Migration and Transnational
Issues. |
This
publication was made possible through financial support provided by the Office
of Regional and Sustainable Development, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC),
U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of Grant No.
LAG-G-00-98-00048-00 and the Commission of the European Union. The opinions
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Commission of the
European Union.
CA 2020: Working Paper # 4
Sarah J. Mahler
Migration and transnational
issues.
Recent trends and prospects for
2020
Sarah J.
Mahle
Migration and Transnational Issues. Recent Trends and Prospects for 2020
Hamburg: Institut für
Iberoamerika-Kunde 2000
(CA 2020: Working Paper # 4)
ISBN 3-926446-71-4
Sarah J.
Mahler; Associate Professor of
Anthropology in the Department of Sociology/Anthropology at Florida
International University in Miami. Her doctorate is in Anthropology from
Columbia University. Her research and publications focus primarily on Latin
America and Caribbean migration to the United States and the development of
transnational ties between migrants and their home communities.
Executive Summary 1
Resumen Ejecutivo 4
1. Introduction 8
2. Regional
Migration Issues 10
2.1.
Nicaraguan
Migration to Costa Rica 10
2.2.
Regional
Migration to Belize 12
2.3.
Continuing
Rural-to-Urban Migration 13
2.4.
Future
Prognosis 17
3. Extra-regional
Migration 19
3.1.
Central Americans in the United
States:
3.2.
Central Americans in the United
States:
3.3.
Central American Migration to
Mexico 26
4. Remittances 28
4.1.
Critique of “Productive” Uses of
Remittances 29
4.2.
Future
Prognosis 31
4.3.
Improving
Utilization of Remittances 32
5. Transnational
Migration and Issues 35
5.1.
Transnational Entrepreneurial
Activities 37
5.2. Home Town Associations 38
5.3.
Future Generations of Central
Americans Living Abroad 41
5.4.
Regional Organizations that
Address Migration 43
5.5.
Future Prognosis 45
6. Conclusions
and Recommendation 47
6.1.
Comprehensive Needs Assessment
Study 47
6.2.
Migration Councils: A Model for Migration-Related Devlopment
Projects 47
Bibliography 54
Central America has been a locus of migration,
both internal and external, for generations; this fact is unlikely to change in
the next two decades. However, migration does not affect the region uniformly.
Some countries and communities are highly impacted while others are little
affected. Given this textured reality, it is very difficult to provide a
comprehensive evaluation of the role of migration to Central America’s
development that is truly regional. Rather, the evaluation and prognosis both
need to be attentive to nuance and differentiation as much or more than to
large-scale trends.
Central America is characterized both by
regional migration as well as emigration abroad, to the U.S. in particular. It
is also a geographic bridge to North America that has become a conduit for
extra-regional migrants seeking entry into North America. In short, Central
America is a crossroads of many different migratory streams. This complex
reality has several implications. First, the region is knitted together by
migration, creating a need for regional strategies to address the issues that
arise from this trend. Second, and in contrast to the first point, the region
is also strained — wittingly or not — by migration, particularly intra-regional
flows (e.g., Nicaraguans to Costa Rica). These stresses can pressure national
governments to think and act unilaterally, undermining regional approaches.
However, during the 1990s the foundations were laid for regional coordination
and cooperation regarding migration, human smuggling, reception of deportees,
and other subjects that are likely to continue in the coming decades. These
programs provide an institutional layer to mitigate against tensions that arise
from migration. The organizations involved include the Comisión Centroamericana de Directores de Migración as well as
the Regional Conference on Migration, best known as “Proceso Puebla,” which has expanded beyond its Central and North
American beginnings to include officials from across the hemisphere. Still
lacking is concerted attention to those communities most affected by migration.
This report calls for addressing these concerns at least partially through the
formation of Migration Councils (detailed below). These bodies would be amply
constituted and charged with helping communities meet their needs as well as
interfacing with larger, regional efforts.
Two current trends in regional migration are
expected to persist into the future. First, rural-to-urban migration will
continue as small-scale agriculture declines, pushing thousands of low-skilled
workers into urban labor markets, agribusiness, and seasonal labor markets,
and into nodes of opportunity in a handful of growing sectors of the economy.
As identified in the Zuvekas report for Central America 2020, the likely growth
sectors are manufacturing (particularly maquilas), tourism, and services.
Within the last category, financial services (accounting, customer orders,
payroll, and so on) are likely to prosper in countries such as Costa Rica,
where human capital levels are highest in the region. Second, such stable and
relatively well-paying jobs will probably stimulate the demand for secondary
services – such as domestic labor – which, in turn, will attract less-skilled
labor, often imported from neighboring countries. This bifurcation of the
service sector into highly paid native workers and poorly paid immigrant
workers is already apparent in Costa Rica. It is also characteristic of the
United States, where Central American immigrant workers have found employment
niches as nannies, landscapers, and house cleaners to middle-class Americans (Mahler 1995, Sassen 1988).
With regard to migration, a combination of
factors, including regional conflict and sustained demand for low-cost labor,
have led to exponential growth in migration of Central Americans northward
into the United States, Mexico, and Canada over the past two decades. I expect
emigration to continue, albeit at an attenuated pace, over the next decades,
driven by Central Americans petitioning for their relatives as well as enduring
demand for labor in the North. A consequence of this migration has been and will
continue to be growing interdependency between Central and North America. A
predominant feature of this interdependency is remittances, which currently
support if not sustain economies in much of the region. Contrary to some
scholars (Pérez Saínz’s report, for example), I do not predict remittance
levels to fall in coming years, in large part because of sustained emigration.
Remittances sustain the economies of several
countries; in the larger picture of migration, however, they mark but one of
several economic, political, and cultural linkages between Central and North
America. Termed “transnational migration” in contemporary scholarship, this hybridity
will be felt most critically in certain countries and regions of Central
America, though its imprints will transform certain areas of North America as
well. In response, public opinion in the North may grow increasingly
anti-immigrant, leading to the adoption of even more restrictive immigration
legislation by the affected countries than the strict measures passed in the
second half of the 1990s. If this occurs, it will only intensify the
vulnerability of many Central American migrants, particularly those whose
status is not permanently legal. In turn, this vulnerability may strain
diplomatic relations between North and Central America. Alternatively, if
growing numbers of migrants become naturalized citizens abroad and therefore
qualify to vote, they may increase their lobbying power to shift policy makers’
opinions toward expanding, not restricting, immigration legislation. This
latter possibility will hinge on the degree to which Central American
immigrants in the North can form coalitions with other immigrants to broaden
their political influence. Finally, Central Americans living abroad are
pressing for an expansion of their political rights vis-à-vis their homelands,
including the right to dual citizenship/nationality and voting from abroad.
Given their economic clout, they are likely to win gains that will make them
pivotal political players at home as well as away.
The report ends with a general call for a
regional needs assessment study to identify areas, communities, and urban
neighborhoods most affected by different types of migration and the issues that
are most pronounced in these areas. A more specific proposal follows for the
institutionalization of Consejos de
Migración, or Migration Councils, in each country. These councils would
operate nationally and coordinate regionally, interfacing with
migration-impacted localities as well as with regional efforts such as Proceso
Puebla and the Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (SICA). Communities
would bring development projects to the council, which would be responsible
for evaluating projects and helping different sectors — government, community,
and migrant — obtain resources to implement approved projects. Beyond
addressing the specific needs of each country and its migration-impacted
populations, the councils would also be expected to meet periodically in
regional fora to discuss the progress and problems each face as they evaluate
funded development projects. Moreover, they would become organizations with
abundant knowledge to offer in the exploration of regional initiatives. The
councils would form an important middle layer between existing regional and
hemispheric migration organizations, such as Proceso Puebla, Comisión
Centroamericana de Directores de Migración, and small-scale communities
impacted by migration.
Durante generaciones América Central ha sido un locus de migraciones internas y externas, y este hecho no tiene
trazas de variar en los próximos dos decenios. Sin embargo, las migraciones no
afectan a toda la región de la misma manera; de hecho, en ciertos países y
comunidades el fenómeno tiene un gran impacto, mientras que en otros pasa casi
inadvertido. Dados los matices de esta realidad, se hace difícil hacer una
evaluación integral y de alcance realmente regional sobre el papel de las
migraciones en el desarrollo de América Central. Ante ello, la evaluación y la
prognosis necesitan prestar igual o mayor atención a los matices y a la
diferenciación que a las tendencias a gran escala.
América Central se caracteriza tanto por los movimientos migratorios
intrarregionales como por la emigración hacia el extranjero, especialmente
hacia Estados Unidos. En su condición de puente geográfico hacia América del
Norte, la región es lugar de paso para emigrantes extrarregionales que buscan
seguir al norte. En pocas palabras, América Central se ha convertido en una
encrucijada en donde confluyen múltiples corrientes migratorias. Esta compleja
realidad tiene varias repercusiones. En primer lugar, las migraciones son un
factor unificador en la región, lo cual plantea la necesidad de elaborar
estrategias de alcance regional para abordar los temas que surgen de esta tendencia.
Segundo, y en contraste con lo anterior, consciente o inconscientemente la
región se ve tensionada por las migraciones, especialmente las intrarregionales
(p. ej., los nicaragüenses que emigran a Costa Rica). Estas presiones a veces
hacen que los gobiernos piensen y actúen de manera unilateral, lo cual
desvirtúa las propuestas regionales. Sin embargo, durante los años 90 se
sentaron las bases para la coordinación y la cooperación regional sobre migraciones,
contrabando de personas, recepción de deportados y otros problemas que sin
duda seguirán de actualidad en las próximas décadas. Ahora bien, estos
programas entregan una base institucional sobre la cual mitigar las tensiones
que surgen con motivo de las migraciones. Los organismos involucrados en estos
programas son la Comisión Centroamericana de Directores de Migración y la
Conferencia Regional sobre Migración, más conocida como el “Proceso Puebla”, el
cual ha dejado atrás sus orígenes exclusivamente centro y norteamericanos para
agrupar hoy a representantes de todo el hemisferio. No obstante, aún falta una
atención concertada hacia aquellas comunidades que se ven más afectadas por los
fenómenos migratorios. El presente informe formula un llamado a abordar esta
problemática, al menos de forma parcial, a través de la conformación de
Consejos de Migración (ver detalles más abajo). Estos organismos de carácter
amplio estarían a cargo de asistir a las comunidades de base a satisfacer sus
necesidades y serían los interlocutores de las iniciativas de alcance
regional.
Las migraciones regionales actuales muestran dos tendencias que con
toda seguridad persistirán a futuro. Una de ellas es el éxodo del campo a la
ciudad, el que continuará en la medida en que la pequeña agricultura siga
decayendo y obligando a miles de campesinos malamente calificados a buscar
trabajo en las zonas urbanas, en actividades agroindustriales, en ocupaciones
de temporada o en los polos de desarrollo de algunos sectores de la economía.
Como señala el Informe Zuvekas para América Central 2020, los sectores con
mayores probabilidades de crecimiento son las manufacturas (especialmente
maquiladoras), turismo y servicios. Dentro de esta última categoría, los
servicios financieros (contabilidad, pedidos de clientes, planillas de pagos,
etc.) tienen mayores posibilidades de prosperar en países tales como Costa
Rica, que muestra los niveles de capital humano más altos de la región. En
segundo lugar, este tipo de empleos estables y relativamente bien remunerados
probablemente estimularán la demanda por servicios secundarios - de tipo
doméstico, por ejemplo - lo cual, a su vez, terminará por atraer mano de obra
menos calificada, especialmente desde países vecinos. Esta división del sector
servicios entre trabajadores nacionales bien remunerados y trabajadores inmigrantes
mal pagados ya se está haciendo aparente en Costa Rica. Este fenómeno es
también característico de los Estados Unidos, donde los inmigrantes
centroamericanos cumplen funciones de cuidadores de niños, jardineros y
aseadores en casas de norteamericanos de clase media (Mahler 1995, Sassen 1988).
Respecto de la migración, durante los últimos dos decenios una conjunción
de factores, entre ellos los conflictos regionales y la demanda sostenida por
mano de obra barata, han causado un aumento explosivo en la emigración de
centroamericanos hacia los Estados Unidos, México y Canadá. A mi juicio, si
bien a un ritmo atenuado, esta emigración continuará durante los próximos
decenios, especialmente a medida que los emigrantes originales pidan a sus
familias y que se mantenga la demanda de mano de obra. Una de las consecuencias
de esta emigración ha sido y seguirá siendo la creciente interdependencia entre
Centro y Norteamérica. Una de las características predominantes de esta
interdependencia son las remesas de dinero, las cuales actualmente aportan –
cuando no sostienen – a las economías de gran parte de la región. Al contrario
de otros investigadores (ver el informe de Pérez-Saínz, por ejemplo), no
pronostico una caída en los niveles de remesas en los próximos años, en gran
medida a causa de la emigración sostenida.
