THE DYNAMICS OF SECTORAL GROWTH IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN
COUNTRIES: RECENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS FOR 2020
[PARTIAL DRAFT, 30 JUNE 1999]
Clarence Zuvekas, Jr.
Consulting Economist
Annandale, Virginia
This paper is a contribution to the "Central America 2020"
project undertaken by the Institute of Iberoamerican Studies (Hamburg,
Germany), the Inter-American Dialogue, and the Latin American and Caribbean
Center at Florida International University, and jointly sponsored by the U.S.
Agency for International Development and the European Commission. The views expressed in this draft version
are those of the author alone. Comments
and suggestions are welcomed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even after two decades of import-substituting industrialization, the
five countries of the Central American Common Market (CACM) remained in 1980
more agricultural than industrial.[1] The same structure was evident in Belize,[2]
while Panama differed from the rest of the region in that both agriculture and
manufacturing were dwarfed by the services sectors.[3]
In the last two decades, the structure of production has changed
significantly in some Central American countries but not in others. The next section of this paper, which
reviews these patterns, notes that the relative importance of any sector (and
in particular agriculture) is sensitive to the base year in which the national
accounts data are expressed in constant prices. Especially where base years are several decades old, differences
between constant-price and current-price shares can be large.
The third section of this paper discusses likely trends in the
regional, hemispheric, and world economies during the first two decades of the
21st century, and their potential effects on the structure of production in
Central America. In the fourth section,
the focus is on economy-wide and sectoral reforms needed for the Central
American countries to strengthen their domestic and regional economies and to
participate more effectively in the global economy. A fifth section presents alternative visions of the structure of
the Central American economies in 2020, with and without major additional
policy reforms [and possibly using the two alternative scenarios for the
world economy presented in OECD (1997)].
The final section provides policy recommendations for development
assistance that would more effectively assist the countries of the region to
achieve their aggregate and sectoral growth potential.
II. CHANGES IN THE
STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION SINCE 1978
A. Data Sources and Issues
This section reviews changes in the structure of production in each of
the seven countries between 1978-80 and 1995-97; data are also provided for an
intermediate period, 1987-89. Sectoral
shares of GDP are calculated on the basis of three-year averages to reduce
distortions caused by sharp annual fluctuations in sectors such as agriculture
and construction. The initial period,
for the most part, excludes the "debt-crisis" effects of the 1980s. Earlier base years were chosen for El
Salvador (1976-78) and Nicaragua [(19xx-xx)] to minimize the effects of
those countries' civil wars. The final
period is 1995-97 rather than 1996-98 to avoid the distorting effects of
Hurricane Mitch, which had unusually severe effects in some countries, particularly
on agricultural production.
Sectoral shares of GDP are presented in the Appendix tables in both
current and constant prices, although most of the discussion in the text is
based on constant-price trends. The
quality of the national accounts data varies among countries. Also, the base year is sometimes quite old
(1958 in the extreme case of Guatemala), a situation that over time
increasingly distorts reported trends in overall real GDP growth, as sectoral
weights become increasingly outdated.
In Central America, the use of old base years tends principally to
exaggerate the relative importance of agriculture.
It is important also to examine two "sectors" not identified
as such in the national accounts, but which for Central America as a whole
recently have shown considerable dynamism: maquila (assembly) operations
(mainly for apparel) and tourism. Data
for these activities come principally from balance-of-payments statistics,
although in some cases maquila operations are identified as a branch of
manufacturing. Both maquila
operations and tourism have good prospects for continued rapid growth.
B. Trends by Country
[Eventually I will
make this section shorter, putting most of the material in an Annex]
1. Belize. [To be added.]
2. Costa Rica. [To be added.]
3. El Salvador. El Salvador updated its national income
accounts in the early 1990s, changing the base year from 1962 to 1990. One of the most significant effects of this
change was to reduce sharply the relative weight of the agricultural sector in
1978, from [XX]% of GDP to 16.8%.
This and other changes have affected overall real GDP growth figures,
sometimes significantly.[4]
The new national accounts figures show that agriculture accounted for
16.1% of real GDP in the 1976-78 period.
Agriculture's share rose to 17.2% in 1987-89, despite a 13.7% drop in
real value added, because war-induced production declines were even greater in
the rest of the economy.[5] And while agriculture grew cumulatively by
14.3% between 1987-89 and 1995-97, the much stronger performance of the rest of
the economy[6] lowered
agriculture's share to 14.2%.[7],
[8] Per capita agricultural production in
1995-97 was 23.4% below its 1976-78 level.
