a significant
upward bias in export growth rates. Value added from maquila operations rose
from about $45 million (1% of merchandise exports) in 1983 to about $165
million (4%) in 1990, more than half of which were accounted for by Costa Rica,
with Guatemala again in second place (see Table 3).
Fiscal
deficits in Central America generally were lower in the mid and late 1980s than
in the early part of the decade, sometimes significantly so. Except for
Nicaragua (17.8%) and Honduras (6.6%), fiscal deficits in 1984-89 averaged less
than 5% of GDP.
Consumer-price
increases during 1984-90 ranged from annual averages of 0.7% in Panama, 2.6%
in Belize, and 3.7% in Honduras (1984-88) to a four-figure average in
Nicaragua, where inflation exceeded 14,000% in 1988. Inflation rates rose
between 1980-83 and 1984-90 in Guatemala and El Salvador but fell in Costa
Rica.
Central
America experienced moderate economic growth in the 1990s, aided by further
advances in policy reform; the strong economic performance of the United
States, the region's major trading partner; and a lowering of tariffs and other
trade barriers within the CACM. El Salvador joined the ranks of the reformers
in 1989, Honduras in 1990, and Nicaragua in 1991. Panama, whose modest reforms
in the mid 1980s were unsustained, began a major reform process only in 1994. A
sharp decline in U.S. assistance to the region was offset by more foreign
direct investment, higher remittance inflows, and further debt renegotiation
and forgiveness.
Regional
GDP increased by a weighted annual average rate of 4.3% during 1991-97
(inclusive), while per capita GDP grew by 1.8% a year[12]. Country growth rates were as follows (in percent):
|
Per Capita |
|
|
GDP |
GDP[13] |
Belize |
3.6 |
0.9 |
Costa Rica |
3.8 |
1.0 |
El Salvador |
5.3 |
3.6 |
Guatemala |
4.1 |
1.1 |
Honduras |
3.8 |
0.9 |
Nicaragua |
2.5 |
-0.6 |
Panama |
5.0 |
3.2 |
These
figures probably underestimate GDP growth in some countries.
The
regional gross domestic investment rate rose from an unweighted average of
19.9% in 1990 to 22.8% in 1997. Although the quality of the investment data is
poor in a number of countries, the efficiency of investment appears to be
greatest (by far) in El Salvador and Guatemala.
A
significant expansion and diversification of exports contributed to economic
growth in the 1990s. Intra-CACM trade more than doubled between 1990 and 1995,
from $0.7 billion to $1.5 billion (21% of total merchandise exports), while
extraregional NTEs rose from $1.1 billion to $2.0 billion (28%). These two
categories of exports continued to grow over the next two years, while
traditional exports were affected by commodity price volatility. Total
merchandise exports by the CACM countries rose from $5.0 billion in 1990 to
$9.8 billion in 1997[14]. Hurricane Mitch, however, disrupted export growth in 1998 and 1999.
Merchandise
exports in Belize and Panama grew less rapidly than in the CACM. Between 1990
and 1997, they rose from $129 million to $179 million in Belize and from $460
million to $659 million in Panama.
Value
added by maquila exports grew especially rapidly in the 1990s, rising from $165
million in 1990 to nearly $1.2 billion in 1997 and at least $1.4 billion in
1998 (almost all in the CACM), as Hurricane Mitch had only minor effects on
these operations.
Central
America's long-term public external debt declined from $23.3 billion in 1990 to
$22.1 billion in 1997, partly because of debt forgiveness and partly because
Honduras and Nicaragua had little capacity to acquire new non-concessional
debt.
Fiscal
deficits during the 1990s have on the whole been relatively modest. Nicaragua's
has remained high (an average of 10.3% during 1990-97), but the bulk is
financed externally.
Consumer
price increases accelerated in all countries in the region in 1990, partly
because of the one-time effects of exchange rate adjustments in several
countries. During the rest of the decade, however, inflationary pressures
eased. El Salvador reached international inflation levels in 1998, joining
Belize and Panama, which have long been there. Panama, in fact, has achieved a
significant real effective exchange rate depreciation, even though its currency
is the U.S. dollar, because price increases there have lagged behind those in
the United States since the early to mid 1980s.
This
section summarizes sectoral growth patterns over two periods, 1978-80 to
1987-89, and 1987-89 to 1995-97 (except as noted below). Real annual growth
rates (compounded) are based on three-year averages to reduce distortions
caused by sharp annual fluctuations in sectors such as agriculture and
construction.
The
initial years exclude most of the "debt-crisis" effects of the 1980s.
An earlier starting point of 1976-78 was chosen for El Salvador and Nicaragua
to minimize the effects of those countries' civil wars. In Nicaragua, only
current-price data are available for 1976-78, and growth rates for the first
period are annual averages for 1980-90 (IDB 1995); the second period is 1990-92
to 1995-97. In Belize and Panama, because of data limitations, the starting
point is the single year 1980. For all countries, the final three years are
1995-97 rather than 1996-98 to avoid the distorting effects of Hurricane Mitch,
particularly on agriculture.
The
existence of widely differing base years for the national accounts data limits
the value of any comparative discussion of trends in sectoral shares of GDP. It
is more useful instead to look at trends in real sectoral growth rates (Table
2)[15].
The
quality of the national accounts data varies among countries, and is highest in
Costa Rica. Some base years are quite old (1958 in the case of Guatemala), a
situation that over time increasingly distorts reported trends in overall real
GDP growth, as sectoral weights become outdated. The use of old base years
tends mainly to exaggerate the relative importance of agriculture.
It is
important also to examine two "sectors" not identified as such in the
national accounts: maquila operations (mainly for apparel) and tourism. Data
for these activities (Tables 3 and 4) come from the balance of payments,
although in El Salvador maquila operations are now shown as a branch of
manufacturing. The recent dynamism of these sectors should continue for the
next two decades.
Another
"sector" that might be considered is the "informal sector."
However, this concept, which is not defined in a consistent manner (see Zuvekas
1993b), is of limited analytical utility, and for purposes of this paper it stretches
the definition of "sector" beyond the boundaries I consider
appropriate.
3.2.1.
Aggregate GDP. Table 2 shows that all Central
American economies experienced slow or negative growth during the first period,
generally from 1978-80 to 1987-89. Per capita GDP declined everywhere but
Belize. During the second period, usually 1987-89 to 1995-97, all countries
recorded positive GDP growth, with the four largest economies each expanding at
annual rates of 4.0%-4.1%. Belize performed even better, at 5.6%, while
Honduras (3.3%) and Nicaragua (2.5%) were below-average performers. Per capita
GDP increased in all countries except Nicaragua.
3.2.2.
Agriculture. At the end of the 1970s agriculture
was clearly the dominant sector of the region, leading all others with between
19% (Costa Rica) and 40% (El Salvador) of GDP in current prices, except in
Panama. Agriculture contributed even more to employment and foreign-exchange
earnings.
During the
first period, agriculture grew slowly or declined (and per capita sectoral
product fell) everywhere but Panama, which had annual growth of 3.3% despite
(although to some extent because of) high levels of protection and costly
subsidies. Still, agriculture outperformed the rest of the regional economy,
with the minor exception of Belize, where it lagged aggregate GDP only
slightly. Agriculture's share of GDP in constant prices thus increased,
although its share in current prices generally declined because of falling
relative prices.
In the second
period, Panama dropped toward the bottom of the list and agricultural
performance improved everywhere else. Belize (6.7%) and Nicaragua (5.2%)
recorded especially high growth rates, reflecting improved macroeconomic and
microeconomic policies. Still, in all other countries agriculture grew more
slowly than aggregate GDP, although per capita agricultural product fell only
in El Salvador and Panama. Agriculture's sluggish performance in El Salvador,
despite price and marketing reforms since 1989, is due partly to a significant
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, explained mainly by large
remittance inflows. At the end of the period, agriculture's share of GDP in
current prices ranged from 14% (El Salvador) to 34% (Nicaragua), again with the
exception of Panama (7%).
3.2.3.
Mining. The mining sector accounts for no
more than 1% of GDP except in Honduras, where the figure is close to 2%. In the
first period, it generally fared less well than aggregate GDP, except in
Belize. The second period, on the other hand, was one of rapid expansion in
all countries, with annual growth rates of 6%-12%. Mining in Central America is
unlikely ever to acquire the importance it has in Peru or Bolivia; but its
potential for continued rapid growth is good if countries do more to address
legal and institutional obstacles to exploration and exploitation, while also
providing adequate environmental safeguards.
3.2.4.
Manufacturing. After growing relatively rapidly
during most of the 1970s, manufacturing activity in Central America as a whole
lagged overall GDP performance between 1978-80 and 1987-89. Only in Honduras
did it grow faster (barely so), while in Costa Rica the sectoral and aggregate
growth rates were equal. Contributing to the sector's woes was the sharp drop
in intra-CACM trade, due both to the economic depression per se and to trade
barriers erected by the CACM countries against each other.
At least
according to published figures, the 1990s were a period of moderate expansion;
but once again manufacturing grew slower than GDP in most countries (the
exceptions were Honduras and Panama), and its share of regional GDP continued
to decline. In current prices, manufacturing's share of GDP in 1995-97 ranged
from 22% in El Salvador to less than 9% in Panama[16].
Some
manufacturing activity in the 1990s clearly was hurt by competition from
extraregional imports, as tariff barriers were reduced significantly
throughout the region[17]. However, the published figures for manufacturing output do not fully
cover maquila operations, and in some cases may not include them at all. For
example, the national accounts figure for value added in Honduras's apparel
industry is far below the respective balance-of-payments figure, even though
this industry's growth rate for 1987-89 to 1995-97 is reported to be 14.9%. If
maquila operations were fully incorporated into the national accounts,
manufacturing's performance during the 1990s might have exceeded that of
aggregate GDP, whose growth itself would thus be higher than reported.
3.2.5.
Electricity, Gas, and Water. The
utilities sector is small in Central America, sometimes suspiciously so. In El
Salvador, value added by utilities in 1995-97 was reported to be only 1.6% of
current-price GDP and 0.6% of constant price GDP. The utilities share of GDP
exceeds 3.3% only in Panama (in both current and constant prices in 1987-89 and
1995-97) and in Honduras (5.7% in current prices during 1995-97). Differences
between current-price and constant-price shares are often difficult to explain,
and cannot always be accounted for by changes in pricing policies.
Value
added by utilities grew relatively rapidly during the 1980s for the region as a
whole. Their share of GDP thus increased significantly, albeit from a small
base. The completion of several large hydroelectric projects helps explain this
rapid growth in the midst of an economic depression.
Growth of
the utilities sector was also relatively rapid in the 1990s, exceeding GDP
growth everywhere but in El Salvador and Panama. The reported real growth rate
of -3.4% in El Salvador is difficult to reconcile with that country's overall
GDP growth rate of 4.1%; it is attributable largely to an implausible decline
of 71% in the electricity subsector between 1990 and 1991.
3.2.6.
Construction. Between 1978-80 and 1987-89,
construction activity contracted everywhere except Belize and Honduras. In most
cases its share of GDP declined. In current prices, construction's share of GDP
ranged from 2% in Guatemala and Panama to 6% in Belize[18]. Public capital expenditures fell especially rapidly after the early
1980s, as debt problems restricted most countries' abilities to borrow abroad.
Construction
activity grew in the 1990s by more than 10% annually in Nicaragua and Panama,
and at low to moderate rates elsewhere. For the region as a whole, its share of
GDP may have increased slightly.
3.2.7.
Trade, Restaurants, and Hotels. Commerce
is by far the largest service sector in all Central American countries, and in
Guatemala and Panama (and in Costa Rica in current prices) it is larger than
any other sector. Its contribution to GDP in 1995-97 generally ranged from 16%
to 24%, except in Honduras, where the 12% figure is probably explained mostly
by statistical problems.
During the
1980s, commercial activity lagged GDP performance in every country. In most
cases its share of aggregate GDP fell by 3-4 percentage points in constant
prices. This situation was partially reversed in the 1990s, as commercial
activity expanded at rates nearly equal to or greater than aggregate GDP
everywhere but Honduras, where again the reported growth rate of only 2.5% may
reflect statistical problems. Still, only in El Salvador did the
constant-price share of GDP in 1995-97 exceed its late-1970s level.
3.2.8.
Transport, Storage, and Communications. This
sector has gained relative importance in most Central American countries over
the last two decades. It is largest in Panama, where Canal-related services and
the transshipment activities of the Colón Free Zone have long been major
components of the economy. Nevertheless, recent growth in Panama has been slow,
and the sector's share of GDP in constant prices slipped from 13.1% in 1980 to
12.3% in 1995-97; in current prices the 1995-97 share was 14.0%.