Si bien las remesas sostienen la economía de varios países, en el
contexto general del fenómeno migratorio éstas sólo ponen de relieve uno de los
muchos nexos económicos, políticos y culturales existentes entre Centro y
Norteamérica. Denominada “migración transnacional” en los estudios actuales,
esta hibridación se hará sentir con mayor fuerza en ciertos países y regiones
de América Central, aunque su impronta también transformará ciertas regiones de
América del Norte. En respuesta a este fenómeno, existe la posibilidad de que
la opinión pública estadounidense reaccione con una actitud anti-inmigrante, lo
cual podría llevar a la adopción de normas aún más restrictivas que las
promulgadas durante la segunda mitad de los años 90. De ocurrir, ello hará más
vulnerables a los emigrantes centroamericanos, especialmente aquellos que
carezcan de residencia legal. A su vez, esta mayor vulnerabilidad podría
tensionar las relaciones diplomáticas entre Norte y Centroamérica. Por otra
parte, si un número suficientemente grande de emigrantes adquiere la
nacionalidad del país y por ende el derecho a voto, éstos podrían aprovechar su
mayor peso político para presionar a las autoridades locales a ampliar las
normas migratorias en lugar de restringirlas. Esta última posibilidad dependerá
de la capacidad de los inmigrantes centroamericanos para conformar alianzas con
otros inmigrantes a fin de ampliar su influencia política. Por último, los
centroamericanos que viven en el extranjero están exigiendo mayores derechos
políticos en sus países de origen, incluyendo el derecho a la doble
nacionalidad y a votar en las elecciones. Considerando su peso económico, es
muy probable que logren lo que se han propuesto, con lo cual pasarían a
convertirse además en actores políticos centrales en sus países de origen.
El informe concluye con un llamado general a hacer una evaluación
regional de necesidades a objeto de detectar las áreas, comunidades y zonas
urbanas más afectadas por los diferentes tipos de migración, así como sus
principales problemáticas. A continuación se plantea una propuesta más
específica para la institucionalización de Consejos de Migración en cada país.
Estos Consejos de carácter nacional se coordinarían a nivel regional para
interactuar con localidades afectadas por las migraciones y con iniciativas de
tipo regional tales como el Proceso Puebla y el Sistema de Integración
Centroamericana (SICA). Las diferentes comunidades podrían presentar proyectos
de desarrollo ante el Consejo, el cual sería responsable de evaluar las
propuestas y de colaborar con diferentes sectores – gobiernos, comunidades y
emigrantes – a fin de obtener los recursos que permitan realizar los proyectos
aprobados. Más allá de abordar las necesidades específicas de cada país y de
las poblaciones afectadas por la migración, los Consejos también podrían
reunirse periódicamente en instancias regionales para tratar los avances
realizados y los problemas que enfrentan a medida que evalúan los proyectos de
desarrollo aprobados. Más aún, los Consejos podrían convertirse en organismos
con un amplio caudal de conocimientos que ofrecer para la exploración de iniciativas
regionales. Los Consejos podrían también conformar una importante instancia
intermedia entre organizaciones regionales y hemisféricas, tales como el
Proceso Puebla y la Comisión Centroamericana de Directores de Migración, y las
pequeñas comunidades afectadas por el fenómeno de la migración.
This
report looks prospectively at the future of migration and Central American
development at a particularly strategic moment in its history. After twenty
years of massive and often abrupt changes in migratory patterns and effects,
Central America appears to be headed toward a period of stabilizing trends.
This does not mean, however, that the effects of continued migration will be
less dramatic. Conversely, migrations — both internal and external — promise
to play a major, transformative role in the region’s future. A brief
historical reprise underscores this point.
Historically,
seasonal rural-to-rural migration within the region was the predominant
migratory pattern from the late 1800s through World War II and into the second
half of the twentieth century. During the decade of the 1980s, severe armed
conflict in the region brought a major shift in the tenor of the region’s
migration. Internal labor migrations diminished as production of crops for
export plummeted and refugee flows surged. Warfare not only killed thousands
and displaced millions, but it also institutionalized a migration pattern that
heretofore had been very minor; viz., emigration to El Norte. A conservative estimate of this exodus, one derived from
the 1990 U.S. Census and now well outdated, is that more than a million
Central Americans fled their homelands and sought safe haven in the U.S.
during the tumultuous 1980s. Central America transformed from being a minor
player in hemispheric migration prior to the 1980s (in comparison to Mexico, in
particular), to becoming a central player. More important for regional
development, the vast exodus began to send homeward larger and larger
quantities of cash remittances, which became extremely significant to families’
survival and regional reconstruction in the post-war era.
Rates of
emigration to the North slowed in the late 1990s, although they remained at
significant levels. At the same time, rates of return migration — whether to
visit or resettle permanently — soared, in large part owing to the cessation of
violence and the fact that many migrants obtained legal status abroad,
permitting them to travel freely. Increasingly, Central American migrants
began to conduct their lives across borders or “transnationally.” People who
travel back and forth or at least maintain close contact with family and
friends in two or more nations through phone calls, letters, and even the
Internet serve to knit together both individuals and nations in ways that have
only begun to be explored. Also in the 1990s, Central American governments to
varying degrees began to recognize that their countries’ interests were
intimately related to the fate of their expatriate populations abroad. They
began actively to cultivate ties with their expatriates and to advocate on
their behalf with politicians in the North. Governments which, in several
cases, had contributed to the flight of refugees abroad now retooled themselves
to become migrants’ friends, a transformation that is still a work in progress.
In the
twenty-first century, migratory patterns born in the past twenty years are most
likely to mature without changing dramatically. This does not imply they will
be negligible. To appreciate the complexities and subtleties of the broad topic
of migration and transnational issues, I have divided it into several
sub-themes: regional migration, extra-regional migration, remittances, and
transnational issues. I will address each separately, though I will try to integrate
them as much as possible. Each topic will not receive equal weight; rather, I
will provide a synopsis of research on the well-documented themes first and
concentrate the bulk of my report on the last themes, which are, to my mind,
generating the ideas and approaches most helpful to predicting the future of
Central American migration and its role in regional development. At this point
I wish to acknowledge that my work has been enhanced greatly by participants
who attended the workshop on migration in July 1999. I have tried to take into
account the ideas circulated in the workshop and in participants’ position
papers in the preparation of this report. The workshop participants were
fundamental in suggesting a model for migration and development along the lines
I develop in the last section of this report under “recommendations.”
Central
American migration has been characterized historically by intra-regional
movement, including rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration as well as
international migration into neighboring Central American countries. These
patterns persist, although they has been overshadowed to a large degree by the
addition of extra-regional migration. Alicia Maguid’s chapter on migration in
the comprehensive volume Estado de la región provides a statistical
snapshot of this shift. In 1970, half of all Central American emigrants (those
moving into other countries) relocated in other Central American countries,
while half moved out of the region. By 1980, the proportions had altered
dramatically to 80% extra-regional and only 20% intra-regional; in 1990, 93% of
all emigrants left the region (Maguid 1999: 364). It should be no surprise
then, that the literature focusing on Central American migration in recent
years makes scant reference to intra-regional flows, with the notable exception
of Nicaraguan migrants to Costa Rica and, to a lesser degree, migrations of
Guatemalans and Salvadorans to Belize. This does not mean that intra-regional
migration has become insignificant, only that it is neither well documented
nor well understood. For example, there is anecdotal evidence of migrations of
Nicaraguans and Hondurans into El Salvador spurred by the late 1990s post-war
economic recovery in that country, a rebound financed in large part by
remittance dollars from Salvadorans living in the U.S. The Panamanian economy
too attracts a modest number of Central American migrants, but this number
(11.600 in 1990) has not increased dramatically over the years (Escobar 1998).
Given the
paucity of data on contemporary regional migration and its declining
significance vis-à-vis extra-regional migration, I will concentrate my
discussion of this topic on two areas. First, I will address the two most
significant cases of intra-regional migration mentioned above. Second, I will
examine the continued rural-to-urban migration, a factor that promises to be of
importance to regional development.
Nicaraguan
migration to Costa Rica, like many regional migrations, has deep historical
roots in agricultural labor. Since the turn of the twentieth century, thousands
of Nicaraguans have migrated seasonally to Costa Rica to assist in the banana
and later coffee industries. This pattern was established a century ago and to
a much lesser degree is still evident today. However, the character of
Nicaraguan migration to Costa Rica has changed dramatically in the past thirty
years. Toward the end of the 1970s, as civil war was brewing in Nicaragua,
growing streams of Nicaraguans sought refuge in Costa Rica, a country that
offered them a humanitarian reception for the most part. This refugee migration
is the main reason behind the two-fold increase in Nicaraguans living in Costa
Rica between the national censuses of 1973 and 1984. The 1984 figure of 46.000
foreign-born Nicaraguans would nearly double again by 1997 to 87.000 (Maguid 1999).
During the
1980s, Nicaraguans continued to migrate into Costa Rica as a consequence of
political and economic upheavals in their homeland and drawn by higher wages
(the Costa Rican minimum salary was 3 to 4 times higher than the Nicaraguan
[Maguid 1999]) and more generous social benefits, such as state-subsidized medical
care. As this migration matured it became increasingly apparent that its
profile no longer fit the seasonal agricultural worker profile of previous
generations. Although some Nicaraguans continued to work in the export
commodity sector, the percentage declined from 42% in 1984 to only 21% in 1997.
Moreover, the migrant population became increasingly female and urban, with 40%
living in the greater San José metropolitan area by 1997. Employment shifted
toward urban occupations and became very gendered; women work overwhelmingly in
the domestic and informal marketing sectors, while men predominate in
construction (for a longer discussion, see Cranshaw and Morales 1998; Morales and
Castro 1999). Additionally, the
Nicaraguan migrant population of 1997 is, on average, much more educated than
its earlier counterparts.
The
demographic information presented is based on household surveys, as Costa Rica
has not had a national census since 1984. I mention this as an introduction to
the problematic area of estimating the total Nicaraguan population resident in
Costa Rica. The 1997 survey indicates a figure of 87.445 foreign-born
Nicaraguans living in Costa Rica, although scholars estimate that the total
population is as high as 450.000. Indeed, Costa Rica’s offer of amnesty in
December 1998 after Hurricane Mitch produced 150.200 Nicaraguan applicants, who
accounted for 97% of all applicants (Morales-Gamboa, personal communication).
If, as scholars argue, the total population of Nicaraguans, foreign-born and
native-born, approaches a half million, it represents between one-seventh and
one-eighth of the country’s total population. Given the amnesty, a second
generation born in Costa Rica, and the likelihood that disparities between
earnings potential in Nicaragua versus Costa Rica will not attenuate in the
next decades, this migration pattern is likely to continue.
Not
surprisingly, the large-scale migration of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica has
generated some hostility. Disdain for Nicaraguans is widespread and growing. A
poll taken in July 1999 revealed that 17% of Costa Ricans view Nicaraguans as
the principle problem Costa Rica faces, and some 60% favor deporting
undocumented Nicaraguans (Rivera 1999). While it is not uncommon
for migrations to spark jingoism and xenophobia, this instance merits an
explanation. Maguid (1999) offers some clues. She argues that several factors
have contributed to Nicaraguans’ visibility and hence their perceived threat
to the greater populace. These are (1) their real increase in population; (2)
their concentration in the capital city; and (3) their transformation from
primarily agricultural workers laboring at the fringes of the economy and in
jobs that Costa Ricans do not want to urban workers who, though they primarily
do not compete with Costa Ricans, are perceived to be potential competitors. In
other words, as the migrants have become more like their hosts, the hosts feel
threatened by them. Public pressure on
government officials — Costa Rican and Nicaraguan — has grown as a result of
the tensions, leading to increasing diplomatic strain. This situation clouds
the picture of the role of migration in regional development. It suggests that
even as the Americas move toward a free trade agreement, there will not likely
be an accompanying policy of free movement for laborers, either to the North
or internally to Central America.
Another
site of significant regional immigration is Belize. Though firm figures will
not be forthcoming until the upcoming census, estimates for the number of
regional migrants, predominantly from Guatemala and El Salvador, entering
Belize in the 1980s range from 60.000 down to 24.000 (Woods, Perry, and Steagall 1997). Their percentage of the
total population rose from 8% in 1980 to 13%, according to the 1991 census. In
absolute numbers this regional migration is smaller than the movement of
Nicaraguans to Costa Rica, but it is proportionately equivalent to that migration.
In contrast to Costa Rica, however, most migrants to Belize settle in rural
areas where they are small farmers and/or participate in harvesting bananas,
citrus fruits, and sugar cane (see Pérez Saínz report).