A significant appreciation of the real effective exchange rate during
the 1990s has offset the favorable effects since 1989 of initial currency depreciation,
price and marketing liberalization, and the end of the civil war in January
1992.[9]
Within the agricultural sector, crop production strongly dominates,
although its share of sectoral value added in constant prices fell from 72% in
1976-78 to 64% in 1987-89 and remained at that level in 1995-97. Coffee accounted for 34%, 39%, and 35%,
respectively, of value added in the crop sub-sector during the three periods
under consideration. Cotton, second in
importance at 23% in 1976-78, fell sharply to 4% in 1987-89 and statistically
disappeared in 1995-97. The demise of
cotton, evident also in the rest of Central America, reflects a combination of
factors, including the civil war, depressed world market prices, and
environmental problems. Basic grains
significantly increased their share of the crop sub-sector from 18% in 1976-78
to 29% in 1987-89 and 31% in 1995-97.
Real per capita value added in basic grains in 1995-97 was 19% higher
than in 1976-78.
All other agricultural sub-sectors increased in relative importance
between 1976-78 and 1995-97: livestock, from 14% to 16%; poultry, from 6% to
10%; forestry, from 5% to 6%; and fishing and hunting, from 3% to 4%.
Manufacturing's share of real GDP fell sharply from 27.0% in 1976-78 to
21.4% in 1987-89, then rose to 22.8% in 1995-97. However, data since 1990 include value added in maquila
operations. If these are excluded,
manufacturing's share of GDP in 1995-97 drops to 21.0%, and its annual real
growth rate between 1987-89 and 1995-97 falls from 8.0% to 6.2%. Despite this relatively strong recent
performance, real manufacturing value added in 1995-97 (excluding maquila
operations) was 13% below its 1976-78 level.
Within manufacturing, the share of food products rose from 15% of real
value added in 1976-78 to 26% in 1987-89 and 29% in 1995-97. The relative increase over the first period
was due more to a sharp decline in other manufacturing activity than to food
products' modest real annual growth of 1.2%.
In the second period, however, real value added in food products rose by
5.3% annually.
The combined share of the textile and apparel sub-sectors fell from 23%
of real sectoral value added in 1976-78 to 16% in 1987-89 and 15% in
1995-97. Wartime disruptions, and the
resulting sharp drop in real per capita GDP, explain most of the relative
decline in the first period. Below-average
growth in the second period may reflect in part the recent appreciation of the
real effective exchange rate. Other
changes in real sector output between 1976-78 and 1995-97 include relative
declines in basic chemicals (from 11% to 9%) and rubber and plastics (from 8%
to 2%), and a relative increase in non-metallic minerals (from 3% to 5%).
Elsewhere in the economy, value added in mining increased in relative
importance during both periods, but it still represents only 0.5% of GDP. Construction's share of GDP fell slightly
from 4.4% in 1976-78 to 4.0% in both later periods. The utilities sector rose from 0.7% of GDP to 1.2%, then fell to
0.6%. However, the reported decline of
24.4% in this sector's value added over the second period seems inconsistent
with overall real GDP growth of 37.8%.[10] Moreover, value added in this sector seems
generally to be significantly underestimated.[11]
Among the services sectors, the sharp relative decline in commerce
during the first period, from 19.6% to 15.3%, seems broadly consistent with the
significant contraction of external trade and overall economic activity at the
time; but if some commercial activity shifted to the unrecorded, informal
economy, the extent of the decline would be exaggerated. Commerce's rebound to 21.4% in 1995-97 seems
consistent with strong economic growth
during the 1990s, the recovery of external trade, and the increased
inflows of overseas remittances, which are heavily biased toward consumption.[12]
In current prices, the commerce sector's share of GDP showed a notable
increase, from 9.2% in 1976-78 to 14.2% in 1987-89 and 20.6% in 1995-97.
The other private services sectors unfortunately are not disaggregated
prior to 1990 in the new national accounts statistics. Their combined share of real GDP rose from
21.3% in 1976-78 to 25.7% in 1987-89, then fell to 22.4% in 1995-97. For the 1990s, the disaggregated data show
the following real annual growth rates between 1990-92 to 1995-97:
Banking, Real Estate & Other Financial Institutions 13.6%
Real Estate and Business Services
4.3%
Housing Rentals
1.6%
Communal, Personal, Social & Domestic Services 4.1%
Of these sectors, only banking, insurance, and other financial
institutions grew faster than the overall GDP growth rate of 4.4%.