Elsewhere,
the transport sector outperformed the rest of the economy in both periods in
all countries except Nicaragua. Its share of 1995-97 GDP in current prices
varied widely, from 3.4% in Nicaragua to about 13% in Belize, where growth has
been rapid for two decades. The Honduran figures for 1987-89 to 1995-97 are
puzzling in that the constant-price share rose from 8.3% to 8.6%, while the
current-price share dropped from 6.9% to 4.6%.
3.2.9.
Finance, Insurance, and Business Services.
During the 1980s, the financial sector outpaced overall GDP in most countries.
The major exception was Panama, where financial institutions are by far the
most advanced in the region and contribute the most to GDP (more than 10%).
After growing by 50% between 1980 and 1985, Panama's financial sector was
devastated by subsequent political events, and real value added fell by 61%
between 1985 and 1989. Despite rebounding by 7.0% annually between 1987-89 and
1995-97, the financial sector was smaller in 1998 than in 1982-85.
Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras all experienced financial sector
growth rates of between 6.2% and 8.3%, substantially above their GDP growth
rates (3.3%-4.1%). In Belize, the growth rate was a respectable 4.9%, but below
the aggregate GDP growth rate of 5.6%. Nicaragua was still struggling, not with
much success, to rebuild a financial sector that was seriously weakened in the
1980s; sectoral growth was only 1.3% a year between 1990-92 and 1995-97.
3.2.10.
Real Estate. This sector largely represents the
imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing. It held up well during the
troubled 1980s, but in the 1990s its growth lagged that of aggregate GDP
everywhere but Honduras. In evaluating Central America's prospects over the
next two decades in the context of increased globalization, this almost-pure
domestic sector is of little interest. In most countries its constant-price
share of GDP is around 5%-6%; the figure is lower in Nicaragua (4%) and much
higher in El Salvador (10%) and Panama (14%).
3.2.11.
Public Administration and Defense. During
the 1980s, Central American countries paid little heed to external advice to
shrink the size of their states, relatively if not absolutely. For the region
as a whole, the public sector grew in real terms by a weighted average close to
4%. Its GDP share rose everywhere but in Costa Rica.
In the
1990s, by contrast, the state has shrunk absolutely in Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama, and declined relatively everywhere else but Guatemala, where most
observers would say a relative increase was desirable to remedy that country's
very low spending on social services. In current prices, the sector's share of
GDP during 1995-97 ranged from 6%-7% in El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Guatemala[19], to 12%-14% in Costa Rica and Panama, with Belize occupying an
intermediate position.
3.2.12.
Other Services. Community, social, personal,
and domestic services account for between 5% and 10% of GDP. Like real estate,
they are of little interest in the context of globalization. Sectoral growth
rates in both the 1980s and 1990s have differed little from those for aggregate
GDP.
3.2.13.
Maquila Operations. After allowing for missing
data and underestimates in Honduras before 1993, value added by maquila
operations in Central America was probably about $45 million in 1983 and about
$165 million in 1990. As late as 1990, Costa Rica still accounted for about
53% of the regional total (see Table 3).
Maquila
expansion was dramatic in the 1990s, at least in Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras. By 1997 regional value added totaled perhaps $1.180
million, with the four big producers each accounting for 18% to 27% of the
total.
Relative
to the size of the economy, maquila operations are most important in Honduras,
where they now directly employ about 5% of the labor force. Value added in 1998
($398 million) represented 7.4% of reported Honduran GDP in that year, although
aggregate GDP is probably underestimated, partly because maquila operations are
not fully recorded in the national accounts.
3.2.14.
Tourism. Regional foreign-exchange earnings
from tourism in the first half of the 1980s rose only from $379 million in 1980
to $429 million in 1985 (see Table 4). Panama was the leader in 1985 with 48%
of the regional total, followed by Costa Rica with 29%. By 1990, however,
Costa Rica had vaulted into first place with 39% of the total, both because of
its own strong promotional efforts, especially in ecotourism, and because
tourism in Panama was set back by political events. Guatemala experienced a
resurgence of tourism after 1985, following a dramatic plunge earlier in the
decade because of civil conflict, human rights abuses, and an upsurge in
criminal activity. Regional foreign exchange earnings from tourism in 1990
totaled $730 million.
Tourism
expanded rapidly in the 1990s, with all countries except El Salvador at least
doubling their foreign exchange earnings between 1990 and 1997. The regional
total reached $1,801 million in 1997. Costa Rica strengthened its hold on first
place, with its regional share rising to 41%. Panama was second with 21%, and
Guatemala third with 15%. Honduras was next with 8%, followed by El Salvador
with 6%, Belize with 5%, and Nicaragua with 4%.
The small,
open economies of Central America are highly sensitive to external events.
Globally, they are affected by volatile prices for their major commodity
exports and for one major commodity import, petroleum[20]. Moreover, the decline in relative prices of primary products since
1980 may continue well into the 21st century (OECD 1997: 78; Reinhart and
Wickham 1994), although its extent will depend on the performance of the global
economy. Within the Western Hemisphere, the Central American countries' high
dependence on exports to the U.S. market makes them vulnerable to trends in
that large economy. Also, as intra-CACM trade has expanded significantly since
1986, the countries of the region are increasingly affected by each other's economic
performance.
Despite
this vulnerability to external events, the economic depression experienced by
the Central American countries in the 1980s led to a widespread consensus on the
desirability of economic openness to external trade in the face of a radically
changed international economic environment (see Zuvekas 1992: 137-142).
This
section seeks to identify some of the major changes likely to occur in the
global, hemispheric, and regional economic environments over the next two
decades, and to consider how these trends might affect the structure of
production in Central America. The region has basically accepted the challenges
of globalization, but not all countries are well prepared to meet these
challenges.
4.2.1.
Aggregate GDP. One can conceive a rosy scenario
for the next two decades, based on rapid technological progress (e.g. in telecommunications,
biotechnology, environmentally friendly energy, and transport); favorable
economic policies in most of the world; and only minor disruptions from events
such as civil wars, localized cross-border conflicts, AIDS, and occasional
financial crises. One such picture is the OECD's high-growth scenario (1997:
92), which envisions average annual world economic growth of 5.0% in the first
decade of the new century and 4.9% in the second.
On the
other hand, one could paint a grim picture in which the world is dominated by
protectionism; other backsliding on economic policy; major regional or global
financial crises; the revival of armed conflict in areas where peace has been
achieved; and social and political unrest, emanating from increased income
inequality and decreased personal security, that could reverse recent
democratic gains.
An
intermediate position is the OECD's (1997: 92) low-growth scenario, which
envisions world GDP growing at an average annual rate of 3.1% in 2001-2010 and
2.8% during 2011-2020.
This paper
leans toward a favorable outcome for the world economy, reflecting the author's
optimistic long-run worldview, however much he might be concerned about
short-term events. Still, it is important to bear in mind that the scenarios
presented in Section 5 are closer to speculations than projections.
4.2.2.
Trade. The OECD's high-growth scenario
envisions world trade as rising considerably faster than global output, thus
increasing its share of global GDP from 30% in 1995 to 45% in 2020. This
scenario assumes elimination of all tariffs and tariff equivalents, and of all
export taxes and subsidies, by 2020 (OECD 1997: 63, 71). Complete free trade by
2020 is unlikely, but further liberalization of world trade is a reasonable
assumption.
Many
policy makers and other interested parties had hoped that a new round of trade
negotiations would be launched at the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings
in Seattle in November-December 1999. However, these hopes were dashed, largely
by strong resistance to further trade liberalization by groups ranging from those
with environmental and equity concerns to those with narrow protectionist
agendas. Weak U.S. government support for a new round of talks - due more to
electoral politics than to a lack of commitment to trade liberalization - also
contributed to the meeting's failure.
Nevertheless,
new talks are likely to be launched formally sometime in the first half of the
2000s. John Croome (1998), the World Bank's Permanent Observer to the WTO,
believes that any such talks are unlikely to rival the Uruguay Round in scope
or duration. Only agriculture and services are certain to be covered;
near-certain areas are tariff reductions and government procurement.
Agriculture remains Central America's dominant sector, while the region's
success in exploiting service sector opportunities will be a major factor in
determining its overall economic performance in the next two decades.
Within the
services sectors, an agreement to liberalize professional services would
benefit countries such as Panama that significantly restrict employment of
foreign professionals. Such restrictions, unless eased, could severely hamper
the effectiveness of Panama's City of Knowledge (Ciudad del Saber), an R&D
and educational complex planned for the site of the former Ft. Clayton.
Ernest
Preeg (1998: 1-4), a former U.S. trade negotiator and ambassador, argues that
the current "third wave" of globalization differs qualitatively from
the previous two (1870-1914 and 1950-70). Preeg maintains that three mutually
reinforcing stimuli - (1) the triumph of economic liberalism, (2) the
information-technology revolution, and (3) the internationalism of private
enterprise - enhance the benefits of globalization and make it more inexorable.
Greater
openness may produce faster economic growth over the long run, but recent
experience in Central America and the rest of the hemisphere makes clear that
trade and financial liberalization also increases short-run economic and human
vulnerability to both internal and external events (Emmerij 1997: 27-31). The
costs of inappropriate economic policies or lack of export diversification
would thus increase if globalization proceeds as Preeg envisions. Emmerij and
Fishlow (1997) rightly call for specific actions to reverse the growing
inequality that has usually (but not always) accompanied economic liberalization[21]. It is worth remembering, too, that the rapid expansion of Central
America's trade between 1950 and 1980 did little to reduce poverty and
sometimes aggravated income inequalities (Bulmer-Thomas 1987).
4.2.3. Financial
Flows. The increased availability of
private capital flows to Latin America generally, and Central America
specifically, has been a mixed blessing. As world financial markets continue to
become more globalized, the potential availability of private external
financing over the next two decades is not an issue, although the OECD (1997:
86) does not envision a dramatic rise in net capital flows to developing
countries by the year 2020. Rather, it expects that the close correspondence
between domestic savings and investment in developing countries, on average,
will continue to prevail.
Both
foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment in developing
countries by the OECD countries will likely increase. Transfers of OECD pension
assets to emerging markets could be $20 billion in 2000 and $35 million in 2020
(OECD 1997: 87-88).
Central
America is better prepared to take advantage of FDI than of portfolio
investment. Financial markets are weak, except in Panama, and they are
insufficiently regulated and supervised. Moreover, some countries have yet to
achieve the requisite macroeconomic stability for attracting significant
pension assets and other portfolio flows from abroad. Even in Panama, many
observers believe the financial sector will not greatly expand its existing
range of services, thus remaining a banking center and not offering the broad
array of financial services that Singapore provides for much of Asia. Indeed,
if the rest of Latin America were to become dollarized, Panama would be less
attractive even as a banking center, except for countries with relatively rigid
banking rules.
4.2.4.
Technological Progress. Central America will meet
its new technological challenges well only if it significantly improves both
the quantity and quality of its educational and training programs, so that its
labor force can move into new jobs requiring computer skills, critical thinking
and problem-solving abilities, and an understanding of economic globalization
processes. Costa Rica is making good progress toward putting computers in every
classroom, but the rest of the region is well behind in applying new technology
to the educational system.
The
following paragraphs look briefly at the implications of technological
progress in four key areas: telecommunications and information technology,
biotechnology, energy, and transport.
4.2.4.1.
Telecommunications and Information Technology.
Many observers believe that the speed, size, and cost of computers will
continue to improve over the next 20 years at the same rate as in the recent
past (Miller, Michalski, and Stevens 1998: 9). These improvements will lower
costs of information gathering and production processes. One observer believes
that "[f]ibre optics will in many parts of the world drop the cost of
telecommunications so low that it will be virtually free" (Coates 1998:
42).
In most of
Central America, the new telecommunications and information technology will
likely widen disparities in income and living standards for much of the next
two decades. Large producers - farmers, manufacturers, and service providers -
who continually take advantage of new technologies to obtain better market
information and reduce production costs, will increase their cost advantages
over smaller producers. At least in urban areas, small producers above a
minimum educational threshold should be able to purchase customized market
information at low cost from specialized firms with access to the Internet.
However, most will likely find it hard to finance cost-cutting capital
investments without significant financial deepening in the region, something
that may not occur until the second decade of the new century.
Still, the
effects of advances in telecommunications and information technology on poverty
may on balance be positive, at least in urban areas. Production costs for some
goods and services will be reduced, and competition from imports - in an
environment of liberalized trade - will ensure that some of these cost
reductions will be passed on to consumers.