The influx
of other Central Americans is complemented by an emigration of Belizeans to
the United States. Emigrants are drawn primarily from the Garifuna, Creole, and
Afro-Belizean sectors of the population, groups that (along with their
counterparts in Honduras) have migrated northward along shipping routes for
generations. As indicated in Table 1, the U.S. census recorded 30.000
foreign-born Belizeans in 1990, a figure that represents about one-sixth of the
1990 population of Belize. Thus, in relative terms, emigration from Belize is
on par with Salvadoran emigration to the U.S., and immigration to Belize is
comparable to immigration of Nicaraguans into Costa Rica. Yet, despite its significance,
little research has been conducted on migration into and from Belize, an area
meriting future study. One of the few publications on the topic to date
documents dramatic shifts in Belize’s demographic mix as a result of the
combination of immigration and emigration. For example, the Afro-Belizean
population dropped from 48% in 1980 to 36% in 1991, while the mestizo
population, swelled by Central American immigrants, grew from 33% to 44% in
the same time period (Woods, Perry, and Steagall 1997). These demographic changes
are likely to continue, particularly as ecotourism expands into Belize,
escalating demand for service laborers.
Population
projections for all of Central America indicate the continuation of a
historical trend toward greater urbanism. According to Celade and UNDP
estimates (1999), by the year 2020 every Central American country with the
exception of Guatemala (42%) will have an urban[1][i] population that exceeds its rural population. The urban population in
El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua is expected to rise to around two-thirds
of the total population by 2020, approximately a 10% rise from 1995 but still
well below the Latin American average of 80% urban. The factors influencing
rural-to-urban migration are diverse and engage themes discussed in other
Central America reports (see, in particular, Zuvekas and Rodas). The factor
most significant to increasing rural-to-urban migration during the previous two
decades, regional armed conflict, cannot be discounted as a future factor, but
it seems less likely. Rather, to predict the degree and nature of these flows
it is critical to examine regional economic opportunities. Historically, these
have not been evenly distributed, causing many migrants to flock to poles of
opportunity.
As
identified in the Zuvekas report and the INCAE/CLACDS/HIID study (1999), the likely sectors of
future expansion in Central America are manufacturing (particularly maquilas), services, tourism, and, to
some degree, agribusiness. The first two will open opportunities primarily in
urban areas, given the need for transportation, communication, and, for some
specialized service markets, skilled labor. Financial services, such as
accounting, customer orders, payroll, and software support are expected to
prosper in countries like Costa Rica, where human capital levels are highest.
These stable and relatively well-paying jobs are likely to stimulate demand for
secondary services – such as domestic labor – which, in turn, will attract
less-skilled labor from the countryside or neighboring countries. This
bifurcation of the service sector into highly paid native workers and poorly
paid immigrant workers is already apparent in Costa Rica. It is also
characteristic of the United States, where Central American immigrant workers
have found employment niches as nannies, landscapers, and house cleaners to
middle-class Americans (Mahler 1995, Sassen 1988). The growth of tourism may
also affect migration patterns, attracting low-wage laborers into vacation
areas to perform low-end services and, to a lesser extent, regional migration
of personnel trained in hotel/restaurant management. In the case of countries
with little tourist infrastructure but high emigration rates, such as El
Salvador, tourism will be linked most closely to returning migrants from
abroad. Government-private sector initiatives are likely to foster this segment
of the tourist industry.
With a few
minor exception, such as bananas and products salable in the overseas ethnic
markets, the growth prospects for agricultural products appear very poor,
particularly in comparison to other sectors. The decline in small-scale farming
will push future migrants out of the countryside and into urban areas, capital
cities in particular. Moreover, many areas of subsistence agriculture have
witnessed such extreme environmental degradation — deforestation, loss of
topsoil, and ground water contaminated with fertilizers, to name just a few —
that peasants cannot survive and are obliged to migrate to urban areas or
abroad. The drop in export commodities during the years of warfare in Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador also affected the peasantry, depriving it of
seasonal agricultural wages that paid for a modicum of supplies from fertilizer
and clothing to medical care. In certain communities, the seasonal migration
evolved into international migration, with remittances fulfilling the role that
wages once filled. One of the groups most at risk for rural-to-urban migration
is indigenous populations, which form a large corps of the rural population in
Guatemala and, to a lesser extent, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. On the
Guatemala-Mexico border, the attraction of international migration is
especially pronounced among Maya youth. Increasing numbers of Maya have
migrated northward; to what degree these individuals have migrated directly
from the countryside to the U.S. I cannot say, but it is likely that at least
some have step-migrated first to urban areas and later across international
borders.
Step
migration introduces another angle from which rural-to-urban migration can be
analyzed. Up until this point I have been developing those factors that attract
people into urban areas — or what are commonly referred to in migration
literature as “pull” factors. If a discussion contains only “pull” factors it
leaves the impression that people have a propensity to move when the incentives
are sufficient. Though commonplace, this assumption does not fit empirical
reality, for the vast majority of Central America’s population and indeed the
world’s does not migrate even when
greater economic opportunities are known to exist elsewhere. When migration is
understood as the exception and not the norm, then the focus of an
investigation shifts to understanding why people become uprooted; that is, from
looking at “pull” factors to “push” factors. An obvious force of uprooting is
disaster — man-made or natural. Other forces are often much less obvious,
requiring a more grounded approach than macro-level studies that can identify
“pull” factors readily, and are quite sensitive to variations in local
conditions. In the case of Central America, the neoliberal reforms of the late
nineteenth century constitute one of the most significant, if not the most
significant, factors contributing to the uprooting of the rural population
historically (see Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991).
In the
next paragraphs I will identify and discuss several factors affecting the
continued uprooting of the peasantry in El Salvador, drawing on my own
research. This is not an exhaustive list, but rather a suggestive one. I
will illustrate forces that I do not see developed in the literature yet which,
according to many conversations with Central American scholars, appear germane
to a broader understanding of persistent rural-to-urban migration. Perhaps the
least discussed and yet the most insidious is the educational system. Academic
achievement in El Salvador as elsewhere in Central America entails increasing
levels of migration. As children continue their studies from elementary into
secondary schools, they must travel increasingly farther from their homes. In
many communities, schools within walking distance offer only the earliest
grades. If students continue their education they must find and pay for
transportation to distant schools; meanwhile, their families assume the burden
not only of the expense of this education but the loss of children’s labor.
Higher education is even more unattainable; secondary schools are often
located only in large towns and cities, while universities are located
exclusively in cities. For students to attend these schools, they may have to
leave home entirely and migrate into increasingly urban areas, where they
acculturate into an urban lifestyle. In addition, there are few jobs for the
highly educated in rural communities. An important corollary to this phenomenon
is the fact that remittances from international migration play a key role in
students’ ability to continue their education — and hence to become urban
subjects (Mahler 1999b).
Whereas
education uproots and pulls students into longer-term migrations, before they
even enter kindergarten children have already been introduced to migration and
urban life via the medical care system. Medical care is another scare resource
in rural El Salvador as elsewhere, and early morning buses are brimming with
parents traveling to cities with sick children in tow. From an early age,
children learn that opportunities are limited near home and that power and
resources emanate from the bustling cities. Similarly, the people I studied in
eastern El Salvador traveled hours each way to buy staple and specialized goods
from well-stocked commercial centers or to retrieve remittances in cities. In
short, peasants are obligated — pushed — into a lifestyle that incorporates
constant mobility. In contrast to generations ago, much if not most of this
motion is not of workers heading to the fields or of families visiting each
other in neighboring villages, but repeated trajectories from rural hamlets
into towns and cities. In the short run this may not uproot populations, but
over the long run I argue that it is a contributing factor. This is
particularly true in the case of students relocated for weeks if not years in
cities where they can pursue their education.
Finally, I
will highlight the effects of remittances on uprooting. Through many
interviews, I have gathered evidence of the relationship between remittances
and escalating land values in the region I have studied. During the Salvadoran
civil war, land prices plummeted, but after the 1992 Peace Accords they began
to climb and then skyrocket. Land distant from roads and with only marginal
agricultural value — owing to high degrees of erosion, steep inclines, or
limited access to water, for example — was selling in 1997 for several thousand
dollars a manzana. Plots for homes
often cost double this figure. When asked why the prices had increased so
dramatically, respondents invariably attributed the rise to migrants living in
the U.S. and their families, who bought the land with remittances. Much of this
property is not planted, and owners are unwilling to lease the land. The effect
is to exacerbate existing land scarcity. Moreover, the rise in land values
prevents the area’s non-migrant youth from access to land, particularly to land
purchases. In sum, the situation places additional pressure on these youth,
boys in particular, to emigrate, although in this case the migration is more
likely to be international (where dollars can be earned) than rural-to-urban.
Regardless, it represents another aspect of uprooting occurring in many
regions of Central America, not just in the region I have studied in depth.
As stated
above, the factors discussed here are not intended to be exhaustive; rather,
they accentuate issues that have received little attention to date but merit
more. They provide a broader empirical foundation for predicting, as I do, that
the uprooting of rural populations in Central America will continue in coming
decades, as will rural-to-urban migration. Some instances of regional
migration, most notably that of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica, may ameliorate some
rural-to-urban migration within nation-states. I also expect that regional
migration to certain poles of opportunity as identified previously will persist
and evolve as a consequence of myriad factors, including disparities in
prosperity as well as political and environmental stability between different
countries.
In the past
two decades, Central America has been transformed from a area marked by
intra-regional migrations to one marked predominantly by migrations beyond its
regional borders. It is important to note at the outset that these migrations,
while significant in many ways, are relatively insignificant demographically.
To wit, in the most recent calculations using 1990 as the base year, only one
percent of Central America’s population is constituted by immigrants from
outside the region and only 5% has emigrated. This latter figure varies from
country to country, with a low of 2% registered for Costa Rican emigrants to a
high of 9.5% for Salvadorans (Maguid 1999: 365). In sum, only five in every
100 Central Americas lives outside the region. The overwhelming majority of
these emigrants have relocated in the United States. More than one million
foreign-born Central Americans were censused in that country in 1990, whereas
only 48.000 were censused in Canada at about the same time (ibid.; see also Lara
Martínez 1994). There are also tens of thousands of Central Americans living in
Mexico, but for purposes of simplicity this report will concentrate on Central
Americans living in the United States. Of course, these raw statistics do not
begin to communicate the impact these migrations have had and promise to have
in the future. Aggregate statistics also obscure the fact that migrations are
notoriously uneven in their origins and effects. They are constituted through
personal and community networks, such that one municipality or region of a
country may be heavily affected while another may experience only minimal
effects. Such unevenness characterizes Central American migration, but the
lack of a comprehensive background study makes it impossible to know its full
extent.
The situation of Central Americans living in the
United States is quite dynamic and, consequently, it is difficult and probably
impossible to provide exact figures. This is owing in great part to the numbers
of undocumented as well as legal migrants. “Undocumented” is one of several
terms (including the more pejorative “illegal”) used to denote individuals who
do not have authorization to remain in the another country legally on a short
or permanent basis. These include people who arrived legally (e.g., with a
tourist visa) and then lost legal status by, for example, overstaying their
visa, as well as people who entered another country illegally and remained. The
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates that as of 1996,
335.000 Salvadorans, 165.000 Guatemalans, 90.000 Hondurans, and 70.000
Nicaraguans were residing in the U.S. unlawfully (INS 1999). For the purposes of this
report I will not attempt to
estimate total Central American migration to the U.S., documented or not, but
will employ census data and figures for legal and illegal migration to identify
migratory trends that should
prove useful to developing future scenarios. A comparison of U.S. census
figures for 1970, 1980, and 1990 in Table 1 illustrates the dramatic rise in
Central Americans living in the U.S. These figures only include the
foreign-born; it is important to note that even 1990 figures are outdated and
therefore significantly underestimate current levels. Moreover, studies have
shown that the censuses underestimate Central Americans residing in the U.S.,
particularly the undocumented (e.g., Mahler 1993).
Table 1
Foreign-Born Central American Population
Living in the U.S., by Census Year
Country |
1970 |
1980 |
1990 |
Belize |
8.860 |
14.436 |
29.957 |
Costa Rica |
16.691 |
29.639 |
43.530 |
El Salvador |
15.717 |
94.447 |
465.433 |
Guatemala |
17.356 |
63.073 |
225.739 |
Honduras |
19.118 |
39.154 |
108.923 |
Nicaragua |
16.125 |
44.166 |
168.659 |
Panama |
20.046 |
60.740 |
85.737 |
Total |
103.913 |
345.655 |
1.127.978 |
Source: U.S. Census 1999
Between 1970 and 1980 the population triples,
and then nearly triples again during the next decade. An examination of Table 2
helps identify a pattern, common to all Central American countries, comprised
of a major rise in legal migration between the late 1980s and early 1990s
followed by a decline to levels higher than the mid-1980s but much lower than
the peak years of 1989-1993. The upsurge is directly related to the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). IRCA is best known for authorizing a
legalization program for undocumented immigrants who met specific criteria,
including over 200.000 Central Americans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans in
particular.