The share of public administration in real GDP rose sharply from 4.0%
in 1976-78 to 7.7% in 1987-89, reflecting expenditures on the war effort,
nationalization of banking and marketing operations, and the sharp decline in
private economic activity. By 1995-97
the public-administration share was down to 6.1%.
Balance-of-payments data for maquila activity show that value
added in 1984, the first available year, amounted to $6 million. By 1990 the figure had reached $18 million,
still a relatively small figure. The
expansion of maquila activity in the 1990s, however, has been dramatic,
with value added reaching $291 million in 1997. Factors contributing to this growth include the end of the civil
war; the devaluation of 1989; sound macroeconomic policies; and declining real
wages (Paus 1995), which have offset the recent real appreciation of the colón.
National accounts data, showing maquila operations as a branch
of manufacturing since 1990, reveal that real value added from this activity
grew steadily from 0.4% of GDP in 1990 to 2.2% in 1997.[13]
Tourism in El Salvador has been only a modest source of
foreign-exchange earnings. From the
late 1970s to the early 1990s, the civil war discouraged travel to the
country. Foreign-exchange receipts from
travel to El Salvador averaged $75 million in 1990-93 and $86 million in
1994-97. Factors contributing to the
slow growth of tourism, despite the end of the civil war and sound economic
policies, include infrastructure shortages, weak public and private promotional
and development activities, concerns about personal security, and an
appreciating real exchange rate.
4. Guatemala.
[To be added.]
5. Honduras. Honduras's structure of production, measured
in constant prices, has changed relatively little since the late 1970s. This is particularly true of agriculture,
whose share of GDP at factor cost has remained at about 27%, and manufacturing,
which has held steady at 15%. The share
of mining fell from 2.0% in 1978-80 to 1.8% in 1995-97, while that of
construction declined from 5.4% to 4.2%.
The relative importance of the utilities sector more than doubled, from
1.3% to 2.9%. The GDP share of three
services sectors increased, while that of three others declined:
1978-80 1987-89 1995-97
Transportation 6.7
8.3 8.6
Finance 5.8
6.6 9.7
Housing 5.5
6.4 6.6
Commerce
15.2 11.6
10.9
Public Administration 6.9
7.5 4.8
Personal and Other Services 9.1
9.0 7.7
The reported sharp drop in the relative importance of commerce, most of
which occurred between 1978-80 and 1987-89, is surprising.[14] It may be due in part to the decline in
external trade during the 1980s; but it may also reflect a shift in some
commercial activities to the informal economy, where many activities are
difficult to measure and therefore are unrecorded.
Since the base year for the national accounts data is 1978, significant
differences between constant-price and current-price data in 1995-97 are not
surprising. As early as 1987-89,
agriculture's current-price share (21.1%) was sharply below its constant-price
share (26.8%), reflecting a drop from the relatively high prices of the late
1970s. The respective figures in
1995-97 are 22.5% and 27.5%. In
manufacturing, by contrast, the current-price share of GDP in 1995-97 (18.0%)
significantly exceeds the constant-price share (15.3%), a phenomenon that was
not evident in 1987-89. Other major
differences in 1995-97 are in transport, storage, and communications, where the
current-price share of GDP (4.6%) is far below the constant-price share (8.6%);
and utilities and other services, whose respective current-price shares (5.7%
and 10.0%) are well above their constant-price shares (2.9% and 7.7%).
Honduras's agricultural sector grew in real terms at annual rates of
2.5% between 1978-80 and 1987-89, and by 3.7% between 1987-89 and 1995-97. In per capita terms, value added in
agriculture declined in the first period by 0.5% a year, then rose in the
second period at an annual rate of 0.8%.
In both periods, coffee grew faster than the rest of the sector:
Annual Growth Rates of Value Added (%)
Total Agri- Other
Agri-
culture Coffee culture
1978-80 to
1987-89 2.5 3.6
2.1
1987-89 to 1995-97 3.7
5.5 2.9
The agricultural sector is dominated by crop production, whose relative
share of sectoral value added held steady at 65% in constant prices, although
varying considerably in current prices.[15] The crop sub-sector was even more dependent
on coffee in 1995-97 (48.3% of value added in crop production in 1978 prices)
than in 1978-80 (38.1%). Meanwhile, the
constant-price share of bananas fell from 24.7% of crop production in 1978-80
to 11.3% in 1995-97, reflecting a considerable loss of the country's
world-market share of banana exports in recent years.[16] The relative share of livestock production
has declined significantly over the last two decades, but poultry production
has shown considerable dynamism.