4.2.4.2.
Biotechnology. Perhaps the greatest advances in
biotechnology will be in the field of human health (Miller, Michalski, and
Stevens 1998: 11-14). Where these advances have public health implications,
Central American populations as a whole will benefit. In other cases, the
benefits will be concentrated among those who can pay for specialized
medications and treatments.
Significant
technological advances are also expected in plant agriculture and animal
husbandry. Genetically modified (GM) seeds, already available, have improved
plant quality (e.g. by prolonging shelf life before spoilage); increased
resistance to weed killers and pests; and in some cases permitted cultivation
on poorer-quality land. Arber and Brauchbar (1998: 88) report that "[t]he
agro-food industry forecasts annual growth rates in the next few years of 40
per cent in the sale of genetically modified seed."
Such a
rapid expansion now seems unlikely, at least in the short and medium run, as
many consumers fear GM foods will have adverse health and environmental
effects. Particularly in Europe, sales of GM crops, as well as hormone-treated
beef, are restricted by both legal means and by lack of acceptance in the
marketplace. If research shows that health and environmental risks are minor,
resistance to GM products will likely fade, especially in the second decade of
the new century.
If
consumers in the developed countries eventually relax their resistance to
hormone-treated beef, Central America's beef exports, long in decline from their
heyday, could suffer further as yields increase in beef-importing countries.
Large yield increases in developed countries from genetically modified basic
grains would also hurt Central American producers, especially small farmers,
who would be slower to learn about the new seeds and financially less able to
acquire them. Some local production, especially with freer trade, would be
displaced by imports, and the resulting rural-urban migration would tend to
depress real wages for unskilled labor in the short and medium run. A positive
element is that Central American consumers would benefit from the price
reduction effects of yield increases.
4.2.4.3.
Energy. The emphasis of applied energy
research over the next 20 years will depend largely on whether the
global-warming controversy is resolved (Coates 1998: 39-40). If no clear
answer emerges, research will likely be diffused among efforts to improve
noncarbon fuel technologies (hydroelectric, nuclear, wind, solar, and
geothermal) and those to make exploration and exploitation more efficient for
petroleum, natural gas, and coal. If global warming came to be widely accepted
as a real threat, research would likely shift toward energy conservation
measures. Even so, many observers expect that most vehicles in 2020 will still
be powered by internal combustion engines.
The OECD
projects world energy demand between 1995 and 2020 to grow by 3.1% annually
under a high-growth scenario and 2.1% a year under a low-growth scenario,
slower than the respective GDP growth rates in these periods (4.8% and 3.1.%)
because of assumed increases in energy efficiency[22]. Still, real oil prices are assumed to rise under the high-growth
scenario by 2% annually between 1995 and 2010, and by 1% a year during
2010-2020; under the low-growth scenario, the assumed increases are 1.5% and
0.8%, respectively (OECD 1997: 63, 79-81). Since Central America imports almost
all its oil, the cumulative balance-of-payments effects of such increases in
real oil prices would be significant.
Central America's
most abundant energy resource is hydroelectric power. The large investments in
generating capacity needed over the next two decades will be difficult to
finance without private sector participation in electricity generation.
4.2.4.4.
Transport. A major obstacle to Central
America's ability to expand and diversify its exports more rapidly is the
generally high cost of international transport. Air and sea transport rates are
high partly because of low volumes and lack of competition. Air transport rates
(and passenger fares, which affect tourism earnings) should fall as the
countries of the region continue to move toward adoption of open-skies
policies. Low volume makes ocean-transport rates so high that goods can often
cross the Pacific Ocean more cheaply than the Gulf of Mexico. High port
charges, due partly to obsolete cargo-handling technology, add to overall
transport costs. Construction or modernization of container-handling facilities
can help reduce those costs, and the passage of time will solve some low-volume
problems as export levels increase. Still, many Central American ports are now
unable to handle larger vessels. The development of even larger cargo ships,
further reducing unit transport costs, would make some low-volume problems longer-lasting
and aggravate the region's comparative disadvantage. Central American
countries would find it even harder to fill ships that higher-volume Asian
producers could easily supply on a regular basis.
Panama,
which does handle large ocean-transport volumes, much of it for transshipment,
has responded well to changes in maritime transport technology and is
converting the Canal area into an integrated, multi-modal transport system. Two
major ports have been privatized, and private investment has financed two new
container ports on the Caribbean, putting Panama in a position to become Latin
America's leading container transshipment center. In 2000 Panama may handle one
million containers (Panama/ARI 1998: 5).
Planned
improvements to the Canal include continued widening of the Gaillard Cut and
construction of a third set of locks (Ardito-Barletta 1998: 9). A
trans-isthmian railroad, now being built, will be ready for cargo in 2001, and
a parallel freeway will facilitate trans-isthmian shipments by truck. Thus even
ships too large to go through the Canal will find it increasingly
cost-effective to bring cargo to one end of the Canal for transshipment by
other modes to the other end.
These
developments suggest that Panama's location continues to give it significant
advantages over its neighbors as a center of maritime transport. The new
investments put it in a good position to respond to further changes in maritime
transport technology, which probably will not be radical over the next 20 years[23]. The construction of a competing Canal elsewhere in Central America
seems increasingly unlikely, as does development of another transshipment
center similar to Panama's Colón Free Zone.
4.3.1. Agricultural Products. With world population growth expected to slow from 1.38% per year
during 1996-2000 to 1.08% annually during 2011-2020 (OECD 1997: 92), pressures
to meet demand for food will ease. The OECD's high-growth scenario envisions
effective demand for agricultural products as growing by 2.5% per year between
1995 and 2020, almost identical to actual growth during 1972-92, with about 80%
of incremental demand coming from developing countries. As world incomes rise,
demand patterns will shift toward high-value foods and nonfood products (OECD
1997: 77). Aggregate supply should not be a major problem, especially if
barriers to agricultural trade continue to come down, in which case
agricultural trade would grow rapidly[24].
The Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations, completed in 1994, significantly liberalized
world trade in agricultural products. Nevertheless, many tariff and nontariff
barriers to free trade remain. For Latin America as a whole, a major concern
is the persistence of export subsidies in both Europe and the United States
(Díaz-Bonilla and Reca 1999: 1). Central America has also strongly objected to
the (tariff-rate) quota imposed by the European Union (EU) in the early 1990s
on bananas, although Costa Rica has worked out an accommodation to the EU's
position.[25]
The price
and demand outlook for bananas over the next 20 years is probably more
favorable than that for most of Central America's other traditional
agricultural exports, such as coffee and sugar. Even more favorable are the
prospects for exports of fruits and vegetables that only recently have become
important in the region, such as melons, pineapple, broccoli, and snow peas,
and for nonfood products such as cut flowers and ornamental plants, for which
the income-elasticity of demand is high. Cultivated shrimp, another important
new export, also has good potential for further expansion. While some observers
have strongly criticized nontraditional agricultural exports (NTAEs) because of
environmental, health, and other concerns, their benefits have been
considerable, and many of the problems are amenable to solutions[26].
An
increase in global demand for beef of 50% is anticipated between 1995 and 2020,
mostly in developing countries (Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Rosegrant
1999: 11). However, as noted above, prospects for Central America's beef
exports are not good.
World
agricultural trade will likely become more liberalized over the next 20 years
through periodic WTO negotiations. Article 20 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture called for new negotiations on agriculture to begin by 31 December
1999. The initial pace of liberalization will probably be slow.
Croome
(1998: 7) believes the next round of negotiations will focus on lowering tariff
ceilings and further restricting subsidies, rather than on fundamentally
altering the existing framework. The major uncertainty is the EU's willingness
to reduce domestic and export subsidies under its costly Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP), whose structure needs to be reconsidered in the light of the
planned accession to the EU of Eastern European countries much more dependent
on agriculture than current EU members.
In the new
WTO negotiations, Latin American countries will seek lower tariffs on the
fruits, vegetables, sugar, meat, and dairy products they export (Díaz-Bonilla
and Reca 1999: 1). Central American countries will also be looking for a quick
resolution of their banana dispute with the EU. Central America would benefit
from these liberalization measures; but it may suffer from freer trade in basic
grains, whose long-term price trend is likely to continue downward
(Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Rosegrant 1999: 17). Over the long run,
small farmers forced by economic pressures to abandon agriculture and migrate
to urban areas will be absorbed into manufacturing and services, where their
productivity on average will be higher. In the short run, however, their
incomes are likely to fall - a pattern that is the norm in response to
structural economic change (Adelman and Morris 1977).
4.3.2.
Manufactured Goods. World trade in consumer
goods, especially textiles and apparel, is expected to grow rapidly in the
next 20 years (OECD 1997: 73)[27]. This is good news for Central America's maquila operations, as well as
its manufacturing industries with much higher value added. This rosy picture,
however, and the successes achieved to date, can easily breed complacency. If
maquila operations continue to concentrate on simple apparel items, real wages
will tend not to rise; if they did, wage levels would diverge from productivity
and these footloose activities would migrate to lower-wage countries.
Productivity (and real-wage) increases can be achieved if the region makes the
investments in human capital needed to shift into assembly operations or other
manufacturing activities requiring higher skill levels, such as electronics.
Even within the apparel industry, a more skilled labor force would permit a
shift to higher-value, customized products for niche markets.
Sourcing
of components abroad by firms in the industrial countries is likely to continue
its rapid growth, facilitated by greater use of the Internet. By the early
1990s, about one-third of world trade in manufactures, or some $800 billion,
was in parts and components (World Bank 1999: 33). This trend will create
opportunities for traditional manufacturing activities as well as maquila
operations.
4.3.3.
Tourism. Tourism is highly competitive
worldwide, but prospects for continued growth of world demand mean that even
less competitive countries have some scope for expanding tourism services. For
sun-and-sand tourism, Central American countries have a higher local
value-added content than many of their Caribbean competitors because they can
provide more locally produced foodstuffs, construction materials, and other
inputs. But this type of tourism is not the most dynamic segment of the market.
Ecotourism, ethnotourism, adventure tourism, and other such segments, although
constituting only about 5% of the market, have been growing by 25%-30% a year,
compared to 4% for sun-and-sand tourism (INCAE/CLACDS and HIID 1999: 79).
The World
Tourism Organization (1994) has projected a slowing in the growth of worldwide
tourist arrivals, from 3.8% annually during 1990-2000 to 3.55% during
2000-2010. The study does not provide projections specifically for Central
America, virtually ignoring this region while viewing favorably the prospects
of other Latin American countries. One is left with the impression that Central
America must be an uninteresting place for tourists[28].
As noted
in section 3, however, tourism in Central America has grown faster than many
observers expected. Overnight visitors rose from 1.876.000 in 1990 to 2.565.000
in 1995[29], a healthy annual growth of 6.5% (WTO, Compendium, various
issues). Excluding Costa Rica, the growth rate was a more moderate 4.3%. Costa
Rica has successfully stimulated ecotourism, mainly because it has taken
environmental preservation seriously, effectively packaged tours to protected
areas, made supporting investments in infrastructure, and improved the overall
environment for private investment.
The
Central American tourist industry has adopted an ambitious set of goals: (1) to
covert tourism into the region's largest source of foreign exchange earnings;
(2) to attract 8 million visitors, spending US$4 billion, by 2005; and (3) to
achieve world-class standards of service. Given an estimated 3.544.000 visitors
in 1998, spending $2.185 billion, the implied annual growth rates between 1998
and 2005 are 12.3% for numbers of tourists and 9.0% for nominal tourism
earnings (INCAE/CLACDS and HIID 1999: 37). The experience of the 1990s suggests
that these targets are feasible (see Table 4); but they will not be achieved
easily, partly because tourism growth in Costa Rica has slowed, as high rates
from a relatively low base could not be sustained indefinitely.
The
expansion of Central American tourism could be slowed or even temporarily
halted if a regime change were to occur in Cuba. Although tourism in Cuba has
already reached significant proportions[30], considerable potential exists for attracting visitors from the United
States who at present can go there only with some difficulty and added
expenses. A new Cuban regime would have a strong incentive to promote
additional tourism, since this sector is better prepared than most others in
that economy to create jobs and foreign exchange earnings in the short and
medium term. A diversion of U.S. tourists to Cuba would probably affect Central
America less than the Caribbean; any efforts to measure the extent and duration
of those effects would be speculative.
4.3.4.