Table 2
Central American Immigrants admitted to the United States
by Country of Birth, Fiscal Years 1986-96
|
|
1986 |
1987 |
1988 |
1989 |
1990 |
1991 |
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
Total |
Percent |
Belize |
|
1.385 |
1.354 |
1.497 |
2.217 |
3.867 |
2.377 |
1.020 |
1.035 |
772 |
644 |
786 |
16.954 |
2.50% |
Costa Rica |
|
1.356 |
1.391 |
1.351 |
1.985 |
2.840 |
2.341 |
1.480 |
1.368 |
1.205 |
1.062 |
1.504 |
17.883 |
2.64% |
El Salvador |
|
10.929 |
10.693 |
12.045 |
57.878 |
80.173 |
47.351 |
26.191 |
26.818 |
17.644 |
11.744 |
17.903 |
319.369 |
47.07% |
Guatemala |
|
5.158 |
5.729 |
5.723 |
19.049 |
32.303 |
25.527 |
10.521 |
11.870 |
7.389 |
6.213 |
8.763 |
138.245 |
20.38% |
Honduras |
|
4.532 |
4.751 |
4.302 |
7.593 |
12.024 |
11.451 |
6.552 |
7.306 |
5.265 |
5.496 |
5.870 |
75.142 |
11.08% |
Nicaragua |
|
2.826 |
3.294 |
3.311 |
8.830 |
11.562 |
17.842 |
8.949 |
7.086 |
5.255 |
4.408 |
6.903 |
80.266 |
11.83% |
Panama |
|
2.194
|
2.084 |
2.486 |
3.482 |
3.433 |
4.204 |
2.845 |
2.679 |
2.378 |
2.247 |
2.560 |
30.592 |
4.51% |
Total |
|
28.380 |
29.296 |
30.715 |
101.034 |
146.202 |
111.093 |
57.558 |
58.162 |
39.908 |
31.814 |
44.289 |
678.451 |
|
Source: INS Yearbook 1996, Table 3
IRCA was designed to thwart illegal immigration
into the U.S. by imposing sanctions against employers who hired undocumented
immigrants. That is, it offered benefits to some undocumented immigrants, but
also created a much more restrictive climate for others. IRCA is very
significant to Central American migration because it not only allowed hundreds
of thousands to obtain legal permanent residency, but it also qualified them to
file for immigration status for their spouses and children. If and when these
IRCA beneficiaries become naturalized citizens (they must wait 5 years after
obtaining residency), they will qualify to sponsor more relatives faster than
they could as permanent residents. A dramatic rise in naturalizations appears
already to have begun, as reflected in Table 3. This promises to produce yet
another rise in immigrants over the coming decade
Table 3
Central Americans naturalized to United States Citizenship
Fiscal Years 1987-96
|
|
1987 |
1988 |
1989 |
1990 |
1991 |
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
Total |
Percent |
Belize |
|
316 |
426 |
373 |
389 |
499 |
304 |
381 |
636 |
856 |
1.765 |
5.945 |
3.26% |
Costa Rica |
658 |
726 |
676 |
589 |
792 |
547 |
672 |
1.063 |
1.145 |
2.603 |
9.471 |
5.19% |
|
El Salvador |
2.428 |
2.291 |
2.001 |
2.410 |
3.653 |
2.056 |
3.057 |
5.675 |
13.667 |
33.240 |
70.478 |
38.64% |
|
Guatemala |
1.490 |
1.358 |
1.281 |
1.280 |
1.832 |
1.086 |
1.682 |
3.001 |
5.159 |
13.383 |
31.552 |
17.30% |
|
Honduras |
964 |
1.229 |
1.167 |
1.259 |
1.306 |
1.248 |
1.713 |
2.208 |
2.943 |
7.494 |
21.531 |
11.81% |
|
Nicaragua |
1.118 |
1.363 |
1.271 |
1.520 |
1.732 |
1.100 |
1.500 |
2.442 |
3.930 |
10.614 |
26.590 |
14.58% |
|
Panama |
|
1.151
|
1.561 |
1.791 |
1.755 |
1.492 |
1.150 |
1.393 |
1.854 |
1.735 |
2.935 |
16.817 |
9.22% |
Total |
|
8.125 |
8.954 |
8.560 |
9.202 |
11.306 |
7.491 |
10.398 |
16.879 |
29.435 |
72.034 |
182.384 |
|
Source: INS Yearbook 1996, Table 47
Another significant change in INS policy will also affect rates of legal immigration by Central Americans.
During the early 1990s, over 300.000[2] Guatemalans and Salvadorans qualified for Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) after the settlement of a lawsuit by immigrant rights organizations with
the INS (American Baptist Church [ABC] v. Thornburgh). The ABC agreement
allowed these immigrants to remain in the U.S. and work until 1995, when the
program ended. The group was then expected to file new political asylum claims,
leaving them again in legal limbo. A more generous benefit was authorized by
the U.S. government toward undocumented Nicaraguans. The Nicaraguan Adjustment
and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) was passed in 1997, allowing an
estimated 100.000 Nicaraguans apply for permanent residency. This unevenness in
treatment by the U.S. toward different Central American groups led to a
campaign aimed at extending NACARA to Salvadorans and Guatemalans. As of this writing,
such legislative changes have not occurred; however, an INS ruling in 1999
enabled ABC-class Salvadoran and Guatemalan members to apply for political
asylum under a legal standard that is less strict than that applied to new
applicants (although the old standard applies to the applicants’ beneficiaries,
i.e., spouses and children). To complicate the description of Central American
legal status in the U.S. further, some 100.000 Hondurans and 6.000 Nicaraguans
were granted TPS after Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Their fate, like that of the
ABC-class Salvadorans and Guatemalans, is unsure.
This
digression into U.S. immigration policy serves to illustrate its complexity and
therein the difficulty in using numbers of current migrants to estimate future
levels of Central American migration to the U.S. If the ABC-class of
Guatemalans and Salvadorans obtain legal residency in the coming years in
addition to the NACARA-class of Nicaraguans, then an additional 300.000 Central
Americans — over and above other channels of legal immigration — will be able
to apply for the immigration of their relatives. This will likely add
significantly to current levels of legal immigration from the region to the
U.S.
Beyond
examining migration flows, it is important to highlight a few demographic
features of this migration. First, Central American immigrants do not reflect
the entire socioeconomic spectrum of the societies they hail from. Rather, in
the aggregate, they are neither the poorest nor the wealthiest members of their
constituent societies (Escobar 1998; Maguid 1999; Mahler 1995). This may be counterintuitive
for many who assume that it is predominantly the destitute who migrate to the
North, but research has shown consistently that migrants must draw on some
economic and/or social resources to orchestrate their migrations.
Another
indicator that the migrant population is not representative of the regional
population is educational achievement. On average, less than 50% of Central
American migrants in the U.S. finished high school and 9% finished college.
These figures vary, however; Salvadorans constitute the least educated (67%
never finishing high school) and Panamanians the most educated subgroup of
migrants, with 20% university graduates (Maguid 1999: 373). The Nicaraguan
migrant population is divided; the more educated migrants head to the U.S.,
while those with less education and fewer skills tend to move to Costa Rica.
These statistics on education highlight the fact that the emigrant Central American
population is more educated on average than those who stay, representing
somewhat of a brain drain to the region.
There is
every reason to believe that Central American migration to the United States
over the next two decades will not decline from its current levels. Conversely,
there is evidence that levels will increase — albeit not as dramatically as in
recent history — in the future unless major changes intervene. The reasons to
expect an incline in emigration from the region are many-fold. First, a large
and growing legal immigrant population (particularly Salvadoran) is
naturalizing at higher rates than ever before. These individuals will be in an
enhanced position to petition for the immigration of more relatives, helping
to multiply legal migration. This has been true of Asian migration to the U.S.
and other more mature Latin American migrations, such as Dominican and Mexican.
Second, changes in U.S. immigration policy approved in the 1990s favor skilled
over unskilled immigrants. These provisions may become a magnet for more
privileged sectors of Central American society, particularly in times of
economic and/or political crises. Third, undocumented migration, already
estimated at approximately 700.000[3], is likely to continue and perhaps expand for several reasons. These
include classic demographic and socioeconomic pressures — such as high regional
birth and poverty rates; insufficient employment opportunities, particularly
in the countryside; and inequitable land tenure policies. Also important are
factors that facilitate migration, such as a sophisticated and mature smuggling
industry and the fact that increasing numbers of Central Americans have family
members living in the U.S. who can help finance their migrations. High levels
of legal immigration may reduce undocumented migration from some countries,
such as El Salvador and Guatemala[4]. Honduras is likely to be an exception to this rule, as its stock of
legal immigrants in the U.S. is quite low. Particularly given the effects of
Hurricane Mitch in 1998, undocumented migration from Honduras to the United
States is likely to grow (see USIA 1999b for Mitch-related estimates, however circumspect).
Another
factor that will influence the future of undocumented migration from Central
America is interdiction, not only by the U.S. but also by Mexican and
Guatemalan authorities. The U.S. has all but admitted it cannot find and deport
undocumented immigrants once they have arrived. Such efforts are too costly;
rather, in recent years the U.S. government has moved to (1) bolster
interdiction of undocumented immigration at the border, enjoining Mexico and
Guatemala to aid in this effort (for more details on the latter see Castillo G. and Palma C. 1996; Castillo García and Palma Calderón 1999;
Izaguirre and Jerez 1999; Kobrak and Palencia n.d.); and (2) pass legislation
aimed at dissuading undocumented immigration by depriving the undocumented from
access to labor markets and legal status.
It is my
personal opinion that U.S. legislation and policy regarding immigration is unlikely
to become less restrictive in the coming years. This opinion is based on
historical analyses that mark restrictions on immigration as evolving out of
economic crises (such as recessions that lead to political and popular
anti-immigrant campaigns claiming that immigrants take American workers’ jobs).
In the late 1990s the U.S. Congress passed major restrictions on legal and
illegal migration, several years after a recession and other events, such as
the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, that fostered
anti-immigrant sentiment[5]. Another factor responsible for rising anti-immigrant sentiment in the
U.S. is fundamental demographic change in the U.S. population. Hispanics are
expected to double from 12% to 25% of the population in the coming decades,
primarily as a consequence of immigration. These changes are likely to fuel
greater racial/ethnic tensions and increased restrictions on
immigration. On the other hand, if Central Americans file for citizenship and
organize politically with other Latino groups, their influence may be
sufficient to block such legislation. In either case, I predict a tense future
in this area, one similar to contemporary animosities between Costa Ricans and
Nicaraguan immigrants.
Several
factors could substantially alter the gradual increase in Central American
migration outlined above. These include unpredictable events such as wars and natural
disasters. Hurricane Mitch highlighted the ecological vulnerability of the
region to natural disasters and the likelihood that some members of affected
populations will emigrate as a consequence. Regarding Mitch, dire predictions
of massive emigration (e.g., USIA 1999a, USIA 1999b) seem to have been
overstated, but a comprehensive report on Mitch’s effects is still incomplete.
Certainly, warfare in the region during the 1980s expelled far more migrants
than Mitch and should remain high on the list of intangibles that could change
emigration from the region dramatically. A second hypothetical change that
could alter migration patterns would be economic transformations producing a
greater equilibrium between opportunities in El Norte and in Central America. The fact that Panamanian and Costa
Rican emigration is so low is indicative of the greater equality in opportunity
between these countries and the United States and Canada versus El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Logically then, greater parity in
opportunity for the latter countries vis-à-vis North America would lessen some
of the pressure to emigrate. This parity could be caused by enhanced economic
development in Central America or, less likely, a decline in opportunity in the
U.S., owing to a major recession, for example. An intermediate scenario would
take into account the uneven economic development that already characterizes
the region and suggest, much as in the Nicaraguan migration to Costa Rica, that
areas generating opportunities will likely attract immigration. These may
siphon off some of the flow that otherwise may have migrated northward.
For many
years Mexico has been a locus for both Central American migrants in transit to
the North as well as a home to more established migrants, such as Guatemalan
agricultural workers on the Guatemala-Mexico border and refugees of regional
civil wars. Exact numbers of Central Americans residing in Mexico are not
forthcoming; census figures, which report only legal immigrants to Mexico,
document a mere 14.000 in 1970 and 1980 but a major jump to 59.000 in 1990, the
overwhelming majority Guatemalan (Maguid 1999: 372). Overall, Mexico absorbed
only about 4.4% of Central American emigrants in 1990, and 16% of Guatemalans (Maguid n.d.: 27). Mexicans also constituted
only 3.6% of all foreigners living in Central America in that same year (ibid.:
16). The single largest group of Central Americans in Mexico were Guatemalan
refugees in the state of Chiapas, numbering some 43.000. They received aided
from UNHCR and other international organizations in the 1980s and 1990s, but
their status was in limbo until 1999, when Mexico finally granted them
permanent resident status.
Though
Mexico is not a haven for large numbers of Central American migrants (even
taking into account that the data above underestimate the number of
undocumented), it is a major conduit for migrants heading to the United States
and Canada. During the 1980s, Mexican officials maintained a virtual
laissez-faire attitude, interdicting and deporting fewer than 10.000 Central
Americans each year despite massive flows. In the 1990s, however, under
pressure from the U.S., Mexico drastically increased its efforts; in that
decade, the number of deportees was more than 100.000 per year, with the
largest numbers from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (Castillo G. and Palma C. 1996: 150). In the near future, Mexico
will remain a principal avenue for migratory flows from the region. It may
attract more permanent immigrants as it develops internally and if, as
expected, U.S. immigration policies become ever more restrictive.