Forestry has also lost considerable relative importance, especially
since 1987-89, while the fisheries sub-sector has gained, mainly because of the
expansion of shrimp farming.
The major factors limiting sectoral growth between 1978-80 and 1987-89
were the uncertainties created by the armed conflicts in neighboring countries
and an increasingly overvalued exchange rate.
Agriculture's stronger performance since then is due largely to
significant liberalization of agricultural prices and marketing and the 1990
devaluation of the lempira.
These positive factors have outweighed the negative effects of limited
public investment in rural infrastructure and agricultural services, continuing
land-tenure insecurity, and real exchange-rate appreciation in recent
years. Still, the sector is performing
well below its potential.
Manufacturing grew at sluggish real annual rates of 2.6% between
1978-80 and 1987-89 and 3.4% between 1987-89 and 1995-97, closely paralleling
the growth of aggregate GDP over these periods (2.5% and 3.3%,
respectively). The largest
sub-sector—foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco—grew at above-average rates (3.9%
and 4.1%, respectively), increasing its share of sectoral value added from
36.3% in 1978-80 to 43.1% in 1994-96.[17] Another major sub-sector, apparel, declined
at an annual rate of 2.4% in the first period, then grew at a rapid annual rate
of 14.9% during the second. Its 12.2%
share of sectoral value added in 1994-96 thus exceeded its 9.1% share in
1978-80.[18] Four other sub-sectors saw their share of
sectoral value added increase, and four experienced declines:
1978-80 1994-96
Paper and Paper Products 4.1
5.7
Non-metallic Mineral Products 5.0
7.9
Basic Industrial Metals 0.1 0.7
Other Industries 0.7
1.0
Wood and Wood Products
10.6 3.7
Chemicals and Chemical Products
11.6 7.9
Metal Products, Machinery & Equipment 6.7 6.3
Artisan Products
15.8 11.5
The wood and wood products sub-sector experienced a 46% real decline in
value added between 1978-80 and 1994-96, reflecting poor management of the
country's extensive forestry resources by the parastatal company, COHDEFOR.
Turning now to the balance-of-payments statistics (Table [x]),
the data on maquila exports are not consistent over the entire period
between 1978 and 1997 because of incomplete coverage in earlier years. Still, as late as 1990 value added by
maquila firms appears to have been at most about $20 million, comparable to
that of El Salvador and far behind that of Costa Rica and Guatemala. Since 1990 it has risen explosively, to $305
million in 1997 and $398 million in 1998.[19] Honduras has become the leading Central
American supplier of maquila products to the U.S. market. About 95% of these exports are apparel
items, although non-apparel assembly operations recently have begun to show
some dynamism. Employment in the
maquiladoras is now close to 100,000, or about 4.5% of the total labor
force.
Factors contributing to the rapid expansion of maquila
operations in Honduras include improved macroeconomic policies since 1990,
favorable tax and other legislation, relatively low wages in dollar terms after
the devaluation of 1990, and the favorable geographic location of the San Pedro
Sula-Puerto Cortés area with respect to U.S. markets.
Figures for exports of tourism services, like those for maquila
exports, are not consistent over time.
Data prior to 1993 are incomplete, excluding information from the
Instituto Hondureño de Turismo that have been incorporated since that
year. The new data show very rapid
growth in tourism receipts during the 1990s, from $60 million in 1993 to $164
million in 1998. This expansion has
been stimulated by the end of armed hostilities elsewhere in Central America;
the 1990 devaluation; economic prosperity in the United States; generally sound
economic policies; and expectations that new legislation friendly to foreign
investment in tourism would be approved (which occurred in December 1998).
6. Nicaragua. [To
be added.]
7. Panama. [To be added.]
III. ANTICIPATED GLOBAL, HEMISPHERIC, AND
REGIONAL ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE STRUCTURE OF
PRODUCTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA
A. Overview
As small, open economies, the countries of the Central American isthmus
are highly sensitive to events beyond their borders. Globally, they are affected by volatile prices for their major
commodity exports and for one major commodity import, petroleum.[20] Moreover, the decline in relative prices of
primary products since 1980 is likely to continue well into the 21st century
(OECD 1997:78; Reinhart and Wickham 1994).[21] Within the Western Hemisphere, the Central
American countries' high dependence on exports to the U.S. market makes them
vulnerable to trends in that large economy.