Other Services. World trade in services grew by
8.7% annually between 1980 and 1995, nearly double the 4.5% annual growth rate for
merchandise trade (OECD 1997: 37). The volume of services trade is
significantly underestimated: "current balance-of-payments statistics …
fail to reflect transactions like cross-border intra-firm exchange of
technology and financial advice, remote data processing and transmission, and
the revenue from services offered in the host country by foreign affiliates of
multinationals" (OECD 1997: 37).
The OECD
(1997: 38) estimates that it is technically feasible to shift abroad 12%-16% of
service jobs in the G7 countries. If it were economically attractive for 10%
of such jobs to move overseas, "as of 1990 the potential additional
exports from developing countries to the G7 was estimated at around $40 billion
(or 6 per cent of non-OECD countries' total exports)."
Within
Central America only Costa Rica and, in the financial sector, Panama have begun
to tap significantly into this potential. In June 1999 Proctor and Gamble
announced it would invest $60 million to build a Global Business Services
center in Costa Rica, employing some 1.500 persons in finance and accounting,
customer orders, payroll, travel management, purchasing, and information
technology[31]. A significant improvement in the numbers and quality of skilled human
resources will be necessary for other Central American countries to begin
attracting such investments.
Panama has
great potential for developing or expanding various maritime services, which
the Autoridad de la Región Interoaceánica (ARI) is actively promoting
(Ardito-Barletta 1998: 18).
The
ambitious goals of the FTAA go beyond the areas currently covered by the WTO
to include a common investment regime, government procurement (which the WTO
may deal with in its next round of negotiations), and competition policy[32]. Whether the negotiations will in fact be completed by 2005 is unclear.
Both the United States and Brazil could be major stumbling blocks.
Just how
the FTAA might be established, if at all, is something of a mystery. A few
years ago, it seemed possible that the CACM would join NAFTA as a single unit
before 2005[33]. Central America's early accession to NAFTA now seems unlikely, both
because of opposition in the United States to the expansion of NAFTA and
because the requisite Central American unity is lacking.
Even if
negotiations were to be completed by 2005, the FTAA would not likely become
operational until about 2007, and its tariff-reduction provisions would be
phased in gradually over perhaps 10-15 years. Its impact on Central America
between now and 2020 would thus be modest. Moreover, Central America already
enjoys duty-free access to the U.S. market for the great majority of its
exports. Approval by the U.S. Congress and president of "NAFTA
parity" legislation, which seems likely but not certain, would benefit
Central America by extending duty-free access, particularly to textiles and
apparel. Still, NAFTA's negative effects on Central America's maquila
operations have been exaggerated.
Perhaps
the greatest potential effect of NAFTA and the FTAA on Central America is one
that is difficult to measure: the stimulus it is providing governments to
improve their economic policies, thus enabling the region to take better
advantage of opportunities for expansion in all economic sectors.
The strong
recovery of intra-CACM trade since 1986 has been facilitated both by the
region's economic recovery and by the tariff reductions, agreed to earlier in
the 1990s, whose gradual implementation will be completed in 2000. Further
progress in economic integration has stalled, however, for reasons discussed in
the essay by Luis Guillermo Solís. Moreover, it seems unlikely in the near
future that either Belize or Panama would wish to join the CACM, or that the
CACM countries would welcome them. More closely integrated economies within
Central America would especially benefit agriculture, finance, and transport.
Panama
currently has only modest economic relationships with the CACM countries. Only
6% of its imports in 1998 came from its northern neighbors, with Costa Rica
providing about half this amount. Panamanian banks and commercial and
industrial enterprises have made few investments in the CACM countries.
Panamanians tend to view the CACM, despite its aggregate GDP of more than $50
billion, as an uninteresting market with currency and other risks that are not
present, or are less serious, in Panama. Some observers believe closer financial
links between Panama and the CACM could develop through Panama's bolsa de
valores (securities exchange), which is closely linked to its banks.
Central
America's economic-growth potential in the next two decades lies primarily in
the services sectors, and secondarily in manufacturing, including maquila
operations. In agriculture, traditional exports will continue to decline
relatively and sometimes absolutely. Agriculture's overall growth will depend
on countries' abilities to (1) continue diversifying their exports; and (2)
reduce poverty and narrow income inequality, thus increasing effective demand
for domestic foodstuffs. Changes in the structure of production will depend on
how well the region exploits sectoral growth opportunities.
Overall
economic performance will depend not only on national economic policies and
entrepreneurial dynamism, but also on world demand for the region's potential
exports. The degree to which intraregional (CACM) and hemispheric (FTAA) integration
advances will also influence GDP growth, although to a lesser degree.
Given
these multiple forces affecting Central America's economic growth potential,
one could develop many alternative scenarios for the trajectory of GDP and its
sectoral composition. However, three scenarios (base, high-growth, and
low-growth), summarized in Table 5, should suffice to illustrate different
possible outcomes.
The
scenarios are developed for the region as a whole, as time and space
considerations preclude aggregate and sectoral growth calculations for each
country. Actual growth, of course, will vary by country. Since skilled human
resources are a major determinant of long-term economic growth, Costa Rica and
Panama are currently best able to exploit growth opportunities, other things
being equal, while Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua are the most
disadvantaged.
The base
scenario, or one of reasonably competent "muddling through," assumes
that Central America will achieve a (compound) annual growth rate of 4.5%, or
2.4% per capita[34]. The region's real per capita GDP in 1997 prices would rise from $1.630
in 1997 to $2.790 in 2020, an increase of 71%. This scenario assumes that most
or all of following conditions will prevail:
·
moderate world economic growth
(somewhat better than the OECD's low-growth scenario), with periodic
disruptions by financial and political crises of more than localized impact;
·
additional debt relief, especially
for Honduras and Nicaragua;
·
relatively slow progress in further
trade liberalization (global, hemispheric, and intraregional), but with no
worsening of average protectionism;
·
continued but slow progress in
Central American macroeconomic and microeconomic policies and modernization of
the state;
·
a relatively modest pace of social
and human-resource development in Central America, which at best only
preserves existing gaps between the region and the rest of the world;
·
modest improvements in environmental
protection, through reduction or elimination of harmful subsidies and better
protection of national parks; and
·
continued advances in democratic
development, but few major breakthroughs in decentralizing public-sector
functions, strengthening civil society, improving personal security, reducing
discrimination against women and minority groups, and strengthening the rule
of law.
The major
shifts in the structure of production would be away from agriculture (17.9% to
13.7% of GDP) and public administration (9.1% to 7.3%) and toward the private
services sectors (50.0% to 55.2%). Manufacturing would retain its share at
16.0%, as continued rapid growth in maquila exports, although at a less heady
pace than in the 1990s, would offset sluggish production for domestic and
regional markets in the face of strong competition from imports[35]. The presumed 3.3% growth rate for agriculture (1.2% per capita) is
respectable if one takes into account the relatively poor outlook for
traditional exports.
The
assumption of public sector growth hides different trends in the various
countries. For example, significantly increased spending on education and
health would be required for Guatemala and El Salvador to approach the shares
of GDP accounted for by these sectors elsewhere in Central America. On the
other hand, all countries have considerable scope for improving the efficiency
of public expenditures by reducing total employment while decompressing salary
scales to relate pay more closely to productivity. The scope for further
reducing military spending is limited because significant reductions have
already taken place.
The
relatively high growth rate of 5.0% for mining, utilities, and construction
(combined in Table 5) reflects in part an assumption that the recent rapid
growth of mining will continue. Also likely is substantial infrastructure
construction, with the private sector playing an increasingly important role.
Among
private services, which account for half the region's GDP in current prices in
1997[36], the sectors assumed to have above-average growth rates for the group
as a whole are trade, restaurants, and hotels (which includes most of the
tourism industry); transport, storage, and communications; and finance,
insurance, and business services. Real estate and other services are assumed to
grow at below-average rates.
The
high-growth scenario envisions an annual GDP growth rate of 6%, less than the
very ambitious rate of approximately 7.2% implied by the INCAE-HIID Agenda
(1999: 119, 134)[37]. Per capita GDP in 2020 would be 137% higher than in 1997, rising to
$3.870 in 1997 dollars. A 6% rate of growth is desirable and feasible, but it
would require an especially favorable set of circumstances, including most of
the following:
·
rapid world economic growth, close
to the OECD's high-growth scenario;
·
additional debt relief, especially
for Honduras and Nicaragua;
·
a successful outcome to the new WTO
negotiations, including agreements on further liberalization of trade in
agriculture and services, as well as additional trade liberalization under
subsequent WTO negotiating rounds;
·
establishment of the Free Trade Area
of the Americas;
·
deeper and broader economic
integration within Central America, converting the current scheme into one
that begins to look like a true common market and includes, sometime before
2020, the adoption of a common currency;
·
significant investments to improve
the quality of human capital, and effectively targeted programs to provide poor
households better access to other factors of production;
·
accelerated privatization of
government enterprises and infrastructure, and other mechanisms to permit
greater private investment in, and management of, infrastructure projects;
·
maintenance of sound macroeconomic
policies, more rapid implementation of microeconomic-policy and structural
reforms, and accelerated efforts to improve the efficiency of government
operations;
·
aggressive implementation of pricing
policies, enforcement actions, educational campaigns, and other measures to
limit or reverse processes of environmental deterioration; and
·
a significant strengthening of the
various elements of democratic development identified in the base scenario.
The
high-growth scenario would produce greater changes in the structure of
production than the base scenario. Agriculture, despite growing more rapidly
(4.2% annually) than under the base scenario (3.3%), would see its share of GDP
drop by almost a third, from 17.9% in 1997 to 12.1% in 2020. Public
administration would grow by 4.5% a year, but its share would decline sharply
from 9.1% to 6.5%. Manufacturing's share would remain at 16.0%. Its 6.0% growth
rate would reflect (1) countries' success in moving away from low-skill maquila
operations toward more skill-intensive export production making greater use of
local raw materials, and (2) greater economies of scale in production for
domestic and regional markets as a result of more complete regional
integration. Mining, utilities, and construction together are again assumed to
grow more rapidly than aggregate GDP.
The private
services sectors are projected to grow at an annual rate of 6.7%. This strong
performance assumes that effective public-private partnerships, national and
regional, will create a dynamic tourism industry. It also assumes that intra-
and extraregional trade will increase notably as a percentage of GDP, thus
stimulating commercial activities as well as the transport, storage, and
communications sector. Finally, this scenario envisions the modernization and
rapid expansion of finance, insurance, and business services, reflecting the
establishment of private pension systems; stronger, better supervised and
regulated financial institutions offering a wider range of services to their
customers and providing loans at lower real interest rates; the establishment
of significant regional financial institutions and capital markets; a large
increase in demand for various types of insurance; and an explosion in the
application of modern information technology.
The
low-growth scenario assumes annual GDP growth of 3%, resulting in a cumulative
increase in per capita GDP of only 23% between 1997 and 2020. An even worse
outcome is possible, but given recent policy reforms in the region, as well as
a reduction in debt burdens, the probability of an outcome similar to the
"lost decade" of the 1980s seems relatively low.
The
low-growth scenario would result from most or all of the following
circumstances:
·
slow growth of the world economy, at
or below the growth rate assumed in the OECD's low-growth scenario;
·
relatively little additional debt
relief, either because of lack of agreement among donor countries and
international agencies, or because of policy backsliding in Central America;
·
little progress in trade
liberalization under WTO agreements, and perhaps more protectionist policies in
the OECD countries;
·
continued failure by most Central
American countries to adopt policy and institutional reforms needed to achieve
significant improvements in educational systems and training programs;
·
slow progress in privatization and
other arrangements necessary to stimulate more private sector involvement in
the construction, operation, and maintenance of infrastructure;
·
frequent backsliding on economic
policy reforms, resulting in failure to consolidate a key element of a
favorable investment climate;
·
slow progress in improving property
rights; lowering the transaction costs of customs procedures, transport,
business registry, and other government operations; and eliminating price
distortions that misallocate resources;
·
lack of attention to policies,
programs, and projects that protect the environment; and
·
relatively slow progress in the
various aspects of democratic development.
The
low-growth scenario would result in little change in the structure of
production. Agriculture's share of GDP would fall only from 17.9% to 16.0%, as
its growth rate would be closer to that of aggregate GDP than under the other
scenarios. World demand for traditional agricultural exports would be weak,
but the region could still have much success with nontraditional exports.
Production for the domestic (and Central American) market would not grow
rapidly because a 3.0% growth rate in aggregate GDP would limit the effective
demand for food.
Manufacturing
would grow somewhat faster (3.5%) than aggregate GDP, mainly because of the
performance of maquila production, although these activities would lose some
dynamism because of the slow growth of world demand as well as insufficient
attention to productivity growth and skills upgrading. Manufacturing's share
of GDP would rise to 17.9% by 2020.