Remittance
flows to Central America are largely a function of emigration; consequently,
as emigration has increased over the past twenty years, so too have
remittances.
Table 4
Remittances received by Central American countries
1984-1998 (in millions of U.S. dollars)
|
1984 |
1986 |
1988 |
1990 |
1992 |
1994 |
1996 |
1998 |
Belize |
16 |
15 |
15 |
16 |
18 |
13 |
13 |
18 |
Costa Rica |
32 |
37 |
40 |
55 |
88 |
- |
122 |
112 |
El Salvador |
118 |
150 |
202 |
324 |
709 |
967 |
1.084 |
1.338 |
Guatemala |
28 |
51 |
142 |
205 |
339 |
263 |
375 |
457 |
Honduras |
10 |
13 |
28 |
49 |
61 |
85 |
128 |
220 |
Nicaragua |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
50 |
95 |
200 |
Panama |
* |
* |
* |
* |
* |
17 |
16 |
16 |
Total
Received |
206 |
266 |
427 |
649 |
1.225 |
1.395 |
1.833 |
2.344 |
* World
Bank data for the years 1984-1992 are not included as they do not use the same
calculation.
Source:
World Bank World Tables 1995 (figures 1984-1992); International Monetary
Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook for 1999. Vol. 50, Part 1:
Country Tables, 1999. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund (figures
1994-1998)
Table 4
illustrate this trend; however, it is important to state at the outset that
estimates of remittances vary owing to differences in definition, accounting
method, and reporting accuracy[6]. Therefore, it is most critical to look at trends over time rather than
specific estimates of overall sums.
In a
macroeconomic sense, remittances have shifted Central American economies
significantly — but not uniformly — in their generation of foreign exchange.
Prior to the onset of mass emigration from the region, most countries derived
the majority of their foreign exchange via commodity exports and, in some
cases, foreign aid. In the 1990s several countries, most notably El Salvador,
saw this relationship shift to a greater and greater dependency upon
remittances (e.g., Funkhouser 1992, 1995; García n.d.). For instance,
remittances exceeded exports in 1992 and 1993 then declined as El Salvador’s
economy rebounded after the war (see also, de la Garza, Orozco, and Baraona
1997). Recently remittances to Honduras and Nicaragua have grown substantially,
mimicking other countries’ patterns. Clearly, remittances have become an integral
feature of many Central American economies in the past decade, a fact that has
motivated a few governments to play increasingly activist roles with their
expatriate communities with the intention of preserving remittance flows.
Before
proceeding to an analysis of future scenarios regarding remittances and
regional development, I feel it is imperative to examine critically the key
concept of “productive use” of remittances. Owing in large part to CEPAL’s
efforts, numerous country reports on productive use of remittances in Central
America have been published recently (e.g., CEPAL 1999a,b,c,d). These reports
employ the traditional, conservative definition of “productive use,” a
designation for remittances invested in business ventures or placed in savings
accounts where the capital can be invested by the banking system. In the wider
remittance literature this definition has generated criticism as (1) too
narrow; and (2) laden with infelicitous sociocultural connotations.
A good
example of the first criticism emerges in revisionist literature examining the
trickle-down effects of remittances on economies at various levels. Durand,
Parrado, and Massey (1996), for example, argue that studies have under-assessed
the multiplier effects of remittances to local, regional, national, and
international economies. More specifically, remittances spent on housing —
which previously had been characterized as of largely individual or household
benefit (e.g., Russell 1986) — have greater ramifications
for at least the local economy (Stahl 1986: 915-6). Indeed, investment in
housing generates more multiplier effects than any other industry (Taylor 1998), meaning that funds spent on
construction and home repair create jobs and circulate wealth more amply than
previously believed. Moreover, “productive” uses for remittances or any income
must be contextualized within the available opportunity structure for
investment. That is, people understand that it makes rational sense to invest
their resources only “if conditions are created that makes(sic) productive
investment viable and if there are policies to channel their monies (sic) into
investments” (Meyers 1998: 7; see also Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996).
The second
issue, sociocultural biases, is best illustrated through gender. Women are the
majority of household remittance recipients. They are also the population most
excluded from access to many of the institutions needed to invest remittances,
such as banks and government offices (CEPAL 1998: 24). When remittances are spent
on consumption then, a subtle gendered critique emerges, one in which women
are portrayed — albeit inadvertently — as failing to put remittances to their
best use, or inhibiting investment. One reason for this characterization is the
fact that remittances are not studied holistically (see discussion in CEPAL
1988). Most research studies only one aspect of the phenomenon, namely, its
uses. Much less attention has been devoted to understanding the various methods
of transfer (Orozco 1999 is an important exception), the factors involved in
the decision to remit or not, the effects on remitters of depriving themselves
of these moneys, and the experiences of recipients. The research biases
expressed in the literature coupled with the difficulty of estimating
remittances and veracity of the data collected leave questionable the overall
validity of remittance data. Certainly, more research on remittances,
remitters, and recipients is necessary.
Overall, I
expect that remittances to Central America from abroad (as well as between
countries, such as the case of Costa Rica - Nicaragua) will at least remain at
their current levels and are likely to climb over the next twenty years. The
main assumptions behind this prediction have already been discussed and include
primarily: (1) the likelihood that emigration will also remain at or exceed
current levels; (2) remittances should not be expected to decline as a migrant
population ages (contrary to the “decay hypothesis”); and (3) the economic
status of migrants abroad will remain at or exceed current conditions (see also
Meyers 1998 and Durand et al. 1996 for detail on these predictors). I do
expect, however, that remittances to Honduras will be more dynamic in the
immediate future than elsewhere. Honduran emigration has risen recently, not
merely as an effect of Hurricane Mitch; consequently, remittances should rise.
This is confirmed in a CEPAL country report that cites a jump in remittances
from $68.5 million in 1993 to $202 million in 1998 (CEPAL 1999c: 7). Of course unforeseeable
circumstances, such as natural disasters or warfare, would affect both
migration and remittance flows in ways that cannot be predicted well. I also
predict that a product of the region’s augmented (albeit uneven) dependency
upon remittances will be ever-increasing levels of government activism
addressing primarily emigrant communities abroad. This attention has multiple
goals, not the least of which is to foster linkages that will ensure steady
remittance flows. While such efforts are comprehensible, they are drawing
increasing criticism because they place responsibility for Central America’s
economic stability disproportionately on the shoulders of migrants. In the
words of a major CEPAL report[7], “the so-called productive use of remittances has been in large part
one of smoke and mirrors as exercised by the migrants’ countries of origin.
These countries’ policies want to treat them as captive agents despite being so
far away and demand from them behaviors and commitments that they do not ask of
the rest of the society” (CEPAL 1998: 33)[8].
To summarize,
remittances will continue to enter Central American economies in the next
decades, but their contribution to regional development is a function as much
of government policy as it is of sheer volume. Savings and investment — whether
of remittances or of income more broadly defined — are best encouraged by sound
social and economic policies. Governments that promote economic, political, and
social stability, including low inflation and free floating exchange rates,
create the conditions most propitious to investments and development in
general (CEPAL 1998, Meyers 1998, Russell 1986). Governments that attempt
to control and channel remittances specifically run the risk of pushing
migrants toward remitting via unofficial means (Meyers 1998: 12). Additionally, countries who
push for “productive” uses of remittances should encourage the non-migrant
population to increase savings and investment as well. If this practice were
applied more universally then the disproportionate burden placed on migrants
would ease.
The 1988
CEPAL report and the Interamerican Dialogue report (Meyers 1998) provide a
basic template of suggestions for making remittances more instrumental to
regional development. Recommendations fall into three substantive areas: (1)
methods for decreasing the cost and inconvenience of remitting; (2) methods
aimed at improving savings and investment among recipients; and (3) methods to
facilitate home town associations and other efforts involving “collective” remittances
(1998: 25). I will address now the first and second areas, describing and
critiquing, where necessary, the ideas laid out in the cited publications. I
will address the third area separately in Section 5.
Several
authors have noted that migrants pay a very high cost for remitting to their
homelands. The fees vary by type of service and from company to company, but
10% of the value remitted is typical (for details see CEPAL 1998, de la Garza, Orozco, and Baraona 1997, Mahler 1999a, Meyers
1998, Orozco 1999). Agencies and wire services
are making high profits off remittances, profits skimmed from the efforts of
hard-working and often poor migrants. Salvadorans in Los Angeles have the option
of remitting through a credit union that charges far less than other services (Kandel 1997); personal couriers also
charge less, a 5% commission on average (Mahler 1999a). There has been some
discussion among government officials in the United States about remittance
intermediaries donating a small proportion of their profits into a common pool
that would be used to fund projects in Central America (Elliott, personal
communication). It has also been proposed that Central American banks establish
more branches in the U.S. and Canada to assist their clients’ remittance
transfers; these proposals have been stalled by U.S. regulators’ concerns over
the problem of money laundering (Orozco 1999). Another suggestion often raised to
improve remittance flows is to allow migrants and their families to establish
savings accounts in dollars and pay high interest rates on these accounts to
attract savings away from the U.S. and Canada. So far only El Salvador and
Nicaragua permit such accounts; interests rates, however, have not been very
attractive (CEPAL 1998; Meyers 1998; Orozco 1999). There has been some effort
at least in California to form non-profit credit unions that would provide
remittance services at discount rates (Kandel 1997).
The second
group of general recommendations focuses on improving savings and investment of
remittances. Among her recommendations, Meyer suggests that national or
regional financial institutions (“remittance banks”) be created into which
migrants can deposit their remittances and have funds sent directly to
beneficiaries. Those funds not sent to migrants’ families would remain in
savings accounts and consequently would then be available for investment in
development projects in the region, opening up a new source of capital. A
problem I see with this suggestion is the fact that in many if not most rural
areas of Central America — where large numbers of migrants originate — there
are no financial institutions of any kind in close proximity[9]. I think it would be hard to attract depositors to “remittance banks”
if their relatives found it difficult to receive funds (state-run postal
services are notoriously bad and would not be adequate to deliver remittances).
Other
suggestions pertaining to the second area of recommendations include more
aggressive banking policies aimed at attracting remittances that would be
invested in housing and other areas of importance to migrants; contracting
NGOs that specialize in training recipients on how to handle their budgets and
the different ways they can put remittances to work (such as in financing
microbusinesses and cooperatives); and the establishment of other technical and
financial services to help direct remittances into development projects (CEPAL
1998: 27). For more suggestions I direct readers directly to the CEPAL and
Interamerican Dialogue reports, which I can only summarize here. Other useful
ideas are raised in de la Garza et al. 1997, Lungo 1997, Orozco 1999, and Siri
1996.
Much of
Central America looks, feels, and sounds like a cultural crossroads, a blend
of lo centroamericano and lo gringo. Upon arrival at the Comalapa
airport in El Salvador, for example, the traveler is greeted with huge billboards
advertising remittance services and international direct dialing to the United
States and Canada. Newspaper headlines in Nicaragua scream the latest
information about the plight of Nicas in Costa Rica, and along the
Guatemala-Mexico border young Mayas have forsaken traditional employment in
agriculture for quick money assisting streams of migrants headed for El Norte to cross Central America’s
northern river border. In many hamlets in the countryside, sparkling new brick
homes with tiled roofs and television antennas contrast sharply with
thatched-roof bahareque huts with a
mule and not a new Toyota pickup in front. Sections of El Norte have also become Central-Americanized. Entire swaths of
commercial thoroughfares in Los Angeles, Houston, Washington, D.C., and even
suburban New York feel more like Guatemala or San Salvador than they do Main
Street U.S.A.; a pupusa or a tamal is easier to find than a hamburger and fries. “Spanglish,” a blend
of Spanish and English, is becoming the lingua
franca of these neighborhoods as well as in pockets of Central America.
What these
brief descriptions portray is cultural syncretism — the blending of once
distinct places and ways of life into a new reality. Of all of the changes
wrought by Central American migration, this is probably the most palpable and
certainly one of the most intriguing to everyday Central Americans and to the
people who try to research and comprehend these changes. It is important to
repeat here that migrations and the cultural transformations they bring with
them do not affect each country, region, or locality equally. People
migrate along networks of contacts, giving some communities a high proportion
of migrants and leaving others almost unaffected.
This
section of the report addresses the complexities of the cultural
interconnectedness that has arisen largely as a consequence of sustained
international migration over the past two decades. The interconnectedness is
also fostered through television, film, and radio as well as through the Internet
and global marketing campaigns which, though also important, lie outside the
scope of the report. This analysis will focus on what is termed “transnational
migration,” a phenomenon understood as the processes through which migrants
maintain and promote ties between the countries where they reside and their
homelands and home communities (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992: 1-2). Some people create and
nourish these bonds by physically traveling across international borders;
others primarily maintain contact through remittances and by sending and
receiving letters, phone calls, and even email. Increasingly, governments
foster linkages as well; for example, several Central American countries deploy
their consular corps to reach out to their expatriate populations abroad.