Also, as intra-Central American trade has expanded significantly since
plummeting between 1980 and 1986,[22]
the countries of the region are increasingly affected by each other's economic
performance. Thus the heavy damage
caused by Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and Nicaragua in October 1998 not only
affected their own export capacities but also temporarily reduced the demand
for imports from their neighbors.
Moreover, the effects of Hurricane Mitch on other Central American
countries (although moderate in El Salvador and Guatemala and small in Costa
Rica) have lowered somewhat the demand for Honduran and Nicaraguan products.
Despite this vulnerability to external events, the economic depression
experienced by the Central American countries in the 1980s led to
[a]
remarkable
consensus . . ., across most of the . . . political spectrum, on the
desirability of export expansion and diversification into new products, based
on comparative advantage and liberalized trade. It reflected a recognition that the international economic
environment had changed radically since 1980, and that several major sources of
foreign exchange, available in the 1960s and 1970s to these import-dependent
economies, would be less bountiful in the future (Zuvekas 1997:3).[23]
This section seeks to identify some of the major changes likely to
occur in the global, hemispheric, and regional economic environments over the
next two decades, and to consider how these trends might affect the structure
of production in Central America. The
region has basically accepted the challenges of globalization; but not all
countries are well prepared to meet these challenges.
B. The Global Economy
One can conceive a rosy scenario for the first two decades of the 21st
century, based on rapid technological progress (e.g. in telecommunications,
biotechnology, environmentally-friendly energy, and transport) and on favorable
economic policies in the OECD countries, China, East and South Asia, Latin
America, and the transition economies of Europe and Asia.[24] Even a few thorns among the roses (e.g.
civil wars, localized cross-border conflicts, AIDS, and occasional financial
crises) would not prevent a generally positive economic outcome. The OECD's high-growth scenario (1997:92)
envisions average annual world economic growth of 5.0% in the first decade of
the new century and 4.9% in the second.
On the other hand, one could paint a rather grim picture of the next
two decades in which the world is dominated by protectionism; other backsliding
on economic policy; major regional and even global financial crises; the
reignition of armed conflict in areas where peace has been achieved; and
generalized social and political unrest that reflects such factors as increased
income inequalities and decreased personal security, and that could reverse the
present trend away from authoritarianism toward democracy.
An intermediate position is represented by the OECD's (1997:92)
low-growth scenario, which envisions world GDP growing at an average annual
rate of 3.1% in 2001-2010 and 2.8% during 2011-2020.
This paper leans toward a favorable outcome for the world economy,
reflecting the author's optimistic long-run worldview, however much he might be
concerned about short-term events.
Still, it is important to bear in mind what is presented below is a
series of speculations, not projections.
1. Trade
[-- Prospects
for WTO reforms, drawing on Croome (1998); Díaz-Bonilla and Robinson (1999);
Lawrence, Rodrik, and Whalley (1996); Preeg (1998); Rodrik (199x); and other
studies.]
[--
Includes brief discussion of labor standards, environmental concerns,
and competition policy as likely elements of trade agreements.]
2. Financial Flows
[--
See OECD (1997); IDB studies; others]
3. Technological Progress
[--
This section will draw on OECD (1998), among other studies]
[-- telecommunications
-- biotechnology
-- energy
-- transport]
4. World Economic Growth and Patterns of
Demand for Central America's Exports
-- agricultural products
[--
Based in part on IFPRI documents]
-- manufactured goods
[-- See OECD (1997); other studies]
-- services
World trade in services grew by 8.7% annually between 1980 and 1995,
nearly double the 4.5% annual growth rate for merchandise trade (OECD 1997:37).[25]
The OECD (1997:38) has estimated that, in terms of technical
feasibility, some 12%-16% of service jobs in the G7 countries could be shifted
abroad. Assuming that it would be
economically attractive for about 10% of such jobs to move overseas, "as
of 1990 the potential additional exports from developing countries to the G7
was estimated at around $40 billion (or 6 per cent of non-OECD countries' total
exports)."
Within Central America only Costa Rica [and perhaps Panama?]
have begun to tap into this potential in any significant way. For example, in June 1999 Proctor and Gamble
announced that it would invest $60 million to build a Global Business Services
center in Costa Rica, employing about 1,500 persons in services related to
finance and accounting, customer orders, payroll, travel management,
purchasing, and information technology.[26]
C. Toward a Free Trade Area
of the Americas
[--
Brief discussion of prospects for the FTAA and implications for Central
America]
D. Strengthening Central
American Economic Integration
[--
Perhaps 1-2 paragraphs, drawing on other CA2020 papers.]