Mining,
construction, and utilities are assumed to grow jointly by 3.5%, with mining
growing faster than construction and utilities. The combined share of these
sectors would rise from 7.0% of GDP to 7.8%.
Public
administration is assumed to grow by only 2.5%, as sluggish revenue collection,
combined with strong internal and external pressure to contain fiscal deficits,
would limit desirable growth in social spending. The share of public
administration in GDP would fall from 9.1% to 8.1%.
The slow
(3.0%) growth of private services reflects, among other factors, disappointing
growth in tourism (due to both slow world economic growth and to ineffective
promotional efforts), and inadequate financial modernization. The share of
private services in GDP thus remains virtually the same at about 50%.
Both the
external environment and domestic (and regional) policy choices by the Central
American countries will determine which scenario will most closely approximate
the course of the region's development over the next two decades. While the
Central American countries can do little to affect their external environment,
their small influence would be enhanced by negotiating in the WTO, FTAA, and
other international fora as a single unit.
That
single unit, for now, would seem to exclude Belize and Panama, although their
eventual incorporation into a true Central American common market seems
feasible by 2020. An expanded CACM would be facilitated by further trade
liberalization; strengthening and maintenance of sound macroeconomic policies;
adoption of a single currency by the five current CACM members; and demographic
and other changes that are converting Belize from a predominantly Caribbean
country to one culturally and economically more rooted in Central America.
The
process of economic development is too complex for economists to tackle alone.
The widening inequalities associated with Latin American countries' recovery
from the debt crisis of the 1980s (Berry 1997; Bulmer-Thomas 1996) make clear
that blind faith in markets is misplaced. Successful, sustainable responses to
the challenges of globalization require national strategies with an integrated
focus on four goals: (1) economic growth; (2) poverty reduction; (3)
environmental protection; and (4) participatory democracy. In addition, deeper
and broader regional integration can enhance the Central American countries'
participation in the world economy.
This
section focuses mainly on economy-wide and sectoral reforms that would
facilitate economic growth. The other three elements of the strategy outlined
above, as well as regional integration, receive only brief attention, as they
are covered in detail in other essays. Finally, I offer recommendations to the
international community for making development assistance to Central America
more effective.
6.2.1.
Introduction. Economic growth is the most
important means for reducing poverty over the long run. It also facilitates
(but does not guarantee) the solution of some environmental problems and the
strengthening of democratic participation.
A key
determinant of economic growth is the amount and productivity of investment,
especially private investment. While governments still have a key role to play
in providing basic infrastructure, private investors are generally more
efficient than bureaucrats as enterprise managers. Further privatizations of
directly productive activities would both improve efficiency and strengthen the
public finances.
The case
for privatization extends to infrastructure, the expansion of which will
require both higher public savings rates and more private investment. This is
especially the case for heavily indebted Honduras and Nicaragua, whose public
sectors have little capacity to finance new investment because of insufficient
domestic resources and an inability to contract non-concessional external loans[38].
6.2.2.
Macroeconomic Policy. An essential requirement
for stimulating private investment - and both private and public savings - is
to keep fiscal and external deficits low, not for just a few years, but reasonably
consistently over time to establish credibility. Macroeconomic stability
minimizes domestic inflationary pressures and exchange rate fluctuations, thus
reducing risks and uncertainties faced by private investors. Controlling
inflationary pressures particularly benefits the poor.
All
Central American countries have made great strides toward fiscal stability, but
backsliding episodes (e.g., Honduras in 1992-93, Costa Rica on several
occasions) still occur. Further progress toward fiscal stability does not
always mean cutting expenditures. In El Salvador and especially Guatemala, the
need for higher levels of social spending means that revenue increases deserve
priority.
Keeping
external deficits low will require vigilant monetary policy to control import
demand, as well as actions to ensure that exports remain competitive.
6.2.3.
Reform of the State[39]. The ideological debate over state
vs. market in Latin America, as elsewhere, has given way to a more balanced
dialogue recognizing that streamlining, strengthening, and transforming the
state are more important than dismantling it. All Central American countries
have made progress in public sector reform during the 1990s, but all have much
to do to create modern and efficient states that can strongly support their
private sectors, stimulate new private investment, and meet the other
challenges of the 21st century.
Key
reforms needed are those to (a) privatize most remaining state enterprises and
improve the efficiency of the others; (b) eliminate arbitrary regulations that
impose high transaction costs on private businesses; (c) strengthen supervision
and regulation of the financial sector, private monopolies and oligopolies; (d)
rationalize and decentralize overstaffed central bureaucracies, especially in
the social sectors, that are out of touch with local concerns; (e) decompress
public sector salary structures that inhibit the hiring and retention of highly
capable managers, administrators, and professional and technical specialists;
(f) modernize and professionalize legal and judicial structures that
inadequately protect private property (physical and intellectual); and (g)
adopt or strengthen integrated financial management systems that permit better
detection of tax evasion, expenditure misallocations, and corrupt practices in
general.
Sectoral
policies should be guided by a long-run vision recognizing that economic growth
will depend increasingly on the expansion of private services and the
performance of manufacturing and maquila operations. However, for a number of
years agriculture will continue to be the primary source of employment and net
foreign exchange earnings, except in Panama, and its performance thus remains
important to aggregate economic growth.
6.3.1.
Financial Sector Reforms. Recent financial crises in
Latin America and Asia illustrate the importance of a strong financial sector
to sustainable economic growth. Full financial liberalization in countries with
weak banking systems is especially risky. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find
that currency crises typically have been preceded by banking crises, which in
turn are often preceded by capital inflows, credit expansion, and an overvalued
currency in the wake of financial liberalization. The clear lesson is that
regulatory and supervisory reforms, much needed in Central America, deserve a
high priority[40].
Except for
Panama, with its dollarized economy, competitive financial services sector, and
(since 1998) strong supervisory and regulatory framework, banking operations in
Central America are inefficient, as reflected in high intermediation margins[41]. As interest rates are deregulated throughout the region, these large
spreads translate into high real interest rates to borrowers, thus discouraging
some potential productive investments.
The
minimal presence of foreign banks, except in Panama, means that an important
stimulus to improved banking efficiency is missing (World Bank 1999: 78-79). A
true common market, especially with a common currency, would make Central
America much more attractive to foreign banks.
Public
pay-as-you-go pension systems in Central America are inefficient, inequitable,
and either technically insolvent or heading there. They should be replaced or
reformed and supplemented with private, individually financed schemes such as
those in El Salvador and Panama, which became operational in 1998.
Private
pension schemes should strongly stimulate savings and the development of
national capital markets. Movement toward a regional capital market, at least
among the five CACM countries, already is incipient. Stronger linkages to
Panama's capital market also appear likely. Belize's participation in a
regional capital market seems more distant.
A key
issue being widely debated now is dollarization. Panama adopted the U.S. dollar
as its currency early in the 20th century. The CACM countries had all
maintained fixed exchange rates with the dollar for long periods until the
1980s. As their currencies depreciated, and then were formally devalued, the
dollar was increasingly adopted as a parallel currency, and most dollar
transactions eventually were legalized. The potential benefits of
dollarization seem clear, but a major risk is that it restricts economic
adjustment options. Moreover, the U.S. Treasury or Federal Reserve System would
not likely serve as lender of last resort or cooperate in supervision.
Neither
regionwide (CACM) dollarization nor the adoption of a single currency seems
feasible in the short or medium term. The requisite macroeconomic stability and
harmonization of policies have not been established. Only El Salvador has the
combination of sound policies, high foreign exchange reserves, and
international levels of inflation needed to make dollarization a viable option
in the near term[42]. The long period required for the European Union (EU) to adopt a common
currency, which some EU countries still have not accepted, should make clear
how difficult this step is. Nevertheless, a fully dollarized Central America,
or the adoption of a common CACM currency, is a reasonable policy target by
2020.
6.3.2.
Tourism. To achieve their ambitious goals
for tourism development, Central American countries will need to improve their
promotional efforts; increase investment in infrastructure; promote more
competition in international air travel to reduce relatively high fare
structures; and take stronger actions to address personal security and
environmental concerns[43]. Promotional activities should be increased in Europe, as 83% of
tourist arrivals in 1995 came from the Western Hemisphere[44].
At the
regional level, Central American tourism ministers, acting through the Consejo
Centroamericano de Turismo (CCT), approved in July 1999 the establishment of an
Organización Centroamericano de Turismo (OCAT) as a mixed entity with both public
and private sector representation[45]. Meanwhile, the Government of Taiwan (China) has provided grants
totaling $1 million to the Secretaría de Integración Centroamericana (SICA) and
the Secretaría de Integración Turística Centroamericana (SITCA)[46]. This apparent fragmentation of the institutional structure may limit
the effectiveness of regional promotional efforts. These efforts will also
founder if public sector institutions are unable to work effectively with the
private sector, as is supposed to occur, appropriately, under OCAT.
The
difficulties of effective regional cooperation are illustrated by the slow
progress in implementing the "Mundo Maya" project, which seeks to
promote multi-country tourism to Mayan sites in southeastern Mexico, Belize, Guatemala,
and Honduras. Stronger national efforts, with the collaborative involvement of
the public and private sectors, are probably a prerequisite to effective
regional cooperation.
6.3.3.
Informatics Services. Demand for informatics
services is expected to grow rapidly in the first two decades of the 21st
century. However, Central America will be poorly placed to exploit these opportunities
without improvements in the quality of education and training programs,
including basic and specialized computer skills. Costa Rica is well ahead of
its neighbors in taking actions to develop informatics exports. Panama could
strengthen its ability to compete in this area by relaxing its tight
restrictions on employing foreign professionals.
6.3.4. International Transportation Services. Panama not only has a strong lead
over the other countries of the region, but also is moving faster to expand and
diversify these services. Privatization has stimulated new construction and
significantly reduced shipping costs. Elsewhere in Central America, new
investments in port services, and in road access to ports, are needed to
improve export competitiveness. Most will have to be made by the private
sector, given limited public resources and increased internal and external pressures
on governments to expand and improve social services.
6.3.5.
Manufacturing. Many Central Americans have
embraced the "competitiveness" theories of Michael Porter and his
colleagues at Harvard, who together with collaborators at the Instituto Centroamericano
de Administración de Empresas (INCAE) have identified "clusters" of
manufacturing and service activities with potential for significant expansion
in the 21st century, based on innovation and productivity growth (INCAE/CLACDS
and HIID 1999). The manufacturing clusters regarded as having the greatest
potential are agribusiness and textiles and apparel. The other clusters are
tourism and electronics and software services.
Although
the focus on clusters represents a type of "industrial-programming"
policy whose record in Asia has been mixed, the most important policy
recommendations focus on the economy-wide actions and financial sector reforms
discussed earlier in this section and investment in human capital. The
industrial programming aspects include targeting public infrastructure
investments to enhance economies of scale and scope in clusters of related
enterprises; close collaboration between the public and private sectors to
identify specific obstacles in various branches of manufacturing; and
promotional activities to lure specific foreign investors. The rationale is
that markets do not work by themselves: government action can both improve
their functioning and guide investors in the most productive directions.
"Free-market"
extremists might criticize the clusters strategy as an ill-fated attempt to
"pick winners". However, the clusters chosen are already demonstrated
winners in Central America. The strategy appropriately seeks to strengthen
their competitive advantage in a dynamic, not just static context.
For the
Central American countries to take good advantage of opportunities provided by
the trend toward increased outsourcing of components, particularly important
requirements are measures to liberalize and strengthen their telecommunications
and transportation sectors (World Bank 1999: 65).
6.3.6.
Maquila Operations. Policies related to maquila
operations require a longer-run vision than exists now in the region, except
perhaps in Costa Rica. One recognized element of a long-run vision is that
NAFTA poses a challenge to Central American maquila exports. Other things
equal, lower U.S. tariffs on Mexican goods make Central American products less
competitive. Thus Central American officials and business leaders have lobbied
hard in the United States for "NAFTA parity" legislation that would
eliminate Mexico's current advantage. To date, however, NAFTA has affected
Central American exports less than is widely believed[47].
A problem
with the fixation on NAFTA parity - whose enactment, although increasingly
likely, is still not certain - is that it diverts attention from the
"other things equal". In other words, Central American countries
need to be thinking more about actions they themselves can undertake to
maintain and enhance competitiveness. Especially important for the long term
is a vision for transforming maquila operations into more of a true
manufacturing activity by enhancing the skilled-labor and other domestic input
content of textile, electronics, and other assembly production, as many Asian
countries have done. Public investments in education and technical training are
a key component of this vision. Also, further trade liberalization within
Central America, to widen the market and stimulate more intra-industry
specialization, would enhance the competitiveness of locally produced inputs
other than labor.