The
transnational perspective on migration is less than a decade old; as such, its
scholarly literature is still quite limited. Ideas and issues studied so far,
however, provide an expanding picture of contemporary Central American
transnationalism and prepare the foundation for making some modest predictions
about the future. I will begin this discussion by addressing the general notion
of Central American transnational migration, that is, of how people maintain
relationships across borders. I will then move to a discussion of several
particular topics, such as home town associations and deportees, that have
captured particular attention in recent years.
During the
conflict-ridden years of the 1980s, many Central American migrants lacked legal
status in the countries where they sought refuge. Political and legal barriers
prohibited them from physically returning to their countries and communities of
origin for many years. Moreover, families were often split as a consequence of
the wars. Some members fled across borders, while others stayed and still
others migrated from rural conflict zones into more protected cities. It should
not be surprising then that a growing literature discusses the effects of
migration on family life and gender relations. One could easily assume that the
tumultuous events of the 1980s would have far reaching consequences for these
relationships, but the evidence is conflictive. In communities highly impacted
by emigration, for instance, it is quite common to hear people complain that
children left behind in the care of grandparents when their parents emigrate
suffer from emotional, disciplinary, and educational problems. For example, in
their research on Nicaraguan migrants to Costa Rica, Cranshaw and Morales (1998) have found that high female
migration leads adolescent girls, in particular, to feel abandoned by their
migrant mothers, resulting in deep psychological and emotional scars. Faulstich Orellana et al. (1998) document that increasing
numbers of children born in California experience “transnational childhoods,”
traveling back and forth between their parents’ home towns in Guatemala and El
Salvador and cities in California during school vacations or even longer.
Negotiating
family matters and relationships across borders is very stressful, not
infrequently to the breaking point. I have discussed these issues extensively
with non-migrants in El Salvador, particularly with the wives of migrants who
depend upon a steady stream of remittances to feed their families. The
remittances received often do not cover the expenses; letters and phone calls
to migrants often do not resolve the problem, for the physical distance has
also become a social distance across which people cannot adequately communicate
the differences in their realities. The fact that many families have become
dependent upon the remittances supplied by migrant members exacerbates as well
as attenuates these difficulties. On the one hand, the income may permit the
family members to enjoy a higher standard of material living than prior to
migration. On the other hand, the long-term absence of migrants from their
families can lead to divorce and to children feeling abandoned by their parents.
There is also evidence that gender relations shift as women and girls assume
“male” tasks, such as planting crops, because so many men are absent for long
periods of time (Mahler 1999c).
Over the
years, one of the transnational phenomena that has received much attention is
the existence of transnational enterprises. These are small to medium-sized
businesses which operate across borders and are frequently run by migrants
themselves. A case in point is the viajeros
or encomenderos who transport
remittances, packages, and communications for migrants and their relatives
living in different countries (Mahler 1999a; Orozco 1999). Another, larger
example, is evidenced by the Tapachulteca supermarket chain, which has a store
in Los Angeles as well as stores in El Salvador (Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999). Transnational businesses
thrive off of meeting the needs and desires of a migrant clientele, often aided
by Central American governments who have also become transnational actors. An
example is the Salvadoran government’s Programa Nacional de Competitividad.
This program works with migrant communities to assist in the expansion of
Salvadoran exports to these areas as well as to cultivate business
relationships with Salvadoran migrant entrepreneurs that could expand commerce
between El Salvador and other countries. In a similar vein, Salvadoran and
Guatemalan governments and business organizations have established trade fairs
in Los Angeles. Government officials have expressed to me the desire to expand
these efforts in the future, to exploit the commercial possibilities opened up
by transnational migration and transnational markets. Given the expanding
Central American population abroad, there is good growth potential in these
markets. Consequently, I expect that such government-private sector hybrid
efforts to develop transnational markets will expand in the coming years.
Home town
associations formed by migrants and operating across borders are one type of
transnational activity that has received a great deal of scholarly as well as
public attention in recent years. Ostensibly, home town associations organize
fundraisers to garner moneys that will be used for altruistic projects in
migrants’ communities of origin: the building of new schools, roads, or
recreation facilities, for instance (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1999; Landolt et
al. 1999; Lungo 1997; Popkin 1999). Numerical estimates are rough as
organizations come into and out of existence with some frequency; figures for
Salvadoran associations suggest that there are 70 or more in Los Angeles,
around 15 in Washington, D.C. and several in metropolitan New York (Landolt et
al. 1999).
Home town
associations mark transnational grassroots involvement in and responsibility
for local development and improvement endeavors. Projects organized with home
town associations can enjoy greater autonomy than state-funded projects because
the associations provide much or all of the necessary funding. Thus,
communities are not as beholden to government funding and to the party politics
that typically accompany such ventures. I will add here that in the literature
to date home town associations are always depicted as transnational; however,
in my own research I have found that home town associations are also formed by
people resident in cities in Central America. Like the transnational
organizations, these associations are usually constituted by migrants, though
rural-to-urban migrants, and serve as support systems for the migrants as well
as fundraising entities to help their home towns. They are urban counterparts
to the transnational associations.
Emerging
research findings on transnational home town associations strike a cautionary
note: Associations may facilitate collaboration in innovative ways, but they
may also foster cleavages. One example is gender. The 1998 CEPAL report
suggests that home town associations are opening avenues for high degrees of
participation by females. Research on this topic is limited and engages Mexican
transnationalism, but its findings, nonetheless, diverge sharply from CEPAL’s
optimism (e.g., Goldring 1996; Goldring 1999). Women are found to
participate, but largely in supporting and not decision-making roles; they have
different priorities for projects, and their interests are neglected. Home town
associations can also be crucibles for class interests if not conflicts. Data
from a cross-national study documents that Salvadoran business entrepreneurs
participate in home town associations over six times more often than
non-entrepreneur migrants (Guarnizo, personal communication). This disparity
suggests that home town associations may be a medium for certain groups — the
wealthy and politically savvy, in particular — to pursue their interests. In
that vein, there is also growing evidence that home town associations produce
rifts between local leaders and migrants as much or more than they foster
cooperation (e.g., Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999; Orozco 1999; Smith 1998). Local leaders become
jealous of migrants’ power as exercised through the associations and the
remittances generated, at least in part because it makes the leaders seem
incapable of addressing their own communities’ problems. In some cases migrants
have run for and been elected to office as local mayors, underscoring the
vulnerability of local leaders.
A corpus
of research also documents that home town associations and their agglomerations
(e.g., regional associations) attract the attention of migrants’ home country
governments, which seek to cultivate relationships that benefit states as well
(Goldring 1998; González Gutiérrez 1997; Guarnizo 1997; Smith 1998). Most of this research extends
beyond Central American case studies, but I will provide a brief overview
because some of these efforts are being explored if not duplicated in Central
America. The quintessential example of state cultivation of migrant home town
associations is the Mexican government’s Program of Attention to Mexican
Communities Abroad (PCME). Founded in 1990 and housed in the Foreign Ministry,
PCME’s mandate is to foster state cooperation with home town associations.
Consular officials, governors, and other government officials are sent to
cultivate ties with migrant organizations and win their support for issues
crucial to the Mexican government, such as the passage of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (for details see Goldring 1998; Gonzalez Gutierrez 1997; Guarnizo 1997; Smith 1998). One strategy employed by
PCME was to match every dollar donated by affiliated home town associations
with two from federal coffers. The “2 for 1 program,” as it was nicknamed
became very popular and attracted the attention of some Central American
governments, most notably El Salvador. In 1999 the PCME director visited the
Salvadoran Foreign Ministry to explain the program more directly. On October 1
of that year El Salvador established the Dirección General de Atención a la
Comunidad en el Exterior (DGACE), with the stated goal of “incorporating the
Salvadoran community abroad into the process of national development by
fortifying its links with El Salvador through national initiatives….” (DGACE 1999)[10].
Central
American governments have also been very active in diplomatic negotiations
with the governments of countries their citizens have migrated to. High-level
meetings have discussed immigration policies (see CEPAL 1998, Mahler 1999b, Orozco 1999) and, most recently, the
impact of Hurricane Mitch as well as more traditional topics, such as trade and
economic assistance. Pressure for governments to act on transnational issues
also emanates from migrant communities abroad who are, for example,
increasingly demanding expanded transnational political rights. At present,
some but not all Central American countries permit their citizens to hold dual
nationality or citizenship with another country; only Belize permits its
citizens to vote abroad. Naturally, this limits migrants’ political influence
back home. In the future, Central American migrants are likely to press for
similar expansions of their political rights. Many nascent organizations
working toward this goal already (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1999; also GUATENET,
personal communication). If more migrants win the right to vote abroad they
could well determine elections, particularly in the case of El Salvador. Such
electoral power already exists for newly legalized Nicaraguans in Costa Rica
who, if they vote en masse, could swing close elections. Given the potential
for transnational politics, I predict that struggles between migrant and
non-migrant constituencies over migrant political rights will be contentious
and lengthy in coming years. Given their existing economic power, they are
likely to succeed over time with major ramifications for Central American
politics.
My
research has found pervasive fear among many government officials that the
children of migrants living abroad will lose their national identity, a sense
of their ancestry and heritage. They
fear that future generations who do not maintain a Central American identity
will be much less likely to remit to their ancestors’ homelands or make other
contributions. The fate of children born to Central American migrants living
outside their homelands is complex and to date there has been little research
to evaluate the situation, let alone hypothesize about the future. As mentioned
previously, some children are being raised transnationally; they are likely to
acquire an identity that incorporates their heritage. There is growing
evidence of this cultural hybridity in music, art, poetry and novels (see for example, Rodríguez 1999).
The positive side of Central American migrant
youth is often overshadowed by the growing incidence of deported gang members.
In the 1990s, deportations from the United States to Central America escalated
by several thousand per year, as reflected in Table 5. Though gang members and
other criminal deportees are only a small subset of Central Americans who
return each year, they have had high visibility and are widely blamed for
accelerating crime rates in several countries, El Salvador in particular. In
that country, gang graffiti blemishes walls nearly everywhere, even in very
small, rural towns, giving the impression that the gang situation is more
pervasive and consequential than is probably true.
Table 5: Central Americans deported from the United States
By Country of Nationality
1992-1996
|
|
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
Total |
Percent |
Belize |
|
97 |
113 |
83 |
55 |
88 |
436 |
1.46% |
Costa Rica |
42 |
36 |
28 |
34 |
47 |
187 |
0.63% |
|
El Salvador |
1.962 |
2.014 |
1.784 |
1.783 |
2.360 |
9.903 |
33.17% |
|
Guatemala |
1.409 |
1.310 |
1.179 |
1.654 |
1.980 |
7.532 |
25.23% |
|
Honduras |
1.849 |
1.648 |
1.585 |
1.875 |
2.693 |
9.650 |
32.32% |
|
Nicaragua |
310 |
252 |
376 |
354 |
382 |
1.674 |
5.61% |
|
Panama |
|
105 |
105 |
98 |
81 |
86 |
475 |
1.59% |
Total |
|
5.774 |
5.478 |
5.133 |
5.836 |
7.636 |
29.857 |
|
Source:
INS Yearbook 1996, Table 67
Grass-roots
transnational organizations such as Homies Unidos have been started to assist
gang deportees and their families (Cruz and Portillo Peña 1998). The crisis that has arisen
around deportations has also motivated new intergovernmental efforts by Central
American countries and the United States. Programs to receive the deportees and
assist in their reintegration into society are being developed in several
countries along a model begun in El Salvador’s airport called Bienvenido a Casa (Welcome Home). Some of these
advances can be credited to the Regional Conference on Migration, more commonly
known as the Proceso Puebla.
Shortly, I will turn to a discussion of Proceso Puebla and other multilateral,
national, and local efforts to address migration and provide services to
migrants.
Finally,
in recent years government advocacy, often in collaboration with migrant
organizations, has begun to sponsor transnational cultural events and
organizations, such as “Immigrant Week” at home and abroad. Central American
consular officials also attend Central American Independence Day celebrations
in various cities in the United States. El Salvador and Guatemala have taken
the lead by each opening a Casa de
Cultura (cultural center) in Los Angeles, a transnational counterpart
to such centers in Salvadoran and Guatemalan towns (Hamilton and Chinchilla
1999; Landolt et al. 1999). The Salvadoran Casa de Cultura encourages home town associations to meet and
plan their activities from its location. One government official stated that
the long-term goal is to encourage collaboration between casas in El Salvador and in Los Angeles. One motivation for such
efforts is that governments correctly anticipate that the second and later generations
of Central Americans living abroad can play key roles in regional development
if their identities are cultivated and their economic and human capital
tapped. Above and beyond continuing to remit, these generations are likely to
enjoy high levels of knowledge, training, and contacts that could benefit
Central America. Such a “brain gain” is unlikely to occur unless expressly
cultivated by governments and the private sector through, for example, cultural
and educational exchanges, internships, and other incentives offered to high
school and university students.