IV. DESIRABLE ECONOMY-WIDE
AND SECTORAL REFORMS
A. Overview
The process of economic development is too complex for economists to
tackle by themselves. The widening
inequalities associated with Latin American countries' recovery from the debt
crisis of the 1980s (Berry 1997; Bulmer-Thomas 1996) have made clear that blind
faith in markets is misplaced.
Successful, sustainable responses to the challenges of globalization
require national strategies focused, in an integrated manner, on four
interrelated goals: (1) economic growth, (2) poverty reduction, (3)
environmental protection, and (4) participatory democracy. In addition, deeper and broader regional
integration can make the Central American countries' participation in the world
economy more effective.
B. Economic Growth
Economic growth is not just an end in itself. It is the most important factor contributing to poverty reduction
over the long run; it facilitates (but does not guarantee) the solution of some
environmental problems (while aggravating others); and it can create (but again
not guarantee) opportunities for more people to participate in democratic
processes that encompass far more than free and fair elections.
A key determinant of economic growth is the amount and productivity of
investment, and in particular private investment. While governments still have a key role to play in providing
basic infrastructure, it is now widely accepted that private investors are
generally more efficient than bureaucrats as enterprise managers. Since 1980 Central American governments, to
varying degrees, have privatized or dismantled many state enterprises,
receiving one-time payments for assets sold and eliminating the annual fiscal
burdens of operating (and capital) subsidies.
For some countries, the case for privatization extends beyond directly
productive activities to encompass infrastructure. Heavily indebted Honduras and Nicaragua, in particular, have
little capacity to provide new basic infrastructure because of insufficient domestic
resources and their inability to contract non-concessional external loans.[27] In order to achieve more than moderate
economic expansion over the next two decades, they will have to both increase
public savings rates and permit greater private investment in infrastructure.
Macroeconomic policy. An essential
requirement for stimulating private investment--and both private and public
savings--is a sound macroeconomic policy that avoids large imbalances, both
internally (fiscal accounts) and externally (current account of the balance of
payments). The key requirement here is
to achieve good performance, not for just a few years, but on a reasonably
consistent basis over time. In the
words of the OECD's 2020 document (1997:16):
"Stable and sustainable macroeconomic policy will be a precondition
for taking full advantage of the opportunities provided by globalisation, as
well as for successful structural reform."
Macroeconomic stability minimizes domestic inflationary pressures and
exchange-rate fluctuations, reducing risks and uncertainties faced by private
investors.[28] It is also worth noting that controlling
inflationary pressures is particularly beneficial for the poor.[29]
Albert Fishlow (1997:405) has observed that Latin American countries
have finally learned the importance of responsible fiscal and monetary policy
as a central condition for economic development." In Central America, Costa Rica absorbed this
lesson much sooner than its neighbors, initiating in the latter half of 1982 a
major program (implemented gradually) of macroeconomic stabilization and
structural adjustment. Guatemala
followed in 1986, while El Salvador (1989), Honduras (1990), Nicaragua (1991)
were late converts. [Identify dates
for Panama and Belize.]
Implementation of macroeconomic stabilization programs in Central
America has not always proceeded smoothly.
Costa Rica has lost macroeconomic discipline on several occasions, and
fiscal laxity in Honduras in 1992-93 contributed to a severe recession in
1994. Nevertheless, in nearly all such
cases, macroeconomic discipline was restored relatively quickly, and in general
fiscal and monetary policy in the 1990s has been much better than in the 1980s. While macroeconomic policy can still be
improved, it seems unlikely to be a major obstacle to Central American economic
growth in the next two decades.
Financial-sector reforms.
[--
Recent Asian crisis illustrates importance of reforms in this area.]
[--
See Kaminsky and Reinhart re relationship between financial
liberalization, banking crises, and currency crises.]
[--
Pension reform.]
Reform of the State.
"Privatisation, the legal
framework for enterprises, regulatory reform and tax and competition policy are
all important areas for reform efforts.
In conjunction with strong macroeconomic policies and financial
management, reforms in these areas will lay the bases for internationally-competitive
domestic enterprises and help attract FDI [foreign direct investment], thus
building up the linkages with the global economy" (OECD 1997:20).
[--
Also important: improving the efficiency and efficacy of government
programs, especially in the social sectors.]
Sectoral policies.