6.3.7.
Agriculture. Central American countries, mainly
because of fiscal pressures, have eliminated most domestic price controls, many
other subsidies, and nearly all export taxes. Many import tariffs have also
been reduced. Additional price reforms would further improve resource
allocation and efficiency, although some producers would be affected adversely.
Other important measures would be improved land tenure security and, in
Honduras, reform of the ineffective timber auction system and other aspects of
forestry policy that discourage production and inadequately protect the
environment.
Considerable
scope exists for liberalizing intraregional trade in agricultural products,
which has not proceeded as far as free trade in manufactured goods. The CACM
countries continue to impose arbitrary tariff and nontariff measures against
each other, in response to pressures from national interest groups.
6.3.8.
Mining. Institutional weaknesses and legal
and judicial issues have limited new mining investments throughout the region.
Honduras, which has perhaps the best potential for minerals development, has
just adopted a new mining law, but it is too early to tell how much it has relieved
investors' worries about secure property rights and other aspects of the rule
of law.
Poverty
and income distribution issues are discussed in detail in Juan Pablo Pérez
Sáinz's contribution to the CA 2020 study. Still, it is worth emphasizing here
both the consistency between equity and economic growth goals and the
importance of the former to the latter. Poor households can do more to escape
poverty and contribute to national economic growth on their own if they have
more education and training and better access to other factors of production,
especially land and credit.
Governments
can promote greater equity by reducing costly and highly inequitable subsidies
such as that for higher education, and by better targeting other subsidies. Equitable
growth can also be fostered by reallocating expenditures, e.g. from university
to primary education, from hospitals to primary-care centers, and from primary-
and secondary-road systems to farm-to-market roads in poor areas with underdeveloped
agricultural potential.
Despite
more attention to environmental issues in public statements and documents
throughout Central America, progress in slowing, halting, or reversing
environmental deterioration has been slow. Environmental damage influences
competitiveness through such effects as lower crop yields, higher energy costs,
and deteriorating workers' health. Neglecting environmental problems may
benefit specific economic activities in the short run, but environmental costs
are passed on to society at large.
One might
question the appropriateness of attaching environmental conditions to free
trade agreements, which can be a convenient vehicle for protectionism; but
membership in the proposed FTAA likely will be conditioned on the adoption of
major programs to reduce environmental damage.
The
voluminous literature on the relationship between political democracy and
economic growth has produced findings that often are inconclusive or at least
complex. Clearly, political democracy, especially in the narrow sense of
electoral processes, does not automatically produce faster economic growth.
However, Remmer's (1993: 393) quantitative analysis of eight Latin American
countries concludes that "competitive elections have enhanced, rather than
undermined, the capacity of political leaders to address outstanding problems
of macroeconomic management."
Apart from
electoral reforms, economic growth can be strengthened by:
·
legal reforms and an improved
administration of justice, which strengthen property rights, lower the costs of
dispute settlement, and reduce the likelihood of arbitrary applications of the
law;
·
measures to reduce criminal
activity, which causes businesses to make significant investments in security
systems and services and to raise risk premiums required as part of profit
margins;
·
decentralization of some government
programs, ideally by transferring financial as well as administrative
authority:
·
greater scope for non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to administer social service and environmental programs,
and for other civil society groups that can play important watchdog roles;
·
more rapid movement toward both
legal and especially de facto equality of opportunity for women and minority
groups; and
·
greater freedom of association, to
allow various groups a reasonably equal opportunity to negotiate for economic,
social, and cultural objectives in the political arena and the workplace.
Intraregional
agricultural trade still faces significant barriers. Removing them would help
Central American basic grains producers survive in freer world markets for
these commodities. Key complementary measures include improving the
intraregional road network and reducing the transaction costs of border
crossings.
Strong
regional financial institutions and capital markets would accelerate the
expansion of intraregional financial flows that already is taking place, but
the development of such institutions depends in part on stronger supervision
and regulation of banks and other financial institutions at the national
level. Greater exchange rate and macroeconomic policy stability would
strengthen the climate for the development of regional financial institutions
and capital markets, as would adoption of a common currency. A dollar-based
CACM economy would strengthen the currently weak links between the CACM and
Panama and facilitate access by private businesses to long-term finance at
interest rates lower than those now available. It might also stimulate stronger
links between the CACM and Belize.
Removing
barriers to the cross-border provision of transport, storage, and
communications services would lower transaction costs for intraregional trade
in goods. Both goods and services sectors would benefit from freer movement of
professionals within the region.
Structural
adjustment experiences in Latin America, and more recently in Asia, have made
clear the need to better address issues of poverty, income distribution, and
even the hardships suffered by middle-class segments of society. Strong IFI
support for social investment funds in Latin America and elsewhere reflects
increased donor sensitivity to these issues. The next step is to reorient the
primary focus of these funds away from temporary job creation (poverty
alleviation) and more toward directly productive activities that help reduce
poverty permanently by improving poor households' access to productive assets.
In some
(but not all) circumstances, IFIs should allow more time for deficits caused by
internal or external shocks to be reduced, and provide adequate and timely
resources in the interim to dampen pressures for inflationary domestic
financing. At the same time, they need to make clear their readiness to
withhold disbursements in the event of policy lapses, thus bolstering
investors' confidence that needed fiscal adjustments will be made.
Donor
financing of various fora can strengthen the role of civil society in planning,
programming, and monitoring development assistance in a climate that emphasizes
cooperation, a focus on technical analysis instead of polemics, and a spirit of
compromise.
Donors can
promote cooperative approaches to economic and social reform by providing more
support for activities that deepen understanding of economic and social policy
issues by government policy makers, business leaders, civil society
representatives, the media, and the public at large. These include:
·
periodic conferences and public
debates on key policy issues, with presentations by representatives of a wide
range of public and private sector groups, and formal comments by independent
discussants to put pressure on all participants to emphasize argumentation
supported by evidence rather than polemics;
·
support for research and
publications by local universities, think tanks, business organizations, and
other groups representing a wide range of political and social viewpoints, to
stimulate competition among them that improves the quality of their analysis
and the subsequent public debate;
·
short courses on economic and social
policy topics for professionals, administrators, and managers from a wide
range of public and private sector groups (both separately and jointly),
including representatives of the media;
·
visits by mixed groups (including
civil society and media representatives) to observe successful policies,
programs, and projects in other Latin American countries; and
·
long-term training abroad (or within
Central America, in institutions such as INCAE) in economics, business and
public administration, policy analysis, and related topics.
None of
these activities will have major immediate impacts. But my observations in
Costa Rica and El Salvador over the last two decades convince me that their
combined, cumulative effects over the long run can be powerful. The most
important need now is to incorporate equity issues more fully, and
analytically, into the policy debate.
Finally,
and again with a long-run perspective, donors should increase support for
collection and analysis of better and more timely economic and social data.
This essay has shown that weak national accounts data in all Central American
countries impede a clear understanding of sectoral trends. Similarly, the lack
of good data on poverty and income distribution, except in Costa Rica, distorts
the debate on these issues in the directions of rhetoric and polemics. Donors
will need to find creative ways to convince governments that good data are
important for sound policy analysis.
Table
1
Central
America: Macroeconomic Indicators, Selected Years, 1978-1998
1978 1980 1983 1990 1997 1998
REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(GDP)
(Index, 1980 = 100)
Belize 90.8 100.0 98.9 162.5 207.1 214.2
Costa Rica 94.6 100.0 93.2 126.9 164.0 174.2
El Salvador 118.3 100.0 85.2 96.2 137.6 142.0
Guatemala 92.1 100.0 94.6 109.1 144.4 151.5
Honduras 94.9 100.0 100.2 127.1 164.7 169.7
Nicaragua a/ 130.0 100.0 109.3 87.2 103.3 107.5
Panama b/ 98.7 100.0 109.7 114.5 161.1 167.4
REAL PER CAPITA GDP
(Index, 1980 = 100)
Belize 94.6 100.0 91.5 125.5 133.4 134.3
Costa Rica 100.4 100.0 85.4 94.9 101.5 105.3
El Salvador 122.6 100.0 86.2 86.9 111.0 112.8
Guatemala 97.5 100.0 86.9 81.9 88.7 90.5
Honduras 100.7 100.0 91.6 94.9 101.0 101.4
Nicaragua 138.3 100.0 99.7 64.2 61.3 61.9
Panama 94.1 100.0 101.3 93.1 115.5 118.1
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT
(GDI)
(% of GDP) c/
Belize d/ n.a. 24.1 20.2 27.9 23.7 n.a.
Costa Rica 23.5 26.6 24.2 27.3 26.5 27.2
El Salvador e/ 19.6 13.3 12.1 13.9 15.0 n.a.
Guatemala 21.6 15.9 11.1 13.6 12.6 14.9
Honduras f/ 24.2 24.5 16.7 20.2 25.5 23.0
Nicaragua e/ 17.3 15.4 22.5 19.3 30.9 n.a.
Panama 24.9 28.1 17.9 16.8 25.4 n.a.
GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS (GNS)
(% of GDP) c/
Belize d/ n.a. 16.5 13.6 26.2 18.0 n.a.
Costa Rica 13.2 11.8 13.5 18.2 24.9 23.3
El Salvador e/ 19.3 13.3 6.7 9.5 15.4 n.a.
Guatemala 17.3 13.6 8.0 10.1 9.9 9.4
Honduras 16.1 12.2 9.6 18.4 21.5 20.0
Nicaragua e/ 15.2 -5.2 -0.8 -1.9 5.8 n.a.
Panama 16.4 27.6 31.7 23.7 22.4 n.a.
Table
1 (continued)
1978 1980 1983 1990 1997 1998
MERCHANDISE EXPORTS g/
(millions of US$)
Belize 80 111 77 129 193 186
Costa Rica 864 1.001 852 1.354 2.954 n.a.
El Salvador 802 1.075 758 582 1.359 1.257
Guatemala 1.092 1.520 1.092 1.212 2.391 2.562
Honduras 631 860 707 887 1.536 1.605
Nicaragua 646 450 452 331 704 573
Panama
386 379 392 460 659 n.a.
PUBLIC EXTERNAL DEBT i/
(millions of US$)
Belize 27 47 75 136 199 n.a.
Costa Rica 951 1.700 3.146 3.063 2.840 n.a.
El Salvador 333 499 1.390 1.912 2.427 n.a.
Guatemala 304 563 1.410 2.478 2.834 n.a.
Honduras 595 976 1.629 3.426 3.910 n.a.
Nicaragua 984 1.668 3.404 8.281 4.819 n.a.
Panama 1.880 2.270 3.145 3.988 5.074 n.a.
FISCAL BALANCE j/
(% of GDP)
Belize d/ n.a. -5.4 -10.7 -0.9 -2.0 -3.1
Costa Rica -9.0 -11.8 -3.1 -2.9 -1.4 -1.3
El Salvador -1.5 -9.6 -13.8 -2.8 -2.0 -2.0
Guatemala -0.8 -4.4 -3.3 -2.1 -0.4 0.6
Honduras -6.2 -9.0 -12.0 -5.9 -1.0 -2.7
Nicaragua n.a. -5.9 -25.7 -20.3 -7.1 -2.2
Panama n.a. -4.6 -5.0 -2.5 -2.2 n.a.
CONSUMER PRICES
(annual % change)
Belize k/ n.a. 7.1 4.9 3.0 1.0 -0.7
Costa Rica 6.0 18.1 33.0 19.0 13.2 11.7
El Salvador 16.0 17.3 13.1 24.0 4.5 2.6
Guatemala 7.9 10.6 4.6 41.2 9.2 7.5
Honduras 5.7 18.2 8.0 23.3 20.2 13.7
Nicaragua 4.6 35.3 31.0 7,485.0 9.2 13.1
Panama 4.2 13.8 2.1 0.8 1.0 0.6
Sources: IDB/ESDB; IMF, Balance of Payments
Yearbook, International Financial Statistics and public country
documents; USAID (1998 and prior years): USAID's data electronic base for Latin
America and the Caribbean (www.info.usaid.gov/regions/lac/sesd/index.html);
World Bank, World Debt Tables; and Zuvekas (1997).
a/ Nicaragua's GDP index in 1977 was 141.1, and its per capita
GDP index, 154.7.
b/ The 1978 GDP and per capita GDP figures for Panama were
adjusted upward to account for economic activities in the former Canal Zone,
which were not incorporated into the national accounts until 1980.
c/ Savings and investment rates are in current prices.
d/ Belize's GDP estimates for 1978 were adjusted upward
significantly a number of years later. It is not clear how this adjustment
affected savings and investment rates (relatively high before the adjustment)
and the fiscal deficit (relatively low).
e/ Figure for 1978 is from 1976.
f/ The net investment data for Honduras are for gross fixed
investment only; the figures for net changes in inventory are not reliable and
indeed have been dropped in most official reporting.
g/ Excludes maquila (assembly) operations, except in Nicaragua
(since 1992), where the gross value of maquila exports is included in total merchandise
exports and cannot always be readily distinguished. Relatively small amounts
of maquila and export-processing activities also seem to be included in
Panama's merchandise exports (since 1996).
h/ Excludes operations of the Colón Free Zone and other such
re-export activities.
i/ Disbursed and outstanding amounts.
j/ Surplus or deficit of the consolidated nonfinancial public
sector, except in Belize, where the balance is for the central government.
k/ Price indices were not calculated in Belize in 1978.