Although
during the crises of the 1980s international organizations such as UNHCR and
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provided most assistance to
Central American migrants, the massive migrant flows through the isthmus
pressured regional governments to address the issue as well. The first effort
was the Comisión Centroamericana de
Directores de Migración (Commission of Central American Directors of
Migration). This Commission was established in 1990 with several objectives:
(1) to establish a permanent forum for adopting regional decisions and actions
on migration; (2) to improve regional monitoring of migration and migration
facilities (e.g., border crossing stations and record keeping); and (3)
facilitate the transit of member countries’ nationals throughout the region
(Maguid 1999). The latter objective evolved into “CA-4,” a convention around
free transit that included a unified migration policy with control cards for
four participating nations: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
In 1996, a
much more ambitious collaborative government-level initiative was begun in
Puebla, Mexico. The Regional Conference on Migration, or Proceso Puebla,
brings together many foreign affairs officials as well as directors of
immigration from the hemisphere, North and Central America in particular, on a
regular basis to create a multilateral approach to regional migration. Its
mission is to coordinate the policies, actions, and objectives agreed to by the
participating governments, who meet annually to set priorities and plan
activities. Proceso Puebla has identified five main areas of concern: migration
policies, migration and development, combating human smuggling[11], international cooperation for returning migrants from outside the
region, and human rights. Throughout the year subcommittees of Proceso Puebla
meet to work on specific objectives around those themes outlined at the annual
meeting. Though NGOs have been active since the inception of Proceso Puebla,
only in 1997 at the third annual conference were they permitted to attend
meetings. Their status is nonvoting; they are invited principally as observers,
sharing this status with the United Nations organizations such as the IOM,
UNHCR, and CEPAL.
Proceso
Puebla is a young organization that is growing and maturing. There is no reason
to believe that its efforts will subside; conversely, I expect them to increase
and expand over the coming decades. However, it is largely a high-level
undertaking. The question remains as to how effective such a regionally focused
organization can be, given the fact that migrations and their effects in
Central America and beyond are so uneven. I will address this query in the next
and final section of my report.
On a
national level, most Central American countries have some type of Consejo, Foro or Mesa de Migrantes that serves as a
collaborative forum for NGOs, government officials, community representatives,
service organizations, and sometimes scholars to discuss and address the
multitude of needs arising as a consequence of migration. They vary by format,
constitution, legitimacy, level of collaboration, and degree of effectiveness
from country to country. In some countries, such as El Salvador and Honduras,
they have been instrumental in coordinating services to deportees; in Guatemala
and again in El Salvador, they have been a locus for organizing “Immigrant
Week” and other activities that affect the perception and reception of migrants
in their countries of origin. They also serve to inform the public about
migration and to sensitize people to the plight of migrants. To my mind they
hold great promise for understanding the particularities of each country’s
migration issues and for being able to communicate these to higher level
organizations such as Proceso Puebla.
In my discussions with members of these forums, however, I have learned of
structural and financial limitations which undermine their effectiveness. A
critical problem is financing; the forums are often underfunded or do not enjoy
funding stable enough to allow them to operate continuously and smoothly.
Frequently, the limited funding available is from the government or from international
funds administered by the government. The perception of a forum as dominated by
government interests — though this need not necessarily be true — can
jeopardize its effectiveness, particularly when it seeks to work with
transnational migrants who are often wary of past experiences with governments (e.g., Lara Martínez 1994).
Finally, I
have noted that in most cases few, if any, researchers participate in these
migrant forums. In some cases, such as Honduras, this is nearly inevitable.
Almost no research has been done on Honduran migration (a notable exception is
Garifuna emigration). Although the countries most impacted by migration have
sufficient scholars to be included, at least in some cases they seem quite
divorced from the Foros, Mesas or Consejos. Thus, there is a significant
distance between the people who generate much of the information about Central
American migration and the people who make policies or address the needs of
migrants. Not surprisingly, no university in the entire region offers a course
on migration — whether on theories of migration, migration law and policies, or
even courses to train service providers. This deficiency needs to be addressed.
FLACSO-Guatemala has begun to do so by offering a year-long training — a good
start, although more needs to be done, as I will emphasize in my recommendations.
There is
no reason to believe that transnational migration and its consequences will
abate in the next two decades. On the contrary, numerous factors indicate that
these ties will widen and strengthen. A principal one is the continuation of
emigration from the region (most notably to the United States, albeit also to
Canada and Mexico) as well as intra-regional flows. The infusion of new
migrants into communities abroad is likely to thwart those communities’
full-fledged assimilation into the larger society. Secondly, transnational ties
are facilitated by technological changes that will only accelerate in the
future. These include the ease of travel via airplane and revolutions in
communication (e.g., the Internet, satellite connections and so on) that make
it cheaper and easier to cultivate ties and interests across transnational
spaces. Lastly, I predict that transnationalism will be fostered through
developing economic and political ties. As addressed previously, Central
American governments have become key transnational actors in recent years and I
see their efforts growing into the future. A case in point is the current
Salvadoran government, whose president is a transnational migrant who has made
relations to expatriate communities abroad a top administration priority.
These efforts include the establishment of technology centers in Salvadoran
towns that will facilitate communication between migrants and their family and
friends abroad. Additionally, as Central American communities abroad mature,
they are generating new leaders, many of whom have a vision for their
communities that acknowledges and embraces transnational ties. The degree and
impact of these ties, however, will be shaped largely by if and how well
different sectors of Central American society — at home and abroad, private and
public, civil and governmental — identify and pursue fruitful collaborations.
Such partnerships must be viewed as processes that will take time and effort to
cultivate. They will likely pursue different styles to meet the varying needs
of each country and region. In the next and final section, I propose one
possible model that I feel holds promise if implemented thoughtfully over the
coming years.
Migration
will remain an enduring feature of Central American life in the coming decades.
Trends in force today are not expected to change radically in coming years. To
date, the enormous impact of different types of migration in the region, though
uneven, has not generated either government or civil sector responses and
planning commensurate with its impact. Consequently, the great potential of
migration has not been harnessed effectively toward concrete regional
development strategies. It is now time to make such planning a priority, but it
must be done carefully and cooperatively.
The wealth
of migratory processes affecting Central America have not been adequately
researched, crippling the work of comprehending their future trajectories and
effects. Problems include inadequate record keeping, such as statistics from
border check points and the lack of standardization in migration-related data
collected during countries’ annual household surveys and periodic censuses. Few
areas affected by migration have been researched comprehensively; no
universities offer classes on migration theory, policy, law, and consequences;
and the dynamics of the region’s multiple migratory flows serve to further
complicate this deficiency in research and training. Consequently, my first and
most ardent recommendation is that Central America undertake a systemic
evaluation of the types and effects of migration in the region. Such a
comprehensive study could be reasonably designed and undertaken over a two-year
period, could lead to more standardized statistics, and would provide a
foundation for embarking on specific development projects related to migration.
Additionally, financial assistance is needed to support centers for research
and training on migration, places where different constituencies can meet,
share ideas, and develop strategies.
At this
point I will direct the report toward a concrete model for addressing
migration and regional development. My approach is to integrate these purposes
into an institutional structure called Consejos
de Migración, or Migration Councils, that would operate nationally and
coordinate regionally. These councils would interface with migration-impacted
localities as well as with regional efforts such as Proceso Puebla and Sistema
de Integración Centroamericana (SICA). The councils would not involve
developing wholly new institutions but rather build upon existing foundations,
the Foros, Mesas, or Consejos de Migrantes, strengthening them and expanding their
roles.
One major
change from existing structures would be the constitution of the organizations.
In my discussion of home town associations and how they have attracted
government attention in Section 5, I noted that these organizations, as well as
Consejos/Foros/Mesas de Migrantes, face the daunting task of
representing and negotiating many people’s interests. Inevitably, some groups
or individuals feel excluded or marginalized. This is a recipe for schisms,
and there is evidence in case studies of fractures that undermine important
community projects. What I will propose now is an alternative that incorporates
many of the different players active in these organizations into a structure
that does not permit the domination of any one group and its interests over the
other. Moreover, this proposed model includes not only procedures for project
implementation, but also for research and evaluation.
Fellow
migration scholars and I agree that the constitution of each council should be
carefully designed around inclusivity. Membership should include
representatives from government, service, and scholarly circles as well as from
migrant groups — urban and transnational — and affected communities. Ideally,
each group would enjoy equal representation and the council would enjoy stable
funding (addressed later). The councils would be charged with two fundamental
responsibilities: (1) to evaluate and address national needs relating to
migration (rural-to-urban, regional, international, and transnational); and (2)
to work collaboratively with councils in the region as well as with larger
regional and hemispheric efforts to address supranational issues, such as
collection of statistical data border entries and exits, treatment of
interdicted undocumented immigrants, and so on. The first step to be
implemented would be for each country to create a council or transform an
existing organization into a council along the constituency specifications
outlined above. The council, in turn, would hire a professional director,
support staff, and program evaluators.
The
centerpiece of the model would address the councils’ first responsibility,
namely, gearing development assistance to communities most impacted by
migration and most willing to marshal different resources to meet their
identified needs. The proposal calls for a research phase, followed by implementation
and later evaluation. Each country in the region would conduct comprehensive
assessment studies to identify areas, communities, and urban neighborhoods most
affected by different types of migration and the issues that are most
pronounced in these areas. Results from the study would be disseminated
nationally and locally through the media and fora during which the council
would describe its mission and explain to communities how they can apply for
development assistance. The councils would encourage communities to: (1)
develop a plan to address their needs and prioritize them; and (2) identify and
bring together different groups to assist in developing and implementing the
plan. The groups I feel need to be included at the negotiation table are: local community leaders (of institutions
such as schools, as well as business and municipal government officials);
representatives of migrant populations (including home town associations
abroad as well as those located in cities in Central America, but not to the
exclusion of other unorganized migrants); and the researchers who originally
conducted the needs evaluation study. A member from each major constituency
(e.g., government, civil society, business, migrant, intended beneficiary)
would be elected to serve on the project’s advisory board. Ideally, council
staff would be available to work with community groups to develop a project,
identify its cost, and generate an implementation plan. Alternatively, local
NGOs, such as community development agencies (ADESCOs in El Salvador for
example) with legal standing (personería
jurídica) could be contracted by the advisory board to serve in this same
capacity if needed.
Once a
plan of action is developed and priced, funds would be raised by the advisory
board using a formula that requires participation by the local community
(including local government), the migrant community (urban and transnational),
and the national government. One possibility is for each group to raise
one-third of the necessary funds. By distributing the financial responsibility
across different constituencies, each group would become vested in the project
and also receive acknowledgment for its participation. There may also be a way
of setting up a bank account or “remittance bank,” monitored by an independent
agency, where each constituency could deposit funds (and so that migrants
abroad could send donations directly to the fund). The council/NGO would
continue to work in an advisory capacity to ensure the trustworthiness of the
fundraising and distribution as well as the orchestration of the project.
Additionally, the council/NGO would be charged with ensuring democratic
representation in the project and arbitrating any grievances. Appeals of
decisions at the local level could be filed with and arbitrated by the council.
The latter regulations would assure that certain traditionally disenfranchised
groups, such as indigenous groups, the peasantry, and women, would not be
excluded in these efforts.
Finally,
upon completion of the project, the advisory board would produce a report that
would be made available to every constituency. Additionally, an independent
evaluation of each project would be required and would be performed by the
migration council’s evaluation staff. The latter evaluation would help to
identify both general strengths and weaknesses of projects designed and
developed in this manner, as well as specific reasons why the community in
question should or should not be funded for additional projects.
I believe
that this model, while not fully refined in this brief description, would
address multiple issues that have plagued development projects in many venues
to date. It would address issues of inclusivity, ensuring that a wide variety
of people and their interests are addressed if not met. Second, it would foster
local initiatives but assist them with backing from a series of different
actors and institutions. This mitigates against both the possibility of one
group controlling the project or taking the funding for its own purposes, and
against the common expectation in Central America that the government or
international aid donors are the only available sources of financial assistance
for development projects. On the contrary, this model would emphasize that
people can take initiative and invest themselves in the betterment of their communities
and that government is obligated to assist them but not resolve their
needs completely. Third, because this model is driven by local needs and
informed by local leadership, it is much more likely to generate appropriate
development strategies than projects identified and financed from national and
international NGOs located almost exclusively in capital cities. Fourth, this
plan would encourage people to work collectively and even across international
borders to achieve their goals. No one group would be allowed to dominate, but
neither could projects be allowed to proceed without the integrated efforts of
different social sectors. Fifth and finally, the model builds in accountability
and evaluation. If problems were to occur, the evaluators would identify them
and perhaps recommend against assisting future projects organized by groups
whose previous projects did not meet council standards.
The major
problem I foresee with this model is its financing, particularly start-up
moneys. Although the funds invested in the actual project would be raised as
outlined above and would not require a major new funding source, the resources
needed to pay for the comprehensive assessment studies, the NGO/advisory board
involvement and the migration councils would need to be generated. This is the
contribution I see international aid agencies making, one with a definite time
limit. For example, agencies could commit to five years of start-up funding and
technical assistance. During these five years, each country would develop and
train a migration council, conduct a nationwide study on migration with the
assistance of the international community, and institute procedures for
receiving and evaluating development project proposals as well as monitoring
and assessing them. During the five years, much of the funding for actual
development projects would emanate from the international agencies, but
councils would work toward identifying alternative, long-term funds to cover
both the administrative expenses of the councils as well as a pool of capital
available to invest into the projects themselves. One possible candidate for
long-term funding is a tax on remittance agency profits, applied in the U.S.
or, less likely, in Central America. Other possibilities include: (1) a tax on
tourism (modeled after Mexico); (2) a percentage of the airport exit tax or
customs duty on imported goods; or (3) a fee incorporated into the cost of the
funded projects. The key is to identify and solidify sources of uninterrupted
income that will guarantee the livelihood and independence of the councils over
time. Funding for development projects themselves may not be as difficult,
following a calculus outlined above.
Aside from
overseeing development projects, the migration councils could become involved
in a variety of other activities relating to migration. Examples include but
are not limited to the following: organizing cultural or academic exchanges
between countries linked by migratory flows; celebrations reflecting the
positive contributions of migrants to their societies of origin, such as
“Immigrant Week”; developing policy recommendations for government leaders on
matters needing legislation, such as tax breaks or special funds for return
migrant entrepreneurs or for local entrepreneurs hiring returnees; starting or
extending programs to assist deportees and their reincorporation into society,
along the lines of the Salvadoran “Bienvenido
a Casa” program. The councils might also provide financial or other
assistance to migrants abroad, such as helping them import donated goods or
facilitating information on associations working in their home towns.
Beyond
addressing the specific needs of each country and its migration-impacted
populations, the councils would also be charged with meeting periodically in
regional fora to discuss the progress and problems each face as they evaluate
funded development projects. They would become organizations with abundant
knowledge to offer in the exploration of regional initiatives. I see the
councils as forming an important middle layer between existing regional and
hemispheric migration organizations, such as Proceso Puebla and Comisión
Centroamericana de Directores de Migración, and small-scale communities
impacted by migration. The broad representation of different social sectors in
the councils would bring an additional dimension to their participation in
diverse regional issues, from data collection on migration to treatment of interdicted
undocumented immigrants.
If the
proposed model were followed and implemented along the lines suggested, the
outcome would be a strengthening and enhancing of existing organizations that
currently serve as a foundation for a much more ambitious effort. The migration
councils would evolve from the Consejos/Foros/Mesas de Migrantes already in existence in most countries but they would
be strengthened and their purview expanded. As such, they would serve as key
intermediaries between local and transnational communities’ interests and those
of national governments. Similarly, they would bridge the existing gap between
the Proceso Puebla hemispheric governmental efforts and the more specific
needs of nations and of Central America as a region. The councils would also
become depositories of information and trained personnel at the disposition of
every sector of society, helping to ensure that accurate information is
disseminated and appropriate procedures are followed. Finally, I see in this
model tremendous potential for implementing development projects that could
actually resolve some problems wrought by migration. A community with high
emigration of its youth owing to a dearth of local employment opportunities
could apply for funds to build workshops to teach skills appropriate to the
region. Another community might apply for funds to build a youth center to
mitigate the effects of deported gang members. An urban neighborhood might
need a drop-in center for women whose husbands are migrants to meet, exchange
their experiences, and work on strategies to help them cope with their spouses’
absence. The list of needs is already long; if the proposal were implemented
then more of these needs would be met and a new chapter written on the role of
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During the
1990s Central America went through processes of profound change on the
political scene, with democratic governments being set up in all states in the
region. However, the political changes were not accompanied to a sufficient
extent by parallel economic and social transformations, so Central America
continues to be the continent’s poorest region. At the same time the armed
conflicts of the previous decade led to greater backwardness in the region in
terms of social development (education, health and life expectancy of its
population).
This
situation has led to increasing awareness in the Central American countries of
the importance of implementing profound changes, and the need to establish a
regional development model for all the states in the area has grown
increasingly apparent. So various actions have been initiated with the goal of
achieving regional economic integration, thus reactivating the common internal
market.
However,
these forces of integration have often found themselves impeded by the lack of
an adequate institutional framework capable of meeting the challenges that the
future will pose. This is precisely where the international community could
support the regional development process in the area in the long term, and the
present project Central America 2020
is in keeping with this.
The aim of
Central America 2020 is to promote
sustainable development in the region, starting from a concept of development
as a dynamic, multidimensional process consisting of:
• sustained
economic growth
• improvement
in social well-being
• guarantees of citizenship
for all social, gender and ethnic categories.
This definition
of development is sound and was devised before Hurricane Mitch struck the
region in October-November 1998, with devastating effects. It is not that the
definition now lacks relevance, but Mitch served to remind us of the region’s
vulnerability to natural disasters and of the state’s meagre capacity to
respond in an effective way. In this context, sustainability acquires a special
significance in Central America: natural disasters are inevitable, but they
must not be made worse by human action, nor must their consequences be
aggravated by the incapacity or incompetence of the state and its institutions.
One of the
chief objectives of the Central America
2020 project is to contribute toward the Central American states’ regional
integration process, taking stock of the results achieved so far and examining
the current difficulties and those which are likely to emerge in the medium
term in the politico-institutional field.
The
specific objectives are:
1.
To mount a comprehensive regional
survey of contemporary development issues. The questions asked must take into
account three intersecting issues:
·
relations between the state, the
market and civil society
·
options at the local, national and
regional level
·
the viability of sustainable
development in Central America
2. To ensure the participation
and contribution of a wide range of key regional players in the course of
research.
3. To provide governments and
other sectors in the region with various policy options and recommendations
4. To promote regional identity
among the public and private players involved in development
5. To extend the project results
to the international players that are most active in the region’s development
dynamics, including multilateral organisations and NGOs
6. To make policy recommendations to the United States and the European
Union for more effective aid programmes.
The
project’s findings will be presented at a major international conference to be
held in Central America during 2000 and at seminars in Washington, D.C., and
Brussels. They will also be distributed in a series of working papers,
monographs and books published in English and Spanish and also available on the
Internet, the Spanish and German versions at http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/IIK/za2020
and the English version at http://ca2020.fiu.edu.
Project Directors:
Klaus Bodemer, Institute
of Ibero-American Studies (Hamburg)
Eduardo Gamarra, Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University (Miami)
Academic Directors:
Sabine Kurtenbach,
Institute of Ibero-American Studies (Hamburg)
Michael Shifter,
Inter-American Dialogue (Washington D.C.)
Lead Consultants:
Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London
Douglas Kincaid, Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University (Miami)
Centralamerican Experts:
Fernando Durán, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress (Costa Rica)
Carlos Rosales, Secretary
of Communication (El Salvador)
Representatives of the Project
Sponsors:
Mendel Goldstein, Head
of Unit Directorate Mexico, Central America and Cuba, European Commission DG IB
(Brussels)
Margaret Sarles, U.S.
Agency for International Development (Washington D.C.)
# 1: Pablo Rodas-martini: Centroamérica:
Para afrontar con éxito la globalización del siglo XXI
ISBN
3-926446-73-0
# 2: Clarence Zuvekas, jr.: The Dynamics of
Sectoral Growth in Central America: Recent Trends and Prospects for 2020
ISBN
3-926446-74-9
# 3: Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera: Centroamérica
2020: La integración regional y los desafíos de sus relaciones externas
ISBN
3-926446-72-2
# 4: Sarah Mahler: Migration and Transnational Issues.
Recent
Trends and Prospects for 2020
ISBN
3-926446-71-4
# 5: Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz: Las cuentas pendientes
de la modernización. Tendencias laborales y sus efectos sobre la integración en
el Istmo Centroamericano
ISBN
3-926446-70-6
# 6: Carlos Sojo: El traje nuevo del
emperador: La modernización del Estado en Centroamérica
ISBN
3-926446-69-2
# 7: Claudia Schatán: Desarrollo económico y
medio ambiente
ISBN
3-926446-68-4
# 8: Charles T. Call: Sustainable Development in Central America:
The
Challenges of Violence, Injustice and Insecurity
ISBN
3-926446-67-8
# 9: Günther Maihold / Ricardo Cordóva:
Democracia y ciudadanía en Centroamérica. Perspectivas hacia el 2020
ISBN
3-926446-75-7
# 10: Knut Walter: La educación en
Centroamérica: Reflexiones en torno a sus problemas y su potencial
ISBN
3-926446-66-8
[1] There is no uniform definition for what constitutes “urban” in Central American countries. For country-by-country specifications, see Celade’s website: URL: http://www.eclac.cl/Celade-Esp/bol63/DE_SitDemBD63-def00i.html.
[2] Concrete figures for TPS/ABC
applicants as well as NACARA and Hurricane Mitch beneficiaries are very
difficult to obtain. The figures cited here reflect estimates provided by
GUATENET, the National Network of Guatemalans in the U.S., and the National
Immigration Forum (NIF). For ABC-class applicants, GUATENET cites 225.000
Salvadorans and 85.000 Guatemalans. NIF figures are 190.000 and 50.000,
respectively. For NACARA, GUATENET gives a figure of 40.000 Nicaraguan
beneficiaries, and NIF 100.000. Mitch TPS beneficiaries cited by GUATENET are
95.000 Hondurans and 5.000 Nicaraguans versus NIF estimates of 101.00 and
6.000, respectively.
[3] INS estimates of the undocumented
immigrant population in the U.S. for 1996 included 335.000 Salvadorans, 165.000
Guatemalans (2nd and 3rd highest groups after Mexicans),
90.000 Hondurans, 70.000 Nicaraguans, and an undefined number of Panamanians,
Costa Ricans, and Belizeans. (See INS website:
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/illegalalien/index.htm).
[4] This is attenuated by the fact that
relatives of legal migrants from these countries now must wait four or five
years for their visas to arrive as opposed to only two years a decade ago.
Families who cannot endure this lengthy separation may choose to have members
migrate illegally, with potentially serious consequences. Changes in U.S.
immigration law in 1996 (the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, or IIRIRA) penalize undocumented immigrants, requiring them
to return to their homeland for 3 to 10 years before they can become legal
immigrants.
[5] These include the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which expedited deportations of criminal
migrants, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), which denied many social benefits to legal immigrants, and IIRIRA,
which, among other things, expanded interdiction efforts along the U.S.-Mexico
border and required immigrants to have higher incomes to sponsor relatives
abroad for legal immigrant status.
[6] Remittances are commonly understood
to be the transfers that migrant workers abroad send back home, to family
members for instance. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), one of the major
institutions that estimates remittances, however, includes in its calculations
not only the funds remitted by workers (who have been abroad over a year), but
also two other categories. These are: (1) gross earnings of foreigners residing
abroad for less than a year, including the in-kind benefits such as housing and
payroll taxes they receive or pay; and (2) “migrant transfers”, which are the
net worth of migrants who move from one country to another. While these are
important analytical categories, “in practice, the data on financial flows that
are provided by individual commercial banks to the central bank [of a country]
cannot make the relevant distinction between transactions that involve
short-term migrants and persons who change residence for at least one year” (Pérez-López and
Díaz-Briquets 1998: 323). There are numerous
other limitations to remittance estimations. For example, the IMF and World
Bank derive their information from data provided by central banks of the
recipient countries. This data varies in quality from country to country. The
banks rely on reports filed by remittance intermediaries (wire services, banks,
remittance agencies) and know that there is a margin of error in this
information (Orozco 1999). Moreover, in-kind transfers (such as goods brought
home by plane) and remittances sent via informal couriers (people who make a
living traveling back and forth personally carrying remittances and packages
and referred to as viajeros or encomenderos) do not figure into
the official estimates. All of these factors produce remittance estimates that
are just that — estimates — and should be treated as such.
[7] All translations of Spanish-language
documents into English were performed by the author of this report.
[8] Original Spanish version: “el
llamado uso productivo de las remesas ha sido en gran medida un espejismo para
los países de orign de los migrantes. Las políticas de estos países quieren tratar como
agentes cautivos a quienes están más fuera de su alcance y exigirles
comportamientos y compromisos que no solicitan del resto de la sociedad.”
[9] CARUNA, a confederation of
cooperatives in Nicaragua, is about to initiate remittance services to rural
areas for migrants living in Costa Rica (Castillo, personal communication).
[10] Original Spanish version:“Incorporar
a la comunidad salvadoreña en el exterior en el proceso de desarrollo nacional,
por medio del fortalecimiento de sus vínculos con el país por medio de
inciativas nacionales eficaces…”.
[11] The official reference is “illegal trafficking in humans” but I personally disdain this terminology as it consciously or subconsciously equates migration with drug “trafficking,” as if they were similar and equivalently evil processes. Many attendees at the Central America 2020 conference emphasized the need to distinguish these two phenomena.