[-- agriculture]
[-- manufacturing]
[-- maquila operations]
[--
Need for a long-run strategy to begin converting maquila
operations into true manufacturing activities]
[-- tourism]
[-- other services]
C. Equity
[-- investment in human capital]
[-- better-targeted subsidies]
[-- improved
access by poor households to the factors of production]
D. Environmental
Sustainability
[-- green, blue, and brown issues]
[-- disaster preparedness]
[-- importance
of attention to this area for access to the FTAA]
E. Participatory Democracy
[-- consolidating electoral reforms]
[-- improved
administration of justice]
-- including
fair administration of legislation regarding property rights
[-- personal security issues]
[-- decentralization of government programs]
-- as
a practical solution, not one driven by religious zeal
[-- strengthening civil society]
-- including
social auditing of development programs
[-- equality of opportunity for women and
minority groups]
[-- freedom
of association (for labor unions, peasant organizations, etc.]
F. Regional Economic
Integration
[-- Incorporation of the agricultural and
services sectors]
[-- Access
to the FTAA is likely to be more feasible for Central America as a group than
for individual countries]
V. ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF CENTRAL AMERICA'S
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE IN 2020
[-- These visions will depend on:
-- The
performance of the world economy (the OECD's high-growth and low-growth
scenarios
-- The
extent of policy reform in Central America]
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
[To be added]
REFERENCES (Partial)
Ardito-Barletta,
Nicolás. "Investment Opportunities
in the Former Canal Zone." Balboa,
Pan.: Autoridad de la Región Interoceánica [ARI], June 1998.
Berry, Albert. "The Income Distribution Threat in
Latin America." Latin American
Research Review 32, No. 2 (1997):3-40.
Bulmer-Thomas,
Victor, ed. The New Economic Model
in Latin America and Its Impact on Income Distribution and Poverty. New York: St. Martin's Press, in association
with the Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1996.
_______. The Political Economy of Central America
since 1920. Cambridge, Eng.:
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Croome, John. "The Present Outlook for Trade
Negotiations in the World Trade Organization." Policy Research Working Paper 1992. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, October 1998.
Díaz-Bonilla,
Eugenio and Robinson, Sherman, eds.
"Getting Ready for the Millennium Round Trade
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Emmerij, Louis,
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in the Twenty-First Century.
Baltimore: Distributed by The
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Fishlow,
Albert. "Latin America in the XXI
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Honduras, República
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Económicas [UDAPE], August 1994.
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Social Progress in Latin America: 1989 Report. Washington, D.C., 1989.
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International
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Kaminsky, Graciela
L. and Reinhart, Carmen. "The Twin
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Lawrence, Robert
Z.; Rodrik, Dani; and Whalley, John. Emerging
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21st Century Technologies: Promises and Perils of a Dynamic Community. Paris, 1998.
_______. The World in 2020: Towards a New Global
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[Panama, Republic
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Paus, Eva. "Exports, Economic Growth and the
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Preeg, Ernest
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Reinhart, Carmen
and Wickham, Peter. "Commodity
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Siri, Gabriel, with
the collaboration of Vilma de Calderón.
"Uso productivo de las remesas familiares en El
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Zuvekas, Clarence,
Jr. "Alternative Perspectives on
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_______. "Changing Patterns in Central America's
Exports, 1980-1995." Revised
version of a paper presented at the 17th Annual Conference of the Middle
Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies, Bucknell University, Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania, March 29-30, 1996.
[1] Victor Bulmer-Thomas
(1987:185) has argued persuasively that the CACM was not intended to replace
the traditional export-led development model based on primary products
(overwhelmingly agricultural), and did not do so; it was simply grafted onto
the traditional model to form a "hybrid" model of industrialization. Agriculture's share of GDP in 1980 exceeded
that of manufacturing in all five CACM countries (percent of aggregate value
added in 1970 prices at factor cost):
Costa El Sal- Guate-
Hon- Nicar-
Rica vador mala
duras agua
Agriculture 19.2 30.2
27.7 25.1 25.7
Manufacturing 16.9 17.1
15.6 15.1 23.1
(Bulmer-Thomas 1987: Appendix Tables A.1, A.4,
and A.8, pp. 309, 315, and 323).
Agriculture's share of employment exceeded that of manufacturing by much
wider margins, reflecting the large average productivity differentials between
the two sectors.
[2] [Add Belize data.]
[3] Agriculture's share of
Panamanian GDP in 1980 (in 1988 dollars) was 9.9%, and that of manufacturing,
10.4% (IDB 1989: Appendix Tables B.1, B.7, and B.9, pp. 463, 467, and 468).
[4] [See data with 1962
base year.]
[5] Aggregate GDP fell by
19.0% between 1976-78 and 1987-89; the decline in per capita GDP was 29.1%.