Table
2
Central
America: Aggregate and Sectoral gdp Trends,
1978-80
to 1995-97 a/
(annual
real percentage growth rates)
1978-80 1987-89 1978-80 1987-89
to to to to
1987-89 1985-97 1987-89 1995-97
Belize 2.6 5.6 Belize 1.1 5.5
Costa Rica 2.0 4.0 Costa
Rica 0.8 4.3
El Salvador -1.9 4.1 El
Salvador -4.0 8.6
Guatemala 0.6 4.0 Guatemala -0.6 4.1
Honduras 2.5 3.3 Honduras -0.5 2.5
Nicaragua -1.4 2.5 Nicaragua -2.3 2.4
Panama 1.5 4.0 Panama -1.2 6.5
Agriculture,
Forestry & Fishing Transport,
Storage & Communications
Belize 2.5 6.7 Belize 11.3 9.2
Costa Rica 2.5 3.5 Costa
Rica 4.2 7.7
El Salvador -1.2 1.7 El
Salvador -1.1 5.4
Guatemala 0.8 3.1 Guatemala 1.7 6.1
Honduras 2.5 3.7 Honduras 5.0 3.7
Nicaragua -0.7 5.2 Nicaragua -3.0 1.5
Panama 3.3 1.9 Panama 2.4 2.2
Mining Finance,
Insurance & Business Services
Belize 13.5 10.9 Belize 2.2 4.9
Costa Rica b/ b/ Costa Rica 4.9 6.2
El Salvador 1.9 6.4 El
Salvador c/ 8.2d/
Guatemala -0.9 10.9 Guatemala 2.4 7.3
Honduras -1.0 5.6 Honduras 4.0 8.3
Nicaragua -3.7 11.8 Nicaragua -0.9 1.3
Panama -6.9 11.8 Panama -2.9 7.0
Belize 0.8 4.9 Belize e/ e/
Costa Rica 2.0 3.8 Costa
Rica 1.9 2.1
El Salvador -4.7 3.9 El
Salvador c/ 1.6d/
Guatemala -0.1 2.7 Guatemala 2.3 2.7
Honduras 2.6 3.4 Honduras 4.3 3.7
Nicaragua -2.8 1.0 Nicaragua e/ 1.7
Panama 0.4 4.5 Panama 7.2 3.9
Table 2
(continued)
Belize 7.0 9.0 Belize 5.5 2.4
Costa Rica 5.8 5.1 Costa
Rica 1.1 1.6
El Salvador 2.9 -3.4 El
Salvador 4.2 1.2
Guatemala 4.1 8.0 Guatemala 4.3 4.8
Honduras 9.4 6.0 Honduras 3.4 -2.2
Nicaragua 2.0 3.7 Nicaragua 2.5 -3.7
Panama 7.7 3.3 Panama 4.5 -0.2
Belize 5.3 4.7 Belize 2.7 2.7
Costa Rica -2.1 1.5 Costa
Rica 1.8 4.2
El Salvador -2.7 3.9 El
Salvador -0.2 4.1d/
Guatemala -3.8 4.6 Guatemala 0.9 3.2
Honduras 1.1 1.8 Honduras 2.4 1.4
Nicaragua -0.9 10.6 Nicaragua -2.9 2.4
Panama -10.9 13.0 Panama 2.5 3.3
Sources: Table A.1 sources
(in the Annex to this paper, available from the
author as a separate
document), except for the first period in Nicaragua, where
the source is IDB
(1995:263-272).
a/ Years differ for some countries:
Belize:
1980 instead of 1978-80.
El Salvador: 1976-78 instead of 1978-80; 1990-92 to
1995-97 instead of
1987-89 to 1995-97 for some sectors.
Nicaragua:
Annual average 1980-90 instead of annual growth 1978-80
to
1987-89; 1990-92 to 1995-97 instead of 1987-89 to 1995-97.
Panama:
1980 instead of 1978-80.
b/ Included with manufacturing, and well below 1% of GDP.
c/ Included in other services, 1976-78 to 1987-89.
d/ 1990-92 to 1995-97 instead of 1987-89 to 1995-97.
e/ Included with finance, insurance, and business services.
Table
3
Central America: Value Added by Maquila Firms, 1980-1998
(US$
million)
Year |
Belize
a/ |
Costa
Rica |
El
Salvador |
Guatemala
b/ |
Honduras
c/ |
Nicaragua |
Panama
a/ |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1980 |
|
2.0 |
|
|
4.7 |
|
|
1981 |
|
1.0 |
|
|
5.2 |
|
|
1982 |
|
1.3 |
|
|
5.8 |
|
|
1983 |
|
19.2 |
|
|
6.2 |
|
|
1984 |
|
26.1 |
5.9 |
|
7.0 |
|
|
1985 |
|
34.5 |
5.9 |
|
9.4 |
|
|
1986 |
|
34.8 |
6.1 |
|
11.4 |
|
|
1987 |
|
44.2 |
13.1 |
|
12.6 |
|
|
1988 |
|
60.6 |
15.7 |
|
15.0 |
|
|
1989 |
|
74.9 |
15.0 |
|
16.5 |
|
|
1990 |
|
86.9 |
18.0 |
36.1 |
9.7 |
|
|
1991 |
|
102.5 |
24.9 |
68.4 |
24.4 |
|
|
1992 |
|
119.3 |
42.1 |
96.2 |
40.3 |
0.7 |
|
1993 |
4.7 |
129.9 |
70.1 |
105.5 |
90.4 |
|
|
1994 |
4.2 |
210.4 |
108.7 |
136.4 |
124.8 |
11.9 |
|
1995 |
3.4 |
269.9 |
173.6 |
166.5 |
162.7 |
28.2 |
|
1996 |
4.1 |
270.0 |
213.5 |
175.6 |
203.7 |
|
3.6 |
1997 |
4.3 |
322.0 |
291.1 |
212.2 |
304.6 |
|
2.7 |
1998 |
|
|
343.2 d/ |
284.9 |
397.6 |
|
1.5 |
Sources: Belize: Central
Statistical Office; Costa Rica: Banco Central de Costa Rica; El Salvador: Banco
Central de Reserva; Guatemala: Banco de Guatemala; Honduras: Banco Central de
Honduras; Nicaragua: Banco Central de Nicaragua; Panama: Author's adjustments
of data from the Contraloría General de la República for assembly firms; does
not include value added in export processing zones. Data are not available for
earlier years, for which the amounts are believed to be small.
a/ All exports of garments are assumed to be produced by
maquiladoras, and value added is assumed to be 23% of the total value of
exports.
b/ Rough estimates; some maquila production in Guatemala is
not exported.
c/ Data prior to 1993 are not consistent with those since
that year. The figures for earlier years underrecorded value added.
d/ Projection based on 9-months' data.
Note:
Regional totals have not been calculated because data for some
countries
are not available for all years, while in other cases some of the
available
figures underestimate value added.
Table
4
Central
America: Tourism Receipts, 1980-1997
(US$
million)
Year |
Belize |
Costa Rica |
El Salvador |
Guatemala |
Honduras a/ |
Nicaragua |
Panama |
TOTAL |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1980 |
9.7 |
83.2 |
13.1 |
60.3 |
24.0 |
21.1 |
167.7 |
379.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1985 |
10.7 |
122.5 |
43.3 |
13.3 |
24.5 |
7.2 |
207.9 |
429.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1990 |
38.2 |
285.0 |
76.0 |
117.9 |
29.0 |
12.2 |
171.8 |
730.1 |
1991 |
45.4 |
340.4 |
70.9 |
145.2 |
30.6 |
16.7 |
203.4 |
852.6 |
1992 |
60.1 |
440.0 |
73.4 |
186.0 |
31.8 |
23.3 |
214.9 |
1.029.5 |
1993 |
69.4 |
487.6 |
78.5 |
204.5 |
60.0 |
41.1 |
225.6 |
1.266.7 |
1994 |
71.4 |
633.8 |
85.5 |
205.0 |
72.0 |
40.2 |
261.6 |
1.369.5 |
1995 |
77.6 |
670.6 |
85.4 |
212.5 |
80.0 |
50.8 |
310.4 |
1.487.3 |
1996 |
93.1 |
695.1 |
86.5 |
216.3 |
115.0 |
56.1 |
343.1 |
1.605.2 |
1997 |
95.1 |
741.2 |
101.8 |
266.1 |
145.6 |
76.8 |
374.2 |
1.800.8 |
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook,
various issues.
a/ Beginning in 1993, the Honduran data provide a more
complete coverage of tourism expenditures.
Note: Data include business travel, which is not
available in most recent Yearbooks as a separate category, except in
Panama, where its share of visitors' expenditures fell from 25% in 1990 to 18%
in 1996. In Guatemala, business travel accounted for 19% of visitors'
expenditures in 1990, compared to 4% in 1980.
Table
5
Alternative
Scenarios for Central America, 1997-2020:
Economic
Growth, Structure of Production, and Per Capita gdp
A. ANNUAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
RATES, 1997-2020 (%)
1997-2020
Scenarios
Low Base High
Aggregate GDP 3.0 4.5 6.0
Agriculture 2.5 3.3 4.2
Manufacturing 3.5 4.5 6.0
Mining/Utilities/Construction 3.5 5.0 6.0
Public Administration & Defense 2.5 3.5 4.5
Private Services 3.0 4.9 6.7
B. STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION,
1997 AND 2020 (% of GDP) a/
2020
Scenarios
1997 Low Base High
Aggregate GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agriculture 17.9 16.0 13.7 12.1
Manufacturing 16.0 17.9 16.0 16.0
Mining/Utilities/Construction 7.0 7.8 7.8 7.0
Public Administration &
Defense 9.1 8.1 7.3 6.5
Private Services 50.0 50.2 55.2 58.4
C. PER CAPITA GDP, 1997 AND
2020 (1997 U.S. dollars) b/
2020
Scenarios
1997 Low Base High
Belize 2.720 3.350 4.680 6.490
Costa Rica 2.600 3.200 4.470 6.200
El Salvador 1.900 2.340 3.270 4.520
Guatemala 1.690 2.080 2.910 4.030
Honduras 790 970 1.360 1.880
Nicaragua 430 530 740 1.030
Panama 3.230 3.980 5.540 7.690
Central America c/ 1.630 2.000 2.790 3.870
Source: Country national accounts data and
author's calculations.
a/ Aggregate and sectoral GDP shares are based on the sums, in
1997 prices, of output in each country, converted to U.S. dollars at the
average exchange rate for 1997 as reported in the International Monetary Fund's
International Financial Statistics. (Constant-price percentage shares
were used to determine sectoral output in Belize and Guatemala.)
b/ Based on population data from the Centro Latinoamericano de
Demografía (CELADE), except for Belize; these figures sometimes differ from
those used for Table 1. Assumes identical per capita GDP growth rates in each
country. Aggregate GDP growth for the individual countries would thus range
from slightly below to slightly above the three scenario averages. Per capita
GDP figures are rounded to the nearest 10 U.S. dollars.
c/ Total GDP in 1997 U.S. dollars divided by total population.
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1987.
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_______. Economic and Social
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International Monetary Fund [IMF]. Balance
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During the
1990s Central America went through processes of profound change on the political
scene, with democratic governments being set up in all states in the region.
However, the political changes were not accompanied to a sufficient extent by
parallel economic and social transformations, so Central America continues to
be the continent’s poorest region. At the same time the armed conflicts of the
previous decade led to greater backwardness in the region in terms of social
development (education, health and life expectancy of its population).
This
situation has led to increasing awareness in the Central American countries of
the importance of implementing profound changes, and the need to establish a
regional development model for all the states in the area has grown
increasingly apparent. So various actions have been initiated with the goal of
achieving regional economic integration, thus reactivating the common internal
market.
However,
these forces of integration have often found themselves impeded by the lack of
an adequate institutional framework capable of meeting the challenges that the
future will pose. This is precisely where the international community could
support the regional development process in the area in the long term, and the
present project Central America 2020
is in keeping with this.
The aim of
Central America 2020 is to promote
sustainable development in the region, starting from a concept of development
as a dynamic, multidimensional process consisting of:
• sustained
economic growth
• improvement
in social well-being
• guarantees of citizenship for
all social, gender and ethnic categories.
This
definition of development is sound and was devised before Hurricane Mitch
struck the region in October-November 1998, with devastating effects. It is not
that the definition now lacks relevance, but Mitch served to remind us of the
region’s vulnerability to natural disasters and of the state’s meagre capacity
to respond in an effective way. In this context, sustainability acquires a
special significance in Central America: natural disasters are inevitable, but
they must not be made worse by human action, nor must their consequences be
aggravated by the incapacity or incompetence of the state and its institutions.
One of the
chief objectives of the Central America
2020 project is to contribute toward the Central American states’ regional
integration process, taking stock of the results achieved so far and examining
the current difficulties and those which are likely to emerge in the medium
term in the politico-institutional field.
The
specific objectives are:
1.
To mount a comprehensive regional
survey of contemporary development issues. The questions asked must take into
account three intersecting issues:
·
relations between the state, the
market and civil society
·
options at the local, national and
regional level
·
the viability of sustainable
development in Central America
2. To ensure the participation
and contribution of a wide range of key regional players in the course of research.
3. To provide governments and
other sectors in the region with various policy options and recommendations
4. To promote regional identity
among the public and private players involved in development
5. To extend the project results
to the international players that are most active in the region’s development
dynamics, including multilateral organisations and NGOs
6. To make policy recommendations to the United States and the European
Union for more effective aid programmes.
The
project’s findings will be presented at a major international conference to be
held in Central America during 2000 and at seminars in Washington, D.C., and
Brussels. They will also be distributed in a series of working papers,
monographs and books published in English and Spanish and also available on the
Internet, the Spanish and German versions at http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/IIK/za2020
and the English version at http://ca2020.fiu.edu.
Project Directors:
Klaus Bodemer, Institute
for Ibero-American Studies (Hamburg)
Eduardo Gamarra, Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University (Miami)
Academic Directors:
Sabine Kurtenbach,
Institute of Ibero-American Studies (Hamburg)
Michael Shifter,
Inter-American Dialogue (Washington D.C.)
Lead Consultants:
Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London
Douglas Kincaid, Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University (Miami)
Centralamerican Experts:
Fernando Durán, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress (Costa Rica)
Carlos Rosales, Secretary of Communication (El
Salvador)
Representatives of the Project
Sponsors:
Mendel Goldstein, Head
of Unit Directorate Mexico, Central America and Cuba, European Commission DG IB
(Brussels)
Margaret Sarles, U.S.
Agency for International Development (Washington D.C.)
# 1: Pablo Rodas-martini: Centroamérica:
Para afrontar con éxito la globalización del siglo XXI
ISBN
3-926446-73-0
# 2: Clarence Zuvekas, jr.: The Dynamics of
Sectoral Growth in Central America: Recent Trends and Prospects for 2020
ISBN
3-926446-74-9
# 3: Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera:
Centroamérica 2020: La integración regional y los desafíos de sus relaciones
externas
ISBN
3-926446-72-2
# 4: Sarah Mahler: Migration and Transnational Issues.
Recent
Trends and Prospects for 2020
ISBN
3-926446-71-4
# 5: Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz: Las cuentas
pendientes de la modernización. Tendencias laborales y sus efectos sobre la
integración en el Istmo Centroamericano
ISBN
3-926446-70-6
# 6: Carlos Sojo: El traje nuevo del
emperador: La modernización del Estado en Centroamérica
ISBN
3-926446-69-2
# 7: Claudia Schatán: Desarrollo económico y
medio ambiente
ISBN
3-926446-68-4
# 8: Charles T. Call: Sustainable Development in Central America:
The
Challenges of Violence, Injustice and Insecurity
ISBN
3-926446-67-8
# 9: Günther Maihold / Ricardo Cordóva:
Democracia y ciudadanía en Centroamérica. Perspectivas hacia el 2020
ISBN
3-926446-75-7
# 10: Knut Walter: La educación en
Centroamérica: Reflexiones en torno a sus problemas y su potencial
ISBN
3-926446-66-8
[1] The author has benefited from comments by members of the CA 2020 steering committee and participants in a project workshop held in Antigua, Guatemala, 7-9 July 1999. Thanks are due also to the many persons in Central America who provided data on macroeconomic and sectoral trends. None of these individuals bears any responsibility for the views expressed in this essay, which are those of the author alone.
[2] Only Costa Rica has reasonably good
poverty and income distribution data.
[3] In constant prices, value added in
manufacturing exceeded that in agriculture in Costa Rica and El Salvador.
However, the base years for calculating constant-price data differ
significantly in these two countries (1966 and 1990, respectively).
[4] Victor Bulmer-Thomas (1987: 185) has
argued persuasively that the CACM was simply grafted onto the traditional model
of agricultural export-led development to form a "hybrid" model of
industrialization. Agriculture's share of GDP in 1980 (in 1970 prices at factor
cost) exceeded that of manufacturing in all five CACM countries, by an average
margin of 8 percentage points (Bulmer-Thomas 1987: Appendix Tables A.1, A.4,
and A.8, pp. 309, 315, and 323). Agriculture's share of employment exceeded
that of manufacturing by much wider margins, reflecting the large average
productivity differentials between the two sectors.
[5] Agriculture outranked manufacturing in
current prices but not in constant (1984) prices.
[6] This section draws heavily on Zuvekas
(1997) and the sources listed in Table 1.
[7] The Guatemalan conflict was longer, but
on a smaller scale and with only modest economic effects.
[8] This decline is exaggerated because of
data problems.
[9] The weighted average figures for both
years would be lower because the two largest economies (Guatemala and El
Salvador) had investment rates well below the unweighted averages, having
suffered significant declines between 1978 and 1980: from 21.6% to 15.9% in
Guatemala and from 24.5% to 13.3% in El Salvador.
[10] Inter-Secretariat Working Group on
National Accounts (1993:327-328). Most Central American countries have adopted
the new methodology, at least in part; but not all of them clearly isolate
maquila operations, as recommended.
[11] Most of the discussion in this section
ends with 1997 to avoid distortions caused by Hurricane Mitch in October 1998.
[12] Based on 1995-97 GDP weights in U.S.
dollars: Belize 0.012; Costa Rica 0.183; El Salvador 0.203; Guatemala 0.316;
Honduras 0.084; Nicaragua 0.039; and Panama 0.163.
[13] Actual per capita GDP growth in
Guatemala and Nicaragua was probably higher, as population growth likely is
overstated.
[14] I was unable to obtain, for all CACM
countries, a breakdown of merchandise exports by major category for the years
after 1995.
[15] An Annex, available from the author, or
on the CA 2020 Web Page (http://ca2020.fiu.edu/), examines the data on a
country-by-country basis and presents sectoral shares in both current and
constant prices.
[16] Current-price data were not available
for Belize, where the share in constant (1984) prices was 16%. Guatemala, the
region's largest economy, does not even produce current-price GDP figures by
sector; manufacturing's share in constant (1958) prices was 14%.
[17] Panama caught up with the rest of the
region dramatically on January 1, 1998 when it reduced all tariffs to no more
than 15%, with exceptions only for rice, dairy products, and automobiles. The
average tariff fell to less than 9%. The new government, however, has begun to
reverse these actions.
[18] In Guatemala the figure is in constant
prices. The low figure in Panama was a temporary phenomenon associated with the
political turmoil surrounding Gen. Noriega's ouster.
[19] Guatemala, as noted above, does not
produce sectoral GDP data in current prices; but the state clearly is small
there.
[20] Guatemala, the only petroleum producer
in the region, depends on imports for most of its requirements.
[21] Costa Rica is an important exception to
this pattern (Morley 1995: 134-150).
[22] Energy efficiency is assumed to increase
by 1% annually in the OECD countries and 2% elsewhere in the high-growth
scenario, and by 0.8% and 1.5%, respectively in the low-growth scenario.
[23] The OECD's (1997: 63) high-growth
scenario assumes that trade and transport margins will decline by 1% a year
between 1995 and 2020; the decline is 0.8% annually under the low-growth
scenario.
[24] Under the OECD's high-growth scenario,
with its assumption of complete free trade, import penetration of agricultural
products and processed food into the OECD countries would jump from 7% in 1995
to 20% in 2020; in non-OECD countries, it would more than double from its 1995
level of 8%. Even under the low-growth scenario - which assumes that tariffs,
tariff-equivalents, export taxes, and export subsidies fall by 50% from their
1992 level - import penetration would reach 13% in both groups of countries.
Import penetration is defined as imports as a share of apparent consumption
(i.e., production - exports + imports) (OECD 1997: 75).
[25] Although the WTO has ruled against the
EU's banana-import regime, the EU has been dragging its heels in liberalizing
banana imports to meet WTO standards.
[26] Thrupp (1995) provides an excellent,
balanced review of these issues.
[27] Import penetration for consumer goods in
the OECD countries rises from just over 15% in 1995 to almost 25% in 2020 under
the OECD's high-growth scenario, and to almost 20% under the low-growth
scenario (OECD 1997: 75).
[28] Central America's share of world tourist
arrivals in 1998 was only 0.56%, and its share of tourism earnings, 0.49%
(INCAE/CLACDS and HIID 1999: 36).
[29] Since no figure was available for
Honduras in 1995, I have estimated the number of overnight tourist arrivals in
that year to be 225.000, compared to 198.000 in 1994 and 222.000 in 1993. These
figures, which exclude day travelers and cruise-ship passengers, probably
underestimate the number of overnight visitors.
[30] Cuba's gross foreign exchange earnings
from tourism were approximately $1.8 billion in 1998, but the local content
(value added) was only around 30%, lower than in Central America.
[31] Reported in Honduras This Week
(June 19, 1999), p. 4.
[32] See the FTAA Web site
(www.ftaa-alca.org).
[33] The United States government made clear
to the region's leaders, early in the process, that it did not want to negotiate
NAFTA accession individually with each Central American country.
[34] All three scenarios are based on a
single set of population projections by the Centro Latinoamericano de
Demografía (CELADE). However, population growth would likely be somewhat slower
under the high-growth scenario, and per capita GDP growth higher, because of
greater urbanization, more educational opportunities for women, and other
factors that tend to reduce fertility rates.
[35] Manufacturing's share is probably
underestimated, as a great deal of maquila activity in the region seems not to
be captured in the national accounts.
[36] This figure is probably an overestimate,
since output in the manufacturing and utilities sectors seems underestimated.
[37] The INCAE-HIID figure is expressed in
terms of per capita GDP growth of 5% annually.
[38] Honduras and Nicaragua, which expect to
gain access to debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative, would be ineligible if they contracted non-concessional debt.
[39] Carlos Sojo's CA 2020 essay provides
another perspective on this topic.
[40] See World Bank (1999: 75-79) for a
discussion of specific banking and financial reforms that would be desirable.
[41] Recent spreads have ranged from 8 (Costa
Rica) to 18 (Honduras) percentage points (p.p.) (BCIE, Comportamiento
económico de Centroamérica durante el primer trimestre de 1999 y perspectivas a
corto plazo [Tegucigalpa, 13 May 1999]). In Panama, by contrast, spreads
for local banking operations are generally 5-6 p.p.
[42] Even in El Salvador, the IMF (1999: 3)
argues that conditions are still not propitious for the adoption of a currency
board, which the government has been considering. It recommends further fiscal
and financial reforms, and even higher reserves, before taking such action.
[43] INCAE/CLACDS and HIID (1999: 36-38,
79-83) provide a detailed discussion of tourism obstacles and policies.
[44] Calculated from data in WTO, Compendium
1991-1995 (1997).
[45] El Tiempo (San Pedro Sula), 5
July 1999, Internet version.
[46] La Prensa (San Pedro Sula), 14
July 1999, Internet version.
[47] Value added by maquila operations
in Mexico rose from about $3.5 million in 1990 to $6.0 billion in 1994 and
$10.6 billion in 1998 (Vargas 1999, Part I:3). Value added increased even more
rapidly in Central America during this period (see Table 3).