[6] Aggregate GDP grew by
37.8% between 1987-89 and 1995-97, an annual increase of 4.1%.
[7] In current prices,
agriculture's share of GDP fell from 39.8% in 1976-78 to 20.0% in 1987-89 and
13.6% in 1995-97.
[8] Sectoral GDP shares
for the revised national accounts data are not quite comparable for 1970-89, on
the one hand, and 1990 onwards, on the other.
In the earlier years they are based on GDP at market prices rather than
factor cost (for which no data are available).
Beginning in 1990, sectoral GDP is based on "gross value
added." To arrive at GDP at market
prices from gross value added, imputed banking services are subtracted from
total gross value added (from all sectors combined), and indirect taxes are
added.
[9] The real effective
exchange rate appreciated by 47.4% between 1990 and 1997 (IMF 1998:103).
[10] The data problem resides
in the electricity sub-sector, where real value added is shown, implausibly, to
have declined by 71% between 1990 and 1991, and to have recovered to only 56%
of the 1990 level by 1997.
[11] [Compare with the
relative importance of utilities in other countries.]
[12] For a discussion of
external remittances, and proposals for channeling more of these inflows to
investment activities, see Siri and Calderón (1996).
[13] GDP in terms of
"gross value added" (see footnote above).
[14] The level of real
commercial activity is reported to have declined by 4.2% between 1978-80 and
1987-89, or by 26.4% per capita. By
contrast, real GDP (at factor cost) grew by 25.2% during this period, while
real per capita GDP fell by 3.8%.
[15] The current-price
shares were 65% in 1978-80, 61% in 1987-89, and 70% in 1995-97.
[16] Even before the
European Union imposed restrictions on imports of Honduran bananas, the
country's market share of Latin American and Caribbean banana exports to world
markets fell from 16% in 1988 to 8% in 1993 (Honduras 1994:5). Contributing to this decline were a fall in
labor productivity, due in part to work stoppages and other labor-relations
problems; increased costs of combating black sigatoka disease; and hurricane
damage in 1993.
[17] Value-added data by
sub-sector are available only through 1996.
[18] In current prices,
apparel accounted for 21.1% of value added in manufacturing in 1994-96,
compared to 9.5% in 1978-78.
[19] Hurricane Mitch did
relatively little damage to maquila production, in
contrast to its extensive damage to the agricultural sector. Losses of value added in maquila production have been estimated at $10 million in 1998 and $15 million
in 1999.
[20] Guatemala is the only
Central American country with any domestic petroleum production, and it is
dependent on imports for most of its petroleum requirements.
[21] Real non-oil commodity
prices fell by about 45% between 1980 and 1992. In the late 1980s and early 1990s they were lower than at any
other time in the 20th century. These
trends are documented by Reinhart and Wickham (1994), who conclude that most of
the real price decline since 1980 has been secular in nature.
[22] The nominal value of
intra-CACM trade fell by 65% between 1980 and 1986, and its real value fell by
69% (Zuvekas 1997:12).
[23] This theme is
discussed in more detail in Zuvekas (1992:137-142).
[24] The performance of
sub-Saharan Africa will have little effect on the global economy over the next
20 years, even if the region soon begins to grow rapidly. The Middle East/North Africa region will
basically follow global economic trends rather than make an independent
contribution to them. The OECD
(1997:80, 92), under its high-growth scenario, envisions this region as expanding
faster than the world economy, based on a significantly rising share of world
petroleum exports. On the other hand,
it is projected to underperform the world economy under a low-growth
scenario. Middle Eastern and North
African economies are highly vulnerable to technological changes that would
significantly reduce world demand for petroleum; these changes might well begin
to occur before 2020.
[25] "Trade in
services in considerably underestimated by current balance-of-payments
statistics which fail to reflect transactions like cross-border intra-firm
exchange of technology and financial advice, remote data processing and
transmission, and the revenue from services offered in the host country by
foreign affiliates of multinationals" (OECD 1997:37).
[26] Reported in Honduras
This Week (June 19, 1999), p. 4.
[27] Honduras and Nicaragua
are both seeking external debt relief under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) initiative and would be ineligible for HIPC if they contracted
non-concessional debt.
[28] The maintenance of
relatively sound macroeconomic policies over the course of a number of decades
is one reason why Colombia has continued to attract investors and to keep
growing in the face of debt and financial crises elsewhere in the region and
social and political turmoil at home.
[29] [Cite studies on
inflation in Brazil